Elaheh Koolaee
Introduction
Iranian-Russian relations have been subject to many changes within the past years. In the Cold War era, Iran belonged to an American-led capitalist camp. In the 1960s and 1970s, Iran’s geopolitics as well as geo-economic location contributed to a wide range of economic relations between the two countries. This relationship in the framework of the Soviet Union’s relations with a Third World country was a unique phenomenon itself.(1) After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar system, the relations between the two countries, which were affected by the Islamic Republic of Iran’s independent rhetoric, kept fluctuating. During the Iran-Iraq eight-year war, Russian leaders supported both Tehran and Baghdad in different ways, and pushed them to the termination of the war.(2) Geographical proximity of the two countries has made both Tehran and Moscow pay attention to the expansion of their bilateral relations. This factor, throughout history in both countries, contributed to different mutual social, economic and political relations.(3) With the collapse of the Soviet Union and appearance of Russian Federation, their relations entered a new phase.
After the collapse of the communist regime and with respect to the dominant Western outlook in Russian foreign policy, which apart from 14 former Soviet Republics gave the first priority to Euro-Atlantic relations in its foreign policy, Iran was evaluated as a centre of Islamic threat.(4) West-oriented politicians represented clearly by Andrei Kosyrev gave priority to Russia’s relations with the United States and Europe in Russian foreign policy.(5) Kosyrev offered a foreign policy concept to Russian parliament, which in spite of some of ambiguities, contained this specific orientation. The Council for Foreign and Defense Policy of Russia attacked this approach, and with pointing to friendly and unfriendly governments around Russia, asked them to consider specific characteristics of the country with ∫ of its territory being located in Asia.(6) The Presence of more than 25 million Russians abroad has been one of the most important subjects for ‘New Eurasianism’ in the country. They emphasize using Russian capabilities in order to achieve specific goals, which certainly are not compatible with those of the United States and seek an independent approach in the country’s foreign policy. Since Russian Federation’s relations with its neighbors transformed significantly, the need new changes in Russian foreign policy were highlighted.(7) Liberal Democratic Party’s victory led by Vladimir Zhirinovski in the 1993 parliamentary elections,(8) and the Communist Party’s rise under the leadership of Gennady Zyuganov in the 1995 parliamentary elections sent a clear signal to the Kremlin leaders that Russian foreign policy needs to be transformed considerably. With respect to new changes in Russian foreign policy, Yevgeny Primakov was a very influential person and an expert on Eastern affairs and secretary of Intelligent Foreign Service. He believed in the use of all tools and capacities in the country, which geographical factor was part of it. Primakov always stressed on the role of Russia in regional and world developments equal to that of the United States. Based on his outlook, Russian relations with the Middle Eastern nations, especially Iran and Iraq, could provide proper opportunities for the country’s interests.(9) According to this view, the importance of Russian relations with its neighboring republics (the Near Abroad) was highlighted, and in the course of post-Soviet developments, this region was assessed as a territory of vital interests to Russia.(10)
In parallel to developments in Russian Federation’s foreign policy, Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign policy also transformed enormously. In early years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was assumed that with return of millions of Muslims in Central Asia and the Caucasus and Russia’s Muslim Republics to the Muslim World, there would be a real chance for the establishment of Islamic governments across the region.(11) This unrealistic presumption seriously transformed the prospect of Islamic Republic of Iran’s relations with the newly independent Republics and Russia in Post-Soviet era. Civil war in Tajikistan and ethnic ties between Tajiks and Afghans created critical regional problems.(12) Domestic developments in these two countries even affected other Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan.(13) Therefore, the effective role that Iran played in bringing Tajikistan civil war to an end highlighted the importance of Iran’s crucial presence in keeping peace and stability in the region.(14) Meanwhile, it was realized that there was no chance for the expansion of an Islamic government model, because the majority of Central Asian Muslims were Sunnis. Before President Khatami came to power in Iran, negotiations about expanding cooperation between Iran and Russia had already started.(15) In summer 1997, Russian government which had faced with NATO eastward enlargement on the one hand, and serious Western objections to military operations against Chechen separatists on the other focused attention on relations with Iran in order to reinforce the new Eurasianist approach.(16) Russian newspaper, Segodnia, in spring 1995, wrote, “Cooperation with Iran is more important than economic benefits for Russian atomic industry. Iran as an enemy can provide Muslim insurgents in the Northern Caucasus and Tajikistan with arms, money and food; and Iran as our friend, can be an important strategic partner for us. NATO eastward enlargement has made U.S. look for a strategic ally. An anti-American and anti-Western government in Tehran can become our natural ally. To equip Iran with Russian arms, including latest submarines, anti-ballistic missiles and taking advantage of the Hormuz Strait’s strategic importance can strike a blow against the West. Russian weapons must help Iran in such a crisis.”(17) Ali Akbar Velayati, former Iranian foreign minister in his visit to Moscow in March 1996, had commented that Iran-Russia relations were on its peak in the recent era.(18)
Before Khatami’s presidency and in a situation of transformations in Russian foreign policy, and replacement of Euro–Atlantic approach with a new-Eurasianist attitude in Russian foreign policy, along with continuation of the crisis in Iran-U.S. relations, ties between Iran and Russia started its multilateral expansion course.(19) Pragmatism in Iran’s foreign policy, from the mid-1990s onwards, became more prominent that was a sign of increased capacities for expanding ties between the two countries. Iran’s restraint with regard to Russian suppression of Chechen separatists sent a clear message to Russian leaders.(20) Although Iranian officials always were talking about a peaceful settlement of conflicts in the Caucasus, their supportive stance on Chechnya was the herald of pragmatist dimensions in Iranian foreign policy. The role that Iran played in ending the civil war in Tajikistan was a clear indication for Kremlin about its constructive role to expand multilateral cooperation with Iran. Of course, Taliban’s victory was an important factor in accelerating the peace process in Tajikistan by itself.(21) In fact, Taliban’s quick rise as backed by the United States and Pakistan(22) was a reason that pushed Russians and Tajik oppositions to end the war. Iranian positive conduct in peace negotiation with the Tajik Oppositions was undeniable for Russian leaders. Previously Iran had tried to play an effective role in the Armenian-Azeri conflict in mountainous Karabakh,(23) which without Russian harmony was not successful.
Geopolitical Factors
After the Soviet collapse and the end of the Cold War, Moscow retreated into Russian Federation’s borders. Many of pro-Western Russian leaders started to search for Russian vital interests not in former Soviet Republics but inside Russia’s borders.(24) From their perspective, newly independent republics started to search for their own goals and security. But the Civil War in Tajikistan, crisis in Karabakh, Moldova, and Georgia raised the importance of ties with the former Soviet Republics for Russian leaders.(25) Iran and Russia as neighbors countries of these Republics considered their common interests. The geopolitical vacuum resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union was filled with different players,(26) something that was reminder of Russian and British rivalry in the 19th century in West Asia referred to as the ‘Great Game’ by Rudyard Kipling. Iran and Russia were searching for social, economic and political interests in Central Asian Republics, thus took their immediate neighbors’ sensitivities into consideration. These Republics, which were in search of different relations with new partners, are landlocked. This feature has limited their efforts in finding new alternatives in Iran’s northern borders and south Russia’s frontiers.(27) Russian leaders who first were following the policy of integration into the American led political and economic system,(28) from the half of the 1990s, paid more attention to their own geographical peculiarities. In light of increasing importance of geopolitics in Russian foreign policy, the country’s attitude toward the Middle East, especially Iran transformed, and Iran’s importance in Russian foreign policy increased.(29)
Establishing Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Forum by Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is an indicator of Russian attention to its eastern borders.(30) Uzbekistan also joined this treaty in 1999. Iran also was granted observer status in 2005. Based on Russian geopolitical concerns, the Middle East regained its status in its foreign policy. From the mid-1990s, expansion of bilateral ties with Iran started(31) and continued Khatami’s era. Iran’s anti-American stances provided Russia with a proper capacity to set their talks in a way that can benefit from them in their relations with the United States. Alexander Dogin, an expert in geopolitical issues in Russia, has always emphasized Iran’s importance in Russian foreign policy. In his book, Geopolitics Basics, Dogin has stressed on special location of Iran in geographical map of Asia–European Continent. In his view, Russian cooperation with Iranian fundamentalists can facilitate relations between the two countries and turn Islam in Eurasia into a positive phenomenon.(32) From his point of view, Iran’s condemnation of terrorist activities in different parts of Russia has created a proper opportunity for presenting the differences between Islam and terrorist activities, which can contribute to reinforcement of world peace.
Russian increasing concerns about NATO’s eastward enlargement that caused Kremlin leaders to talk about revision of disarmament agreements, added to the importance of such relations in light of Iran’s anti-American rhetoric. Both countries faced American unilateralism, which, in the absence of the Soviet Union, was trying to establish a hegemonic world order. For Russians, expansion of ties with the Islamic Republic has become a nationalist sign in their foreign policy.(33) Earlier in 1993, Moscow tried to sell missile engines to India, then as a result of American pressures they retreated. But this trend, along with expanding relations with Iran in spite of American objections, changed.(34) This kind of independent conduct from Russia in the Post-Soviet era satisfied many Russians who felt humiliated in the new power play scene. In light of this Eurasian approach, Russian leaders have seriously envisaged the means to secure their interests independently.(35) Iran has also looked upon this change and its consequences as an opportunity for reducing Western notably U.S. pressures against itself. As a result of growth of this approach, securing various Russian interests in Iran has become a foreign policy priority.
Washington’s decision in May 1995 to suspend Iran’s legal efforts for concluding oil and gas contracts with the French Oil Company TOTAL and the Russian Oil Company Gazprom, which were signed for exploitation of an Iranian natural gas field, was in fact an indicator of change in American foreign policy.(36) Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) ratified in 1996 in U.S Congress led to serious protests by many American as well as European companies. As result of President Khatami’s interview with CNN, Washington came to the conclusion that a prospect of change in Iran-U.S. relations was within the reach.(37) Any rapprochement in U.S.-Iran relations could have an effect on Iran-Russia cooperation trend. But soon it became clear that there was no strength inside the reformist camp in Iran for making such changes. Khatami who participated in the World Leaders Summit in UN General Assembly, because of Bill Clinton’s presence, even did not take part in world leaders’ photo session. U.S. President as well as Secretary of State’s later efforts in this regard did not gain any respond from the Iranian President.(38) Iranian 6th parliamentary elections even raised Russian concerns about this matter more than before. Many of the reformist elements within the Islamic government had come to the conclusion that continuation of Iran-U.S. conflict was not useful for American and Iranian peoples. But this did not last long too. The reformist parliament very soon made it clear that it does not have actual intention for a real breakthrough in Iran–U.S. relations. In this manner, Russia with increased confidence pursued the continuation of productive cooperation with Iran.
Military Cooperation
Contrary to the early years of Russian Federation’s appearance when the country’s foreign policy was dominated by the pro-Western leaders, who viewed the Islamic Republic as a threat and “Islamic threat agent”,(39) expansion of relations with the Islamic Republic, in light of this new Eurasianist perspective, was pursued. After China and India, Iran was the third arm purchaser from Russia, and the purchase of Iran’s needed equipment continued. Arms deals with Iran had started during the Iran-Iraq war and continued in the post-Soviet era. Between 1999 and 2000, three submarines, more than 200 T-72 tanks, 10 Sokho and 8 Mig 29 airplanes were among the arms delivered to Iran.(40) Russia has allowed Iran to produce some kind of military equipments. Presence of a large number of Russian military advisors in Iran is a proof, while Western countries rejected to supply Iranian needed arms. Different advanced weaponry is among delivered arms and equipments to Iran in order to fulfill Iran’s defense needs.(41) Dispatch of Iranian military personnel to Russia for training is an indicator of this expanded cooperation. This trend continued in Khatami’s era. Presence of Russian experts from public and private sectors, in the framework of bilateral military cooperation, has increased.(42) Iran-Russia military cooperation against developing military cooperation between the United States and Turkey is a kind of reconstruction of the Cold War era’s stereotypes. Both countries have undertaken a negative approach to American and Turkish increased presence in the Caspian Sea, where they were dividing its resources (however unequally) between themselves. Expansion of the ‘New Great Game’ in the Caspian basin has made Iran-Russia military cooperation more prominent.(43)
Continuation of the conflict between Iran and the United States and Israel helped to realization of Iran-Russia military cooperation. It is noteworthy that Russia and Israel have also experienced multilateral developing cooperation.(44) In 1995, with the aim of putting pressures on Iran, the United States shaped Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement in order to limit export of military equipments and advanced weaponry to Iran.(45) Although the two sides had different views on this matter, the Russian side believed that these limitations covered missiles and nuclear technologies, while the U.S. wanted to generalize it to all kind of advanced weapons. From Clinton’s point of view, this agreement had to prevent modernization and reinforcement of Iran’s military might. But Russian leaders, in the framework of their economic and strategic interests, pursued military deals with Iran covering conventional weapons. This agreement later was cancelled by Vladimir Putin,(46) and Russia tried to continue the expansion of military relations with Iran. This opportunity could provide Russia both with bargaining chip at the negotiation table with the U.S. and enormous economic benefits. Given that both sides (the U.S. and Russia) disagreed on the content of this agreement, its abolition paved the way for improvement of Iran-Russia ties. Russian officials tried to play an effective role in modernization of Iran’s military forces in order to take advantage of its economic, political and strategic outcomes. Iranian military forces’ access to Russian’s advanced military systems provided them with an opportunity to satisfy their arms needs. Given Russia’s economic problems, military contracts with Iran brought them good reputation as well as considerable economic gains.(47) Iran’s access to advanced nuclear and missile technology in the framework of this cooperation has been one of the most important concerns of the West.(48) Of course, Russia has always defined this cooperation as a fulfillment of Iran’s defense needs based on the international commitments.(49) Although some of the pro-West elements in Russia have criticized this cooperation, the Russian leaders have attached importance to its different dimensions. However by reinforcement of federal control on all institutions which are working partners of Iran, Putin has been able to respond to all of these concerns and has described Iranian efforts in this domain in line with peace and stability in the region.(50)
Nuclear Cooperation
Confrontation of Russia and America, especially with regard to completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, for which none of the Western countries provided any help, has entered a new phase. Russian officials have always put emphasis on controlled and peaceful nature of Iranian activities.(51) Russia has denied all allegations about production of ballistic missiles for Iran. Some evidence of cooperation between Iran and Ukraine has been reported in this field. U.S. officials have always repeated their allegation about Iran’s aims to complete the Busheher power plant with the help of Russians in order to access to nuclear weapons.(52) Some of the Russian experts attribute U.S. pressure to economic losses of America in this project. From their perspective, Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran resembles American nuclear cooperation with North Korea, which has been promised by the U.S. instead of ending its nuclear program. For Russians, Iran’s readiness to international inspections has always been a proof of her transparent conduct in this respect.(53) Nonetheless, continuous cooperation between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been formed.(54) Some of Americans have accused Russia of helping Iran with its nuclear military aims, but they have been unable to show any proven document for their claim. U.S. and Israel have always voiced their concerns about the completion of Iranian missiles technology as well.(55)
Contrary to noticeable expansion of military cooperation between the two countries, Russian National Security Secretary officially called these information leaks about technology exports very harmful to Russian security.(56) Afterwards, Russians have always emphasized its commitments on this matter. Natan Sharansky, Israel’s Commerce and Industry Minister, a former Soviet dissident, who has immigrated to Israel, blamed Russia for failure to paying enough attention to cases of missile technology deliveries to Iran.(57) Israel-Russia relations have consistently expanded in the post-Soviet era and presence of one million Russians in Israel has created proper capacity for their bonds.(58) In response to these allegations, Russian officials have always rejected them. As a result of Russian Defense Minister’s visit to Tehran in summer 2000, mutual military relations raised to higher level.
Then both countries agreed on a regular and continuous timetable for exchange of ideas about the military matters of interest. Based on some reports, they pursued their common interests in three domains.(59) First, the U.S. increasing influence and presence in the South Caucasus. Russia traditionally has considered the South Caucasus as its vital interests’ domain.(60) Second, balanced Power in the Middle East with respect to internal developments, Palestinian resistance and expansion of Intifada waves; and third, unclear and ambiguous developments in Afghanistan. For Russia, Iran is a country that could play a positive role in Russia’s Middle East policy. Some American exports believe that Russia is using Iran as a buffer zone against the U.S.(61) After Iranian Shahab missile was tested in summer 1998, American propaganda campaign against Russia increased. The U.S. accused Russia of helping Iran’s missile program. In a C.I.A report in the same year, Russia was accused of helping Iranians to achieve nuclear technologies for their military goals.(62) Following the release of this report, the U.S. punished a Russian company. In respect to Russian economic needs, this kind of cooperation could provide Russia with a better opportunity at the bargaining table with the U.S.(63) Slow process of construction of the Bushehr power plant is a good indicator of their non-confidential conduct towards ending this project. For many Russian political analysts and given energy and nuclear power pressure groups, this cooperation will not stop.(64) The real problem is how to transfer them and how to exchange. Russia clearly, in confrontation with the U.S. and in search of its interests, is pursuing Mini-max policy towards Iran: increasing its influence in Iran, and at the same time, reducing its negative effects on U.S.-Russia relations.
Economic Cooperation
Contrary to military-political cooperation between Iran and Russia, their economic cooperation and business extrados, in spite of noticeable capacities, has not increased. International situation and U.S. efforts to create a hegemonic world order have pushed Russia and Iran closer to each other. With respect to expansion of Eurasianist orientations and rise in importance of the Middle East and Asian countries in Russian foreign policy, Iran has experienced improved economic-military relations with Russia. Their common political-security interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus have accelerated this trend.(65) Russian Federation possesses advanced technology and skilled experts in different fields, so has high capabilities for expansion of cooperation with Iran. But Russia has not fully taken advantage of these capabilities, partly because their technical cooperation has been more focused on military aspects.(66) Russia has a high capability to fulfill many of Iran’s technical needs. Although Iran-Russia economic and technical ties developed, they did no reach its proper level. Both countries’ experiences in these fields brought them considerable achievements.(67) Since 1997, economic relations between Iran and Russia have increased. Both countries are dependent on their oil revenues, and oil price has an immediate impact on their economies. Both of them have vast natural gas resources, and both supported the idea for a separate organization-similar to OPEC- to set policies for gas production. In 1997, bilateral trade volume between two countries had a 40% increase. Russia has exported shipments worth $490 million and Iran has exported merchandise to Russia worth $100 million. These figures indicate that they have huge capacities for cooperation in their bilateral economic relations.
Since 1990, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, economic ties between them have not increased at a rate proportionate with their real trade capabilities and technical ties.(68) Since March 1998 ‘Iran-Russia Commission for Economic and Trade Cooperation’ has increased its activities. They have signed many agreements in support of investments and cooperation in communication field and double tax avoidance. Cooperation of littoral cities of the Caspian Sea with Iran also expanded. Many meetings of local and national Iranian officials with the Tatarestan, Kalmickia and Astarakhan officials set the goals for more regional economic cooperation between them. Due to absence of necessary political will and misunderstandings among Iranian executive elites about Russian economic-technical capabilities, there has not been any serious effort to remove obstacles in favor of further economic ties.On the other side, many decision-makers in Russia too have focused their efforts on Iran largely from political-military and even strategic considerations. One of the main obstacles to advancing economic- technical cooperation includes their misunderstandings about each other’s capability. Although in March 2001, during President Khatami’s visit to Moscow, a number of agreements were signed, because of historical Western tendencies in both countries, the possibilities of exploitation of economic-technical capacities have not yet been actualized. In airplane manufacturing sector and its related branches, cooperation of the two sides concerning fulfillment of Iranian industries’ needs have reached desirable dimensions. Their cooperation in gas and oil sector has become directly connected to the Caspian affairs.
The Caspian Sea Challenges
After disintegration of the Soviet Union into 15 independent Republics and transformation of the two coastal states into five, exploitation of the Caspian resources entered into new multilateral disputes with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Before that, Iran-Soviet relations in the Caspian Sea were based on the 1921 and 1940 agreements.(69) Although the provisions of these agreements were not fully executed, both countries, in practice, had agreed on mutual exploitation of the Caspian resources. Russia did not allow foreign countries to enter the region in that period. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caspian Sea became the arena of a new ‘Great Game’.(70) Multinational oil companies in hope of access to vast energy resources in this region, which were generously estimated at about 20-30bn barrels of oil, began their efforts. Regional countries in search of necessary international support in order to protect their interests against Russia encouraged the penetration of their influential supporters into the region.(71)
Since the early years of the post-Soviet era, Iran and Russia have emphasized shared exploitation of the Caspian resources. After the emergence of new independent states, they initially agreed on validity of that legal regime in the Caspian Sea. But very soon Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan tried to pave the way for other great players’ entry into the region in order to reduce Iran’s and Russia’s influences.(72) Iran and Russia have constantly condemned their efforts. But in 1988, Russia and Kazakhstan reached a separate agreement on the division of the Caspian line along their borders.(73) So Iran remained alone in emphasizing the preservation of the legal regime (of the Soviet era). Russians repeated this deal with Azerbaijan in 2001.(74) Iran protested to these agreements and called them illegitimate. Although the Khatami government tried to remove disagreements between Iran and Russia in a ‘cautious way’, it was because of some of the parliament representatives, including this author, protested that led the government dealing with the Caspian issues with more sensitivities. Establishment of a committee consisting of parliament representatives for monitoring the process of new Caspian legal regime was in fact a symbol of Islamic parliament’s concern for such basic arguments.(75) In the Ashgabat Summit, capital of Turkmenistan, in 2002, in the midst of George Bush’s criticism of Iran calling it part of the ‘Axis of Evil’, the Turkmen government tried to impose an imaginary Husseyngholy-Astara line on Iran, and sought the continuation of negotiations between four former Soviet Republics, namely 4+1 model.
But some of the Iranian parliamentarians protested to conduct of these coastal states in the Caspian Sea. President Khatami opposed to these attempts and efforts to collect all the maps depicting this hypothetical border line in the summit place caused Iran’s President postpone his trip half a day. But in this Summit, contrary to 4 former Soviet Republics’ perspectives, Iran’s President, in defense of Iran’s interests, did not retreat from country’s legal stances. This summit, which was the first (and the last up to now) one in the post-Soviet era, practically came to an end without any Results.(76) It was in this summit that Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan’s differences surfaced. Iran and Azerbaijan failed to agree on the limits of their interests in the Caspian Sea. Azerbaijan’s government in 1993 had declared itself owner of part of the Caspian Sea, which was supported by the U.S.(77) Russia declared a military maneuver following this summit that made political experts interpret it as confrontation between Iran and Russia. Many analysts believed that curbing Azerbaijan -and not Iran- was the main aim of Russia. By pointing to terrorism, drug trafficking and Caviar smuggling, Mr. Putin called this military maneuver a necessity. Then Azerbaijan established security cooperation with Turkey and Georgia in Trabozan in Turkey. Turkish Defense Minister declared provision of security for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline and Tbilisi-Baku as the main reason for this security cooperation. American representative in the region clearly supported Azerbaijan. After the Ashgabat Summit, Turkmenistan insisted on the necessity of peaceful resolution of the differences, and declared its readiness for continuation of negotiations. Kazakhstan, which had always followed very careful and sensitive relations with Russia, also called for continuation of the negotiations. However, the Ashgabat Summit showed that the new ‘Great Game’ in the Caspian Sea was very complex.(78)
The September 9th attack on the U.S., in fact, made Russia and the U.S. come closer together in the war on terror. Iran, which at the same time had insisted on a 20% share and preservation of the Soviet era legal regime, was unable to take advantage of its geopolitical supremacy. These problems continued in the Khatami era. The framework of Iran’s foreign policy largely based on confrontation with U.S. provided regional rivals with proper grounds especially in the arena of the new ‘Great Game’ in the Caspian Sea.(79) From this perspective, Iran is the only country in the world that can provide an economic and straight path for the access of the Caucasian and Central Asian Republic to the world high seas.(80) This fact has a negative effect on Russian exclusive interests in making access for these republics.Russia is not happy with this communicative role of Iran, but has preferred it to the expansion of U.S. influence in this region. Russia, since the Soviet days, has benefited from its transit role in providing connection between the Caspian basin republics and world markets. Shifts in transit routes and finding new trade partners, which could reduce Russian influence, have been one of the important debates in the post-Soviet era. There is no doubt that Russia does not prefer this trend, but expansion of Iran’s influence has been considered as less costly than western rivals’. It was in Khatami’s era that geopolitical concerns in the post–Soviet era became more visible. This trend, since 2001 in President Khatami’s second term in office, in the interim changes in the management of foreign ministry conducts with regard to Russia and Central Eurasia was formed which led to further expansion of bilateral relations.(81)
The issue of oil and gas pipelines for transferring the region’s energy has been one of the important questions related to the Caspian legal regime. Russian traditional route could lead to the revival of its influence among regional republics, something unfavorable to the U.S. and Europe. Eastern route toward China is a very long and expensive one, and southern route, i.e. Iran, has always been rejected by the United States. The U.S. has supported a very highly expensive Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline,(82) a route that passes through Georgia and Turkey and will impose heavy costs on the environment. This project has raised too many discussions. In order to ensure security in Afghanistan and to isolate Iran, the U.S. supported Taliban in Afghanistan as well.(83) The September 11th events in the U.S. were the outcome of Taliban’s sovereignty in Afghanistan. In Khatami’s era, Iranian Parliament’s pressures on the Foreign Ministry led to change of management in its external conducts in regard to oil swap, and establishment of port facilities in the Caspian coast, something that was not done before. The relations with the U.S. in Khatami’s era did not change, and the course of confrontation between the two countries continued, thus opportunities for regional republics particularly Russia to gain from Iran’s situation remained intact. Therefore, early Russian fears that reformist policies in the government and the parliament might bring a change in Iran-U.S. relations were removed.
Central Asia and the Caucasus
For Russia, unlike the early years of newly independent republics, Iran’s presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia is not interpreted as an Islamic threat. Iran tried to play a positive role in Tajikistan peace negotiations and Karabakh conflict resolution. When Iran was the head of the Organization of Islamic Conference, its role in dealing with the suppression of Chechen separatists continued. In his visit to the region Kamal Kharazi, Iran’s former Foreign Minister, emphasized peaceful settlement of the conflicts and criticized Russian conduct.(84) This, in fact, was the most favorable conduct which Russians could have expected from Iran. Expansion of military-political relations between the two countries was the only alternative left for Iran. Developments in the post-Soviet era and Iran’s pragmatist polices respecting the Caucasus and Central Asia made it clear for Russia that priorities in Iran’s relations in the region are commercial and cultural. When the Taliban took power in Afghanistan in 1996, concerns for growing Islamic tendencies in Central Asia increased.(85) Some factors such as violent actions in Tashkent, suicide bombing in February 1999 in Kyrgyzstan and other operations made this danger more visible. Regional leaders pointed to Uzbekistan Islamic Movement (IMU) as the suspect.(86) Earlier, regional countries (except Turkmenistan) in 1996 had created the Shanghai Forum in order to contain terrorist acts. After the September 11th events, these concerns were heightened.(87)
Iran-Russia cooperation to protect the Northern Front, opposition forces against the Taliban in Afghanistan, helped the U.S. to topple the Taliban regime.(88) Terrorist events in the United States paved the way for Russia and regional leaders, alongside the United States, to use the ‘War on Terror’ as a tool for defusing their oppositions’ criticism. Iran and Russia, which had experienced terrorist attacks in their territories, after the 9/11 events expanded their efforts on this matter. But their relations with the U.S. that had tried to conduct this war were not the same. War on Terror created a different situation for them. In spite of Iran-Russia’s effective cooperation with the U.S. in overthrowing the Taliban, the U.S. resumed its hostile charges against Iran. Russia’s effort for completion of the Bushehr power plant for energy production purposes faced U.S. increased objection. Affected by the 9/11 events, discussions of Iran’s nuclear program entered a new era, but Russia continued its support with a mixture of economic, political, technical and geopolitical interests.(89)
The amount of services, and military and technical purchases by Iran from Russia, as its third trade partner, has reached $4bn. Bilateral relations in the end of the 1990s enlarged in a way that Iran became Russia’s closest ally in the Middle East.(90) In the meantime, CIA has accused Russia of collaborating with Iran in order to upgrade its missile systems.(91) Russian Defense Minister’s visit to Iran and Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani’s comments on the two countries’ decision to deepening and expansion of defense, security and military cooperation was a troubling statement for the U.S. Russian senior officials expanded the possibility of Iran’s military forces’ training in Russia. At the beginning of 2001, the U.S. and Russia were trapped in a difficult situation about NATO eastward enlargement and the plan for abolition of the agreement about IBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles). Therefore, for Russia the relationship with Iran was highly important that could offer suitable opportunity for bargaining in its relation with the United States.
In spite of positive aspects of reciprocal relations, the question of exploitation of the Caspian legal regime has already disrupted this relationship. As pointed out previously, Khatami’s visit to Moscow in March 2001 and conclusion of many agreements paved the way for further improvement of their relations. However Iran did not accept agreements among Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan for dividing the Caspian, and called them illegal.(92) Iranian military forces stopped the operations of a British Petroleum’s exploratory ship, and warned Azerbaijan’s government to halt its activities in Iran’s 20% share zone (in the case of division). Azerbaijan, with the help of U.S., publicly tried to execute his views about exploitation of the Caspian resources. Meanwhile, Iran-Russia cooperation in the military field has continued to expand. Sergei Ivanov’s visit to Tehran has been a sign of Russian emphasis on transfer of military systems to Iran. U.S. and Russian cooperation against terrorism made Iran anxious, but after a while it became clear that the U.S., unlike Russian expectation, is not willing to leave the region (Central Asia). Uzbekistan-U.S. increasing cooperation and expansion of U.S. military presence and influence in Central Asia added to Russian concerns, a fact that in turn helped to strengthen Russia-Iran relations. In the course of American pressures on Iran’s nuclear program, Russia frequently emphasized peaceful nature of this program and supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), thus rejecting American hostile stances. Different technical, economic and political gains from Iran-Russia nuclear cooperation, under the IAEA supervision, provide Russia with an opportunity to employ Western achievements in its nuclear industry. This is such an advantageous gain that has made Russia resist American pressures. Putin has been criticized by the U.S. and Europe for his resistance to democracy and the U.S. alleged cases of human rights violation in Iran. He has always rejected the U.S. claims about the development of mass destruction weapons in Iran. Russia has tried to play a positive role in the process of regional development. The Middle East peace has gained priority in Russian foreign policy agenda. In his last meeting with Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s former nuclear negotiator, Russian Defense Minister emphasized peaceful purposes of Iran’s nuclear program, and called for the use of diplomacy as the best way for ending the crisis.(93)
Conclusion
Iran-Russia relations went through a period of West-centered orientation in Russia foreign policy, which later gave place to Eurasianist perspectives. The Eurasianist perspective paved the way for the improvement of mutual relations. This trend in President Khatami’s era steadily expanded. Iran’s foreign policy after independence of the Caucasian and Central Asian Republics focused upon pragmatism, and economic-social cooperation with those nations. This fact has paved the way for expanded relations between the two countries. Iran-Russia cooperation in ending the war in Tajikistan displayed Iran’s constructive role to insure Russian security needs. Iran’s effective capacity in Russian military considerations recurred in the Caucasus. The Taliban’s rule and emergence of a common enemy in Afghanistan provided the grounds for further political-military cooperation between them.
The Collapse of the Soviet Union and American efforts to create a hegemonic order in the world brought Iran and Russia closer together. This trend continued in President Khatami’s era reinforced by U.S. efforts to contain Russia in its borders and widening the gap between America and Russia. In spite of increasing Iran-Russia military-political cooperation, economically they have not taken full advantage of their real capacities. Although their nuclear cooperation has reached a higher level, in this field political concerns have also prevailed. Possessing vast political and technical resources, Russia has continued its nuclear cooperation with Iran under the IAEA supervision. Nevertheless, continued American presence in Central Asia after the collapse of the Taliban’s regime in Afghanistan has posed new challenges to Russia. This unacceptable policy pursued by the U.S. in turn helps Iran-Russia relations to expand. The Caspian unresolved questions, however, concerning the exploitation of its resources has become an obstacle to the further promotion of bilateral ties. At the same time, ignoring Iran’s interests in the Caspian will have a negative impact on such relations.
Notes:
1. See Elaheh Koolaee, Soviet Union and Islamic Revolution, Tehran: Center for Islamic Revolution Documents, 1980.
2. Robert O. Freedman, “Gorbachev, Iran and the Iran-Iraq War,” Trans. Elaheh Koolaee, Journal of Foreign Policy (in Persian), Vol. 7, No. 2, Summer 1997.
3. These developments have been very variant in the past two centuries, but the October Revolution caused it to resurface in a new form. Although there has not been any serious change in content.
4. See Elaheh Koolaee, Politics and Government in Russian Federation, (Chapter Seven), Second Edition, Tehran: IPIS, 2006.
5. Suzanne Crow, “Competing Blueprints for Russian Foreign Policy,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) (Research Report), Vol. 1, No. 50, 18 December 1992, pp. 45-50.
6. Ibid., p. 48.
7. See Elaheh Koolaee, Politics and Government in Central Asia, Tehran: Samt Publications, 1997, pp. 123-126.
8. Suzanne Crow, “Why Has Russian Foreign Policy Changed?” RFE/RL Research Report [Munich], Vol. 3, No. 18, 7 May 1994, pp. 3-4.
9. Stephan Blank, “Russian’s Return to Middle East Diplomacy,” Orbis, Vol. 9, No. 4, Fall 1996, pp. 517-519.
10. Ibid.
11. See Koolaee, Politics and Government in Central Asia, Chapter 2, op. cit.
12. See Elaheh Koolaee, “Security Ties between Afghanistan and Tajikistan,” Journal of the Caucasus and Central Asia Studies (in Persian), No. 38, Summer 2002, pp. 83-108.
13. Edward W. Walker, “Islam, Islamism and Political Order in Central Asia,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2, Spring 1993, pp. 35-38.
14. Oliver Roy, “The Iranian Policy toward Central Asia,” quoted in: http://www.eurasianet.org.regional/royoniran/html, 11/18/2008.
15. Robert O. Freedman, “Russian–Iran Relations in the 1990s,” MERIA Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2, June 2000, p. 6.
16. Alan Gersh, “Return of Russia to the Middle East, Perspective and Report,” Middle East Studies, No. 17, Spring 1999, pp. 189-201
17. Freedman, “Russian – Iran Relations in the 1990s,” op. cit., pp. 4-6.
18. IRNA, 7 March 1996.
19. Freedman, “Russian – Iran Relations in the 1990s,” op. cit., pp. 3-7.
20. Ibid.
21. See Elaheh Koolaee, “Russia Role and Influences in Tajikistan,” Economic-Political Ettelaat (in Persian), Nos. 119–120, August–September 1997, pp. 96-103; Roy, op. cit.
22. Ted Rall, “The New Great Game: Oil Politics in Central Asia,” Alternet, Oct. 11, 2001, quoted in: http://www.Alternet.org.storyhtml?story ID=11692, 11/20/2008.
23. See Svante Cornell, “NATO’s Role in South Caucasus Regional Security,” Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 2, May 2004.
24. See Koolaee, Politics and Government in Russian Federation, op. cit.
25. Ibid.
26. Oliver Roy, “Central Asia: Geopolitical Domain,” Trans. Abolfazleh Sadighi, Journal of Foreign Policy, Nos. 29-30, Winter & Spring 1999, pp. 100-101.
27. See Koolaee, Politics and Government in Central Asia, op. cit.
28. Mohiaddin Mesbahi, “Russian Foreign Policy and Security in Central Asia and the Caucasus,” Central Asia Survey, No. 12, 1993, pp. 181-85.
29. Ibid., pp. 210–215.
30. Alex Rasizade, “The Specter of a New Great Game in Central Asia,” Foreign Service Journal, Nov. 2003, p. 49.
31. See Elaheh Koolaee, “Russia, West and Iran,” The Caucasus and Central Asia Studies, No. 12, Winter 1995, pp. 75-94.
32. Professor Lee, “Iran and Russia Need a Comprehensive New Deal,” Iran Conference from Russian Perspective, 15–16 Oct 2001, Moscow, Trans. Islamic Republic Embassy, pp. 15.
33. Reinforcement of Eurasianist attitude and emphasis on necessity of expanding relations with Asian countries, especially the Middle East and Persian Gulf has been a contemplating subject in this framework; Blank, op. cit., pp. 517-518.
34. See Koolaee, “Russia, Iran and the West,” op. cit.
35. Roy, Central Asia: Geopolitical Domain, op. cit.
36. Gersh, op. cit., p. 196.
37. Ibid.
38. Madeline Albright, former U.S. Secretary of State clearly apologized for American involvement in the coup against Dr. Mohammad Mosadegh’s nationalist government in 1953.
39. See Koolaee, Politics and Government in Russian Federation, op. cit.
40. Oksana Antonenko, “Russian Military Involvement in the Middle East,” MERIA Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, March 2001, p. 5.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Amy Myers Jaffe and Robert A. Manning, “The Myth of the Caspian Great Game: The Real Cooperation of Energy,” Survival, Vol. 40, No. 4, Winter 1993-1999, pp. 115-122.
44. See Elaheh Koolaee, Reasons and Consequences of Expansion of Israel-Russia Relations, Tehran: Faculty of Law and Political Science, 2004.
45. Antonenko, op. cit., p. 6.
46. Ibid.
47. See Elaheh Koolaee, Politics and Government in Russian Federation, op .cit.
48. Robert O. Freedman, “Putin and the Middle East,” International Eurasia Institute for Economic and Political Research, Washington, Estados Unidos, 2003, p. 4.
49. Ibid., pp. 3-5.
50. Antonenko, op. cit., p. 6.
51. Gersh, op. cit., p. 196.
52. Freedman, “Putin and the Middle East,” op. cit., pp. 3-4.
53. This Issue has been expressed by Russian officials in response to American attacks.
54. Ibid.
55. Freedman, “Putin and the Middle East,” op. cit., pp. 3–4.
56. Antonenko, op. cit., p. 7.
57. Ibid.
58. See Koolaee, Reasons and Consequences of Expansion of Israel-Russia Relations, op. cit.
59. Freedman, “Putin and the Middle East,” op. cit., p. 4.
60. Ibid.
61. See Robert O. Freedman, Policy Brief, 12 June 2003, Middle East Institute.
62. Freedman, “Russia-Iran Relations in the 1990s,” op. cit., p. 9.
63. Ibid., p. 10.
64. Yevgeny, “Present Situation and Perspective of Expansion of Iran-Russian Economic-Commercial Relations,” Translation of Iran’s Papers from Russian Perspective, p. 22.
65. See Koolaee, Politics and Government in Central Asia, op. cit.
66. This is a point that has been criticized by Russian officials in bilateral talks in different levels. Experience of economic-technical cooperation in the 1960s and 1970s is a referable point.
67. See Koolaee, Soviet Union and Islamic Revolution, op. cit.
68. Yevgeny, op. cit., p. 24.
69. Mohammad Esmiel Norian, “Different Perspectives about Caspian Sea Legal Regime,” Caucasian and Central Asia Studies, No. 14, Summer 1996, pp. 105-126.
70. Amy Myers Jaffe and Robert A. Manning, op. cit.
71. Lutz Kleveman, “The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia,” in: http://www.guardian.co.uk/oil/story/0.11319/1.66600,00.html, 11/15/2008.
72. See Elaheh Koolaee, “Reinforcement of Caspian Coastal Countries Cooperation, a Step toward Regional Development,” Caucasian and Central Asia Studies, No. 14, Summer 1996, pp. 95–283.
73. Freedman, “Russian–Iranian Relations in the 1990,” op. cit.
74. Freedman, “Putin and the Middle East,” op. cit, p. 3.
75. This committee was consisted of Elaheh Koolaee, Hassan Ghashghavi, Kazem Jalali, Members of Foreign Policy and National Security Commission, Iran’s Parliament.
76. Mr. Khatami’s and Iranian delegation’s resistance was the reason that nothing was ratified by leaders against Iran.
77. See Elaheh Koolaee, “Geopolitical Consequences of Exploitation of Caspian Oil,” Rahbord, No. 13, Summer 1997, pp. 19-36.
78. Kleveman, op. cit.
79. Ibid.
80. American efforts in preventing Iran from playing a role in connecting Central Asian Republics to one another at least as a communication alternative have imposed heavy costs on these Republics. The Great Game dimensions also have added to these costs.
81. These changes are directly related to shifts in the Commonwealth of Independent States’ affairs and return of an ambassador - who was in this post for two terms – to Iran and operations in this office.
82. Kleveman, op. cit.
83. Rall, op. cit.
84. Ettelaat Newspaper, 28 Jan 2000; Freedman, “Russian–Iranian Relations in the 1990,” op. cit.
85. Edward W. Walker, “Islam, Islamism and Political Order in Central Asia,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2, Spring 2003, p. 27.
86. See Elaheh Koolaee, “Islamic Fundamentalism Threat in Central Asia,” Journal of Faculty of Law and Political Science, No. 67, Summer 1995, p. 219.
87. Fiona Hill, “Central Asia and Caucasus: The Impacts of War on Terrorism,” quoted in: http://www.Freedomhouse.org/research/nitransit/2003, 10/14/2008, pp. 39-45.
88. Ibid., p. 220.
89. Alex Vatanku, “Russian Relations with Iran,” quoted in: http://www.erasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav32602.a.shtml, 10/16/2008.
90. Ibid.
91. Freedman, “Russian–Iranian Relations in the 1990,” op. cit. p. 1.
92. Ibid., p. 4.
93. Shargh Newspaper, No. 419, December 2004, p. 5.