Mohsen Rezaee
Introduction
First, I would like to present a conceptual framework upon which the strategy I delineate later will be based upon. I define national security as the defense and continued advancement of fundamental values of a political system. These fundamental values are: territorial integrity, social cohesion, the political structure, economic growth and national interests. Both hardware and software instruments are essential in the processes that lead to the preservation of these values. In the Middle East where on the average, there has been a war every eight years, still the military machinery, strategic depth, natural resources like water, oil and gas as well as an effective population are salient. Along these instruments, issues such as political legitimacy, political flexibility, policy making capability and supranational effectiveness can also be raised as significant approaches to maintaining security and making strategic forecasts particularly in recent years. Therefore, in sketching national security in its broad and multidimensional parameters, I pay attention to both the soft as well as hard aspects of the term.
A Paradigm for Regional Order
National security in academic terms can be interpreted in realist and liberal ways. In the realist school, all behavior is organized in the polity and states are the sole players in the international system.(1) In the liberal approach, the state represents the society and is only one player in the global system among others.(2) My approach is different. I believe the realist school places too much emphasis on the hard dimensions of national security like the defense of national territory and borders. This approach falls short of explaining the new processes of power. Moreover, the liberal school can not fully be satisfactory because of its flawed view of the limitations of the state and the significance of the concept of national interest. This is more important in a region like the Middle East. This turbulent region despite the end of the Cold War remains as the most internationalized region in the international system and thus deserves a different method of study. In my perspective, a more appropriate way of understanding the issue of national security in the Middle East, particularly in the aftermath of Soviet demise and the downfall of the bipolar system, is the “regional security approach,” which is a compromise method between national and international paradigms. Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver have focused on this method in the post Cold War period.(3) Others like Linore J. Martin have also drawn on the regional approach dubbed as “The New Façade of Security in the Middle East.”(4) In my belief, the regional security level of analysis can explain Iran’s national security with much more precision. I should point out that unlike Buzan, Weaver and Martin, my definition of the “region” does not confine itself to the Middle East. As I will outline later, my reference to the region is the southwest Asian region. I pay attention to this particular region because I believe it has a great potential of a strong political sub region and is far beyond the geography of the Middle East. I further believe that the concentration of efforts in this region provides far more potential in maintaining Iran’s national security. So, my perspective on regional security refers to the southwest Asian region which in my view can turn into a powerful and influential bloc in the next quarter century.(5) This is the same as the Old Middle East where it moves to the north and the northeast comprising the Caucasus, Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The Geopolitical Movement of Mountains
Due to changes in the structure of power in the international system, new regions emerge as in parallel new mountains gradually erupt from earth.(6) In the aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union, two new regions of a united Europe and southwest Asia have emerged. Though the phenomenon of the European Union clearly belongs to the last half a century but since the Soviet downfall, it has taken on a new momentum. The southwest Asian region has a long record where its western leg is the current Middle East shaped many centuries ago but its eastern leg which constitutes the Caucasus, CIS and the Indian sub region has a new potential in the post Soviet Union to join the older western leg. The geographic parameters of this region are Russia from the north, China from the east, the Indian Ocean from the south and Europe and Africa from the west. This greater region has experienced some two thousands years of Iranian civilization and many centuries of Islamic civilization. The last time, there existed a civilization is this region was during the Safavid era where the western leg was ruled by the Ottoman Empire. During this period, a bipolar system of Safavids and the Ottomans controlled the region. In the 20th century, however, the United States and the Soviet Union dominated the region meaning that two external powers held authority over this entire domain. The format and the structure of the international system can both cultivate or obstruct the shaping of the new southwest Asian region. Some conditions for the formation of this region are as follows:
- Multi-lateralism replacing unilateralism and political monopoly leading to cooperation and effective interaction
- Democracy of its Eastern type and definition having the chance to materialize
- Iran gaining the acceptance of the countries in the region to design a regional security arrangement and gradually drawing international cooperation
- Regional organizations like ECO be expanded
Change in the Nature of Future Challenges
Regional powers like China, Russia, Europe and the United States, due to their long presence in Asia, the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean, present challenges and threats as well as potential for cooperation in this region. The true nature of threats and challenges of the 21st century in the southwest Asian region will focus on how this region will be shaped and which countries and to what degree will contribute to its formation. At the present time, the overwhelming American presence and its impatient encroachments into the region pose the most serious challenges to the autonomous emergence of this powerful sub region. Will other powers join the United States or they will define their own independent agenda vis a vis this region? To what degree will they cooperate with the countries of the region? Though nothing is certain but we can also influence the forces of this region and defend our national interests. What matters the most is that the nature of opportunities and threats facing us has greatly altered. If regime change or the change of Iran’s behavior were the focus of the international system in the past two decades, today the aim is to limit the influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the regional level. What concerns the Americans today is not so much the nature of the Iranian political system. Rather, they are uneasy about Iran’s effective role at the regional system. While both Europe and the United States are assured that Tehran does not have the objective of acquiring nuclear weapons, the fear is of Iran’s nuclear advancement. Thus, from their perspective, sanctions have become necessary. In the greater Middle East, Washington viewed Iran as a rogue state. But in the new Middle East, Americans define Iran as a competitor. Monopolization of power and animosity towards Iran have led Americans into a strategy of posing Tehran as a threat and since they have faltered on their previous approaches towards the region, now we witness a new American military offensive to limit Iran’s emerging power. If the Europeans and the regional countries in the Middle East do not join the U.S. in their sanctions program, it will certainly be another failure. In my view, the current American strategy is to limit Iran’s influence through economic sanctions and an enlargement of its own military forces in the region.
Iran’s Domestic and Regional Threats and Opportunities
The Islamic Republic of Iran as a country with ancient sources of identity, young and large population, vast territory and adequate natural resources is the center of global energy theater. Iran’s soft and hard advantages in maintaining its national security are as follows:(7)
- Civilizational past and a history of statecraft for five thousand years
- A young, productive, skilled, intelligent and demanding population
- Appropriate strategic depth
- An important Iranian-Islamic cultural geography in southwest Asia
- Huge resources in oil, gas, water and coal
- Diversity of weather and self sufficiency in producing basic products
- Unique geopolitical and geostrategic position in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea
- A flexible political system with vast capacity to influence
- Reliable experience in military and political affairs to manage crises at the domestic, regional and international levels
Along with these advantages, the defense of the national security of the Islamic Republic of Iran suffers from vulnerabilities. Some of the important ones are as follows:
- Weaknesses in the social cohesion
- Weaknesses in the indigenous and comprehensive national strategy
- Competition arising from countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan
- Confining Iran to its national borders or coercing Tehran to accept American order and hegemony
These difficulties have turned Iran into a country where it only has to concern itself with security issues.(8) Such conditions present serious limitations for foreign direct investment, transfer of technology and strategic partnerships with great powers.
A Stable Power
The Islamic Republic of Iran that faces critical years ahead has reached the following conclusions:
- The most important instrument to produce Iran’s supranational mobility is a stable power at home. A stable power emerges along with sustained national development. This will satisfy the power preoccupation of Iranians that has been prevalent in the last three centuries. Numerous occupations of Iran and lagging behind global advancements have convinced Iranians of relying on their own independent national development model
- Iran has been a victim of international events and of tacit agreements of great powers. It follows that Iranians now view less reliance on great powers and the diversification of security and economic sources as embodying their national security
In this context, the most suitable way to eliminate dependence and acquire stable national security is to realize the domestic and external potential and real sources of power and their internal logic. At this time, the most important sources of producing wealth and power that aim to weaken Iran are the United States and Europe through the Israeli mechanism. In the meantime, they need Iran’s balancing regional role. These countries pursue their interests in a monopolizing way denying role for others. At the same time, there are other powers that may be effective in the coming years with a potential to balance out American and European influence. In my outlook, the most significant sources of power for Iran are its domestic and regional sources along with the benefits arising from the competition of powers in their southwest Asian region. Iran has a great potential to emerge as a regional power and with the assistance of regional states contribute to the security, peace and development of the region.(9) Sources of stability of power for Iran in the next two decades will be as follows:
- Comprehensive national development based on Iran’s 20-year Prospective Document
- Boosting the armed forces preemptive capabilities within conventional measures
- The gradual emergence of a regional cooperative system
- The formation of a regional security system with Iran being one of its permanent members
- A two layered strategy of cooperating with the international system on narcotics, environment, peace and security while cooperatively resisting foreign intervention on national and regional interests
As discussed, Iran’s stable power resources are intertwined with internal, external and international factors. In other words, Iran’s national security relies on an appropriate relationship within and logical relations with powerful countries outside the region. But my emphasis here is on a targeted regional relationship and the link between Iran’s national security and regional security. In the following paragraphs, I will expand on the concept of the southwest Asian security and development system and then will delineate the strategy I have in mind.
Why Southwest Asian Region?
The southwest Asian region has vast parameters with Iran being at its center. Major countries in this system are Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Turkey and Syria.(10) Other countries will stand on the periphery of this major circle. The southwest Asian region has a golden belt that extends from Syria in the Mediterranean to China while passing through Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. The region consists of three sub regions: the Caucasus, the Middle East and sub Indian. Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia and Iran account for fifty percent of the whole region that along with Turkey are also a huge economic bloc.(11) The southwest Asian region is a political, economic, cultural and geographic bloc that is potentially an indigenous looking regional hegemon seeking stability, order and peace. This bloc is a reliable force to counter American designs on the region. Iran can play an effective role in maintaining the equilibrium of this regional system. Unlike other systems where Russia or the United States may dominate, the logic in this cooperative system is indigenous and there exists local incentives for cooperation and coalition building. While some may argue that an effective regional system may not take shape without the United States, I believe that American monopolistic entry into this regional system may pose more problems than solutions. Other powers such as Russia, China and Europe may contribute to the empowerment of this region. The most important pillar in this coalition is the role of Iran with its geopolitical, geoeconomic and geostrategic capabilities that stem from its human and natural resources. Therefore, a vision of “collective cooperation at the region while an interaction based on parity beyond the region” could pervade for the next two decades.
Threats to Southwest Asia
Sources of threats leading insecurity in southwest Asia within the last fifty years are:
A. External factors and sources of threat:
1. Communism: This ideology, supported by the former Soviet Union, was a direct source of insecurity in parts of CIS, Caucasus and Afghanistan and an indirect source of insecurity in other regions, which was removed upon the disintegration of the USSR.
2. Colonization: This approach, taken by the United States, was a source of regional insecurity, which was practiced directly in recent attacks on Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon, and prior to that, indirectly, in the form of supporting Iraq in its launching attack on Iran, nurturing Taliban, and supporting MKO in Iran.
3. Zionism: This ideology led to the formation of the state of Israel in the region, which has directly brought insecurity inside and outside Palestine, to Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt, and indirectly to other countries in the region.
B. Besides external factors, which contribute to insecurity in the region, the presence of differences and hostilities between countries has also led to insecurity. Some of these factors are: The war between Iran and Iraq as well as the one between Iraq and Kuwait, disputes between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Azerbaijan and Armenia, Iran and the U.A.E, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
C. Other factors and sources of insecurity in the region are: Dictatorship; injustice; lack of democracy; underdevelopment
The above factors have led to conflicts, uprisings, and, sometimes, coups. Of course, the combination of external factors and internal factors or the merging of external factors and regional factors have been the major mechanisms of insecurity in the region. Thus, two insecurity processes have been identified:
1. External factor + Regional factor = Insecurity
2. External factor + Internal factor = Insecurity
The Potentialities and Instruments of the Southwest Asian Region
In the first look, it appears that the economies of the region in mind are characterized by weakness, dependency and corruption. It might also be pointed out that Iran may not be accepted by the countries of the region and that Tehran will need the green light from the United States and Russia. To some degree and in some occasions, these assertions are correct. But they are not always accurate. It is not a fact that Americans will have the first role in all regional developments. Economic, cultural and political potentialities of the southwest Asian region demonstrate that member states have a capacity to interact with global powers, cooperate among them and accept a role for Iran. At the present time, the United States attempts to obstruct the formation of such a regional bloc due to reasons such as energy security, Israel, New Middle East and a coalition of anti-terrorist countries. However, countries of the region can convince great powers like the United States that their cooperation and regional order will assist international peace and security. Mechanisms below display processes that will lead to the success of the regional bloc:
- The independence of all members will be recognized and that they will refrain from intervening in the domestic affairs of each other
- Members such as Iran will attempt to bind national security and regional activity through balanced economic growth
- Given the new significance of “regions” in the post Cold War era, southwest Asian region will emphasize on its energy, geopolitical and geostrategic advantages
- This region enjoys such capacities that limit the presence of a foreign hegemon
- This region will focus on economic growth and trade and the last area of concern will be security
- The weight of regional cooperation will outpace foreign hegemonic powers. Interaction and resistance will characterize the model of the region with the external environment
- Member countries will initially concentrate on bilateral and then on multilateral and civilizational interactions. For example, one can refer to the cooperative model of Iran, Syria and Lebanon. This model can also incorporate Iraq and Afghanistan to sketch the golden belt of the southwest Asian region
- Members and in particular Iran will attempt to establish regional arrangements: regional economic cooperation, gas exporting countries, conflict resolution committees and inter parliamentarian conferences can be of great relevance.(12) In this regard, ECO, NAM and the OIC can contribute to the regionalization of the bloc
Difficulties Facing the Southwest Asian Regional Bloc
Countries in this bloc confront many fundamental difficulties. While these difficulties may be managed in the long term, they are realities at the present time. Some of these difficulties are as follows:(13)
- Strategic relationships of some states like Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan with the supraregional hegemon, the United States
- The presence and interest of the United States in the golden belt of the bloc (Iraq and Afghanistan)
- Varying degrees of power among members
- The phenomenon of Israel: Israel attempts to dislocate countries and disrupt their cooperation and make arrangements for its own interest
- Economic dependence of the countries on the West: most members of the bloc rely on the political engineering, bilateral and multilateral agreements and particularly of the West
- The diversity of political systems of the bloc members
- Border and territorial disputes of the member countries
- Suspicion of members in accepting a central role by Iran
The aforementioned obstacles have led to the disparity of the countries in the region forcing them to lose interest in the idea of regional cooperation. But the great potential of this region can overcome the obstacles by presenting a strong logic. In this regard, the Islamic Republic of Iran can elevate its national security to a regional policy and a solid strategy. The senior policymakers of Iran composing the supreme leader and the heads of the three branches have collectively issued a directive entitled as the “20 year Prospective Document.” Based on this document, Iran plans to use its potential to interact with global powers to create a regional, new and collective role. In this context, Iran will draw on the needs of the global powers in the region on the one hand and establish strategic commonness with regional states to emerge as an economic power and make effective contribution to regional and global developments on the other. In this process,
- First, Iran will attempt to convince other countries in the region that regional cooperation will lead to peace and stability of the region and that an unstable and undeveloped Iran will only be a threat to the international system, centers of the international power structure and the regional countries
- Second, Iran intends to utilize its civilizational and Islamic potential in the southwest Asian region and move towards greater coordination with important countries such as Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The first step in this process is to draw on scientific, technological and economic cooperation. Such cooperation will expand regional bonds and reduce distrust
- Third, in the spirit of reducing the anxieties of the regional countries as well as great powers, Iran plans to focus on strategic deterrence that avoids sensitive offensive measures. Such a strategy will cultivate further trust and cooperation
- Fourth, while the global hegemon in this region has proven the fact that its only concerns are Israel’s security and cheap oil, cooperation of the states of the region can balance off local power against global power
At last, it should be pointed out that national security in the 21st century is linked to the cultivation of both soft and hard power.(14) One must be mindful of the fact that the operationalization of such potential power requires an understanding of the rules of the game. If the Islamic Republic of Iran can avoid illusion and inaction, it can perform its effective regional role and the defense of its basic values. Through a realistic plan, it is possible to win the trust of the great powers while internal obstacles are overcome. If Iran fails to play the effective role it is expected from, regional security will be jeopardized and the past will be repeated.
Conclusion
The realization of American hegemonic policy faces a major contradiction. The U.S. pursues the policy of defending Israel and controlling the regional energy on the one hand and attempts to present itself as the friend of the region on the other. The claim that Washington intends to promote freedom and democracy has not resolved this contradiction. American efforts display the fact that such contradictions will impede the envisioned success. America has paid a heavy price in human lives, prestige and economic costs. The hegemonic policy of the United States has failed. As a result, the only exclusive way of securing regional cooperation is through indigenous organization alongside extraregional interaction. Iran’s role in this regional organization is central and such a role will serve the interests of the global powers as well. It is therefore necessary for them to abandon their animosity and choose a cooperative strategy. We can all attempt to establish a powerful economic and political bloc. This bloc can secure energy needed by the global economy and maintain regional stability. We believe that the Americans and the Europeans should remove themselves as obstacles to regional cooperation, terminate obstructionism and combative behavior.
Footnotes
1. Kolin Hay, Political Analysts, New York & London: Palgrave, 2003, p. 17.
2. Lenore G. Martin, “A Comprehensive Approach in National Security Studies in the Middle East” in: Lenore G. Martin, NewFrontiers in the Middle East Security, Trans. Ghadir Nasri, Tehran: Strategic Studies Research Center, 2003, p. 35.
3. Barry Buzan & Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 35-36.
4. Lenore G. Martin, “A Comprehensive Approach in National Security Studies in the Middle East,” op. cit., pp. 38-39.
5. Mohsen Rezaei, Regional Iran: Excerpts from Southwest Asia Region Formation Research Plan, Tehran: Armed Forces Geographic Organization Publications, 2005, p. 119.
6. Mohsen Rezaei, The Evolution of International Power Structure, Geopolitics Seminar at Armed Forces Geographic Organization, 2004.
7. Rezaei, Regional Iran: Excerpts from Southwest Asia Region Formation Research Plan, op. cit., p. 35.
8. Refer to Mohsen Rezaei, Tomorrow’s Perspective of Iran, Tehran: Andika, 2006, p. 74.
9. On the reality of Iran in the region refer to Mohsen Rezaei, In Search of the Sun, Tehran: Farhang Gostar, 1999, pp. 30-31.
10. Mahmood Sariol ghalam, Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Theoretical Reconsideration and Coalition Paradigm, Tehran: Strategic Research Center, 2000, p. 32.
11. Rezaei, Regional Iran: Excerpts from Southwest Asia Region Formation Research Plan, op. cit., p. 114.
12. Ibid., pp. 233-234.
13. Ibid., p. 221.
14. Ghadir Nasri, Hard Power and Soft Power: Essentials, Dimensions and Resources, Tehran: Strategic Studies Research Center, 2006, pp. 11-12; Edward Azar and Chung-In Moon, “Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity: The Software Side of Third World National Security,” in: National Security in the Third World, Tehran: Strategic Studies Research Center, 2000, p. 115; Terry Thriff and Stuart Croft, Contemporary Security Studies, Trans. Ali Reza Tayeb and Vahid Bozorghi, Tehran: Strategic Studies Research Center, 2004, p. 271.