The eight-year Iran-Iraq war has greatly affected the political developments of the Islamic Republic of Iran and despite the fact that 16 years have passed since the end of war, there are many untold matters in respect to the political and military aspects of event. Although enough time has not passed to allow the Iran-Iraq war to be scrutinized as a historical event and many related military and security issues are still considered confidential, the more we distance from the war, there is more room to talk about political issues surrounding it. Therefore, political and military elite shed more light from time to time on the war-related issues, thus helping remove the ambiguities in relation with this eventful historical milestone of the Iranian society. In this report, high profile Iranian elites such as Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mohsen Rezaei, Aliakbar Velayati and Commandor Alaei expose differing aspects of the war.
Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani
Q: Many things have been told about various aspects of the war including valor, sacrifice and so forth. However, many basic questions related to this historical event have gone unanswered including the question that on what basis Iran postponed accepting the UN resolutions up to 1988? Was Iran in a better position politically, economically and militarily during that year when it accepted the UN resolution 598 or the reverse is true? Please explain.
A: The current conditions make way for revealing more facts about the war. Several issues should be made clear here. First of all, the late Imam (Khomeini) was in charge of war and was commander-in-chief of the armed forces. His policy was obeyed by all of us and we did not oppose him. Imam had many things in his mind. He thought now that Saddam Hussein has attacked us we must not only repel aggression, but also try to deliver the Iraqi nation freedom from tyranny. Imam had seen the Baathist regime’s crimes from close range. We were aware of them from far away, but he was a witness to them through his contacts with Iraqi clergy, preachers and nomads. Now that Saddam is gone, the world knows what they have done. They talk about killing millions of people. Iraqis who come here say millions of people have been killed. Perhaps this is exaggeration, but the Baathist regime wronged people there and specially suppressed Shias. Imam was aware of all that and could not do anything directly. When Iraq invaded our country, Imam thought we could snatch that opportunity and relieve the Iraqi nation from Saddam’s oppressive regime. Since early months after the victory of the Islamic revolution in the Iran, the Iraqi government had increased repression of Iraqi people, especially when they decided to follow suit with the Iranian nation and revolt. On the other hand, forcing the Iraqis of Iranian descent to leave that country and settle in Iran, added to tension between the two neighbors. Imam believed that we cannot cooperate with them and they were hatching plots against us. The relations became more strained everyday.
The second issue was insolence of a small country in attacking a greater one. We could not ignore the occupation of parts of five provinces along with all subsequent damages. Under those conditions we could not simply accept the truce and ask the occupying forces to leave our country. This was very important. Imam also believed that Iran is three times bigger thanIraq in terms of size and we have enough wherewithal to claim our right. So, why we should have passed over our rights and let Iraqis to get away with it? The third issue was morale of our armed forces. The Army believed that we must defend our dignity while the revolutionary guards and martyrs’ families were not willing to quit the war. Our combatants hoped to reach Karbala. Our armed forces could not be easily convinced to relinquish war and there were also the martyrs’ families, Imam and the revolutionary guards. The fourth issue was the continued occupation of parts of our country by Iraqis. Up to the very end of the war and even after accepting the (UN) resolution, there was never a time when a part of our territory was not occupied by Iraqi forces. For this reason, Imam believed that if we accepted ceasefire, Iraqis would stay in our territory and reinforce their troops for repeated invasion. His analysis was right and we accepted it. We believed that if Iraq was made to accept a truce from a position of weakness, it would attack us again after mobilizing required forces. So, they were not likely to leave our soil and were even possible to attack again.
The fifth issue was that Imam had announced that Iraq is aggressor and insisted that the world should own up to their aggression through the UN resolutions and international bodies should accept it. Those were the salient points of Imam’s thought about the war and we agreed to his viewpoint. Yet, I as official in charge of the war followed a policy after the Operation Kheibar which was never officially accepted by Imam while it was not rejected too. He was aware of my policy because I had talked about it with Imam and the war commanders. I had devised that conclusion before the Operation Kheibar and even those operations were carried out according to the said policy. That policy was based on occupying valuable positions inside Iraq to be used as leverage for driving Iraqis out of our land and claiming our rights. We wanted to announce that we would stay in those areas until a court is convened to decide about the war damages. Since we had not occupied any place inside Iraq up to that time, we had no bargaining chips against them during any possible negotiations. First, we wanted to conquer the east of Tigris River, pass through Hawr marshes and command Basra road. In this way we could control oil-rich regions inside Iraq. However, we could not complete that plan. We also aimed to start from Faw and reach Umm-al-Qasr port city to cut off the Iraqi government from the sea. We thought that we could achieve those goals. We advanced as far as Salt Factory, but were stopped by Iraqi forces there. We carried out the Operation Karbala 5 to conquer Basra, but we failed. This was our policy to the end of war. I announced this policy once and once again in my speeches, but some revolutionary guards opposed me and expressed, “Imam says ‘war, war until victory’ while you say ‘war, war, until a victory”. I told them that I would obey Imam, but this is my policy. I told them that if they did this, the war would be over, but they opposed me.
Q: Did you consider conquering Faw to be a prelude to ceasefire?
A: I considered conquering Faw up to Umm-al-Qasr to be important because the latter connected Iraq to the sea. If we had conquered Umm-al-Qasr, we would have stayed there until we were given our due. This was our policy since we retook Khorramshahr from Iraqis, but we failed to realize it. One of our plans was conquering Darbandikhan Dam near Halabjah in northern Iraq. It could have been a good leverage, because the dam supplied water to Baghdad. We also aimed to conquer Dukan Dam after Darbandikhan Dam. Anyway, that policy failed too.
Q: What new event happened from 1983, when you retook Khorramshahr to 1988, which made you accept the UN resolution; what prompted you to reach that conclusion? Had Iran’s military strength been impaired or you concluded that Saddam is not powerful enough to invade Iran anymore? What was the reason behind that u-turn?
A: A couple of reasons prompted us to accept the resolution. Firstly, our forces were tired. We had carried out a series of unsuccessful operations and failed to achieve our goals. Countries supporting Saddam Hossein had equipped him with dangerous weaponry. For example, he was using special forms of chemical weapons and nerve gas which he used in Halabjah. He was also given precision weapons which were laser-guided. His planes could target bridges from high altitude where they were not accessible for our antiaircraft guns. They could sink ships at sea. They had also plenty of long-range missiles which could even hit Tehran. Our surface-to-air missiles could not reach warplanes given to Iraq by the Soviet Union. Another factor was that several successful operations were carried out by the Baathist troops whose success could be attributed to worn-out soldiers on our side and the advanced weaponry on their side. They did not hesitate to use chemical weapons. The nerve gas they used intoxicated our soldiers and many of them were killed. Saddam was very imprudent because great powers had given him carte blanche to do anything that he wanted to do. Everything was vulnerable. Another issue surfaced after the conquer of Halabjah and the Operation Karbala 5. In that operation which was conducted a little while after the Operation Karbala 4- for which Iraqi forces were ready to counteract-and during that operation we overcame the most formidable fortifications erected by the Iraqi forces. They had inundated lands to prevent any attack therefrom. Beyond the water, they had prepared the most formidable fortifications. We took Arvand River by surprise. At that time it was rumored and was later proven that the Western and Eastern experts were present at Iraqi bases near Basra to prevent the port city from being overrun by Iran. We were very close to Basra. On the other hand, we had seized Halabjah through something like a miracle. Passing through high, snow-covered mountains and conquering Halabjah was a sign of the military might of Iran. Those achievements showed to the Soviet Union, the United States and European countries that we could defeat Iraq and their ultimate policy was to prevent us from doing so. We had reached a good point with missile production. We could pound Iraqi cities with our missiles. Therefore, the Americans and other countries supporting Iraq decided to block our way even through direct confrontation. There are some people who claim that in the middle of war, the Americans decided to change sides and support Iran. According to that claim whose documents I will release in the future, the Americans argued that Iran had the upper hand and Iraq was on the Soviet Union’s side. Thus, they decided to take sides with Iran. They first approached us through arms dealers which culminated in MacFarlane’s case. However, they later changed their mind and decided not to let us win the war. Therefore, from that the time on, we were not solely fighting Iraq and were grappling with a superpower like the United States.
Q: That is, the war had gone beyond confrontation between Iran and Iraq?
A: Yes. In addition, we were facing another problem. They thought the best way to defeat us was to cut off our revenue sources. Since we were not supported by other countries, they decided to deprive us from the oil revenues. They had given many financial resources to Iraq to block our oil exports. We were building an oil pipeline toward Bandar Abbas to export oil from there. However, it would have taken two or three years to finish. We did not have enough time and Western countries were delivering more arms to Iraq including Exocet and laser-guided missiles. France also delivered them SuperEtenderd warplanes. They aimed to dry out our revenue sources. Our reciprocal policy was that each country should be allowed to export their oil. If we couldn’t do this, other countries should not be able as well. Of course, Iraq kept exporting its oil through a pipeline which ran through Saudi Arabia toward the Red Sea, but its capacity did not exceed one million barrels per day. We adopted a similar policy and when they hit one of our ships, one of their ships was hit. When they attacked a port, one of their ports came under attack. The United States witnessed that Iran continued to have the upper hand regardless of the supports provided to Iraq. Therefore, they entered the scene and escorted tanker ships. The US flag was hoisted on a Kuwaiti super tanker, but it was hit and sank. It was escorted by two American warships when it was hit early one morning and subsequently sank.
Q: Did you expect the news?
A: Yes (he smiles). We always claimed that they cannot continue to export oil through such tactics. At that juncture we could have blocked the Hormuz Strait anytime we decided. The United States was then directly involved in the war. They destroyed our oil platform. Iraq could not do such operations. The Americans shot down our choppers; they sank one of our good destroyers and broke one of our good ships in half. They also shot our passenger Airbus. They did the same things that Saddam did. Therefore, we were directly facing the United States. They pursued the policy of cutting off our revenue sources and we were determined to stop them. The issue became hotter everyday. Up to that time neither Imam, nor our soldiers were ready to accept the ceasefire. Before that date Imam would not allow anybody to talk about truce because it would have impaired the morale of our armed forces. A later development, however, made him accept it.
Q: What was that development?
A: The then prime minister wrote a letter to Imam followed by another letter which was written by economic ministers as well as the governor of the Central Bank of Iran who told Imam that they were unable to supply war requirements and could only provide people’s food. Domestic economy was incapable of sustaining the war anymore. If we wanted to continue fighting, Imam could have called on people to tolerate more austere policies. However, new developments at war fronts convinced our military that they cannot go on with the war anymore. I went to headquarters and Mr. Mohsen Rezaei who was commander of the revolutionary guards at that time, gave me a long list and told me those items should be provided if we were to continue fighting. That list is available now and included many things such as tanks, helicopters, planes, money and ammunitions. He also told me it would take three years to reinforce military forces; so as to be able to launch offensives in addition to defending our positions. He mentioned politicians should try to get the United States out of the Persian Gulf through political tactics or continuing the war would be impossible. I told Mohsen Rezaei to give me the list and I will deliver it to Imam to find a solution. I took Mr. Rezaei’s letter to a meeting of heads of three powers and they announced that they could not meet those needs. Five of us went to Imam and told him that firstly, the United States would not let us prevail, and secondly; if war continued we would not progress and only casualties on both side would increase. We could not continue our operations as before. Imam said that considering all the evidence, there was no way but to accept the ceasefire.
Q: Mr. Hashemi, those analyses existed as early as 1984. War critics asserted that from the viewpoint of economic power, Iran is no match for the United States. That is; three or four years before and even after retake of Khorramshahr, they said that, but nobody heeded their exhortations and they were even sometime refused as being contradictory to national interests and the revolution.
A: They did not say that as directly as you said. There were analyses to the effect that both Eastern and Western power would not allow us to capture Iraq. We argued that we did not intend to capture Iraq. If we had progressed from Faw to Umm-al-Qasr, everything would have been over. For the same reason that we occupied the Majnoun Islands, if we had gained control of the Basra-Baghdad road, the war would have been ended. We had succeeded in several operations to show that we could do that. But each time we were faced with problems about whose details I am not ready to talk right now…. We captured half of Darbandikhan Dam’s lake. If we had obtained full control of the dam, it could have changed many things. In that case, Iraq would not have been able to use nonmilitary means against us. The dam was a major weapon with 3 billion cubic meter water stored behind it. We had plans to gain leverages against Saddam. At that time, we did not think about conquering the whole Iraq or bringing down Saddam, but we thought about seizing key points and use them as levers to regain our rights.
Q: The question is why when you realized that the United States is willing to take sides with Iran to keep the Soviet Union and Iraq in check; you did not take the best advantage of that opportunity? Why Iran did not make the most of MacFarlane affair, of which you are fully aware?
A: Those documents we accessed later and were not totally dependable. They could have been taken as possibilities. Our cooperation with the United States was very limited. If we helped release an (American) hostage in Lebanon, the United States would deliver us some TAV missiles. They were very useful. If our soldiers had those missiles, tanks could not come closer than four kilometers. They also helped us in Faw. They also gave us HAG antiaircraft missiles which we used to protect sensitive areas such as the Kharg Island. Besides, our radars needed special lamps which were delivered to us by the Americans. Yet, the Americans were never fully honest with us. Imam and the heads of three powers were aware of such dealings until the information leaked into Al-Shara newspaper. It was then that Imam said we cannot work with them anymore.
Q: You mean that you preferred to have covert ties with the United States and when they were made public, you decided to cut those relations?
A: We never trusted them. For example, MacFarlane was supposed to bring with him many weapons to Iran, but they brought several containers full of the needed spare parts onboard a plane. There were also some HAG missiles which were made in Israel and were kept at the airport so long that they had to reclaim them. On the whole we did not fully trust them.
Q: How information leaked to Al-Shara?
A: Its documents are available. Mr. Ghorbanifar was the go-between and he reached his current position through selling arms. They charged high prices for our needed parts. When we consulted the price list, we realized that they have run us up by five or six million dollars. Later on, we discovered that they wanted to channel the extra fund to contra guerrillas in Nicaragua. So we did not pay it. Mr. Ghorbanifar even wrote a letter to Mr. Montazeri complaining about this.
Q: They said Mehdi Hashemi had informed Al-Shara. Is that true?
A: I don’t know. Anyway, it was printed in Al-Shara.
(Hamshahri Newspaper; September 23, 2003)
Dr. Mohsen Rezaei
Q: A theoretical issue which always affects lives of nations, is relationship between war and politics. There is a famous quote from the 19th century politician, Metternich, who said, “War is the end of politics”. Was that true about Iran’s war with Iraq? That is, did war begin after politics came to a deadlock or it was the end result of a combination of political and military problems?
A: The Islamic revolution was an end to the former Shah’s policies. Within the context of what you mentioned, Iran’s policy changed as a result of the Islamic revolution and the new policy which sought independence overseas and freedom inside the country was not welcome both at regional and international levels. Before the revolution, US policy in the Middle East was based on supporting tyrants. Though the United States advocated freedom in other parts of the world, only despotic regimes could support US interests in this region. Therefore, all regimes ruling in Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and so on were despotic and this was exactly what the United States aimed. Another point was the dependence of our country on one of the two power poles. There were no independent countries in the region. Iran was the first country to change international politics by introducing the concept of ‘Neither East, Nor West’. Therefore, Iran’s policy had ended before the war by walking out of the US-backed despotism and severing ties with that country. This prompted regional countries which were concerned about their own political stability like Saudi Arabia as well as the other countries like the United States which wanted Iran to be dependent on the international order, to come together and resist Iran. They first opted for political solutions which were based on fostering domestic separatist tendencies and encouraging coup d’états. When Iran thwarted those policies after capturing the US embassy in Tehran, it was an end to the US policy too; that is, two political lines reached their end point before the war: one policy was to keep Iran in a state of dependence and suppression with the other one being the US policy which sought to exert pressure through domestic levers, just as they did to Mossaddeq’s government. All conditions pointed to the fact that something should happen outside the political frame. Here, the Iraqi government was the best tool and pretext. Having an appropriate analysis of Saddam’s motivations and cooperation of regional countries, the Americans goaded the Iraqi army into war with Iran.
Q: It is clear from your explanation that you agree with what I said. In addition, you take the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war to be an ending point not only to Iran’s policy, but also to international policy. However, many Western analysts believe that war is a natural consequence of revolutions and have tried to find scientific evidence to their claim. They say revolution is an abnormality which contradicts with the international order and may lead to aggression. Since Iran planned to export its revolution to other countries and voiced its support for the oppressed people all over the world, it started to pursue that cause by helping Iraqi Shias who were under Saddam’s repressive rule to help establish the Islamic Ummah. Don’t you think that even though Iran did not start the war, it welcomed it as a means of realizing the said goals?
A: Even if all you say is true, they were limited to nonmilitary measures. That is, they were political ends pursued by Iran. They should not have been opposed by war because using war to contain political measures is a failed policy. We have evidence to prove that Iraqis did the same against us with more vigor. The Iraqi government cooperated with the Shah for suppressing revolution in Iran. For example, they shut down Radio Freedom in Iraq and forced Imam to leave that country. Iraq moved in harmony with the Shah. And until several weeks before the victory of the Islamic revolution, Saddam and the Shah worked in unison against the revolution.
Q: Do you mean that before that time, relations between the Shah and Saddam were not cordial?
A: Yes. But when Saddam realized that the Islamic revolution is on the verge of victory, he changed sides. After the victory of the revolution he started to help the separatists groups and, for example, supported separatist Arabs in Khuzestan. Many explosions in Iranian oil wells in 1979 were carried out by those who brought in bombs from Iraq. This means that the conflict between Iraq and the Iranian nation had started before the victory of the Islamic revolution and it just got worse up to September 1980. Therefore, any claim that Iran welcomed the war in order to export its revolution would be baseless. Political and spiritual effects of the Iranian revolution on other countries are not deniable and this has nothing to do with military issues. Iraq was plotting against Iran long before the beginning of war and was supported by international powers.
Q: Some claim that Imam was willing to continue war with Saddam, not to liberate the occupied Iranian territories, but to punish Saddam. They argue that since he had watched Saddam’s crimes closely, he was willing to free Iraqi Shias from that repressive regime through the war. If we accepted this, we should accept many things too including the fact that Imam was willing to fight Iraq. What is your opinion, as his (Imam’s) appointed war commander in those years?
A: As my accurate information about Imam, especially before and after the war, such a claim can only be described to be imprecise and unfair. Saddam hit the bottom of world leaders from his viewpoint. Quotes from Imam about other leaders including King Hussein and King Hassan… were much sterner than what he said about Saddam. At the same time, Mr. Hassan al-Bakr was Iraq’s president at that time and Saddam had to first overthrow Hassan al-Bakr in order to attack Iran. Yet, in Imam’s eyes, he was not so important as to be the target of revenge and punishment in the form of a full-fledged war. When Imam talked about regional rulers, he excluded Iraq and Syria and only implied to those countries with kingdoms. I cannot believe this claim to be true about the late Imam. The war was fully planned and a combination of Saddam’s insanity and revengeful regional sheikhs imposed the war on Iran as part of an overall counterrevolutionary operation and this is quite independent of Iran’s treatment of the Iraqi government. Therefore, there was no personal grudge against Saddam, but Imam considered him to be deserved for punishment because he had waged war on Iran.
Q: How do you analyze Imam’s motto about continuing war until victory? Imam talked about conquering Iraq and eliminating sedition in the whole region and he even went as far as calling for the annihilation of Israel.
A: There were two distinct junctures during the war. The first juncture lasted from the beginning of the war up to the liberation of Khorramshahr. During that period, Iran’s military strategy was based on forcing Iraq out of its soil. The second juncture started after the liberation of Khorramshahr when Iran followed two strategies. Political officials believed in continuing the war up to final victory through diplomacy which was different from the military strategy adopted to continue the war. This duality in strategy immediately started after the liberation of Khorramshahr. We had a meeting with Imam which was attended by the late Ahmad Khomeini (Imam’s son), Mir-Hossein Mousavi, Mousavi Ardebili, Velayati, and the current Supreme Leader (who was president at the time). During that meeting, Hashemi Rafsanjani told Imam that we must cross the international borders to have something to be used as bargaining chip at the negotiating table. Mr. Zahirnejad opined that the southern borders could not be defended and we had to depend on a natural barrier such as Shat al-Arab. Both arguments were offered and were supported from political and military viewpoints. Thus, the main strategy which was pursued after the liberation of Khorramshahr was a political one; that is, to use military operations to realize peace or use military operations as a means of promoting diplomatic goals. Military operations were to be used as a leverage to serve political goals. This was our political strategy: military operations per se were not major goals, but they were used to shore up Iran’s foreign policy.
Q: This strategy was presented by Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani. Did anybody oppose it?
A: No. All military and political authorities agreed to it. Of course, the late Ahmad Khomeini raised objection and said we must stop at our borders. Imam also asked why we had to cross border?
Q: You mean that at that time nobody thought about overthrowing Saddam?
A: Yes. It was out of the question.
Q: During a recent interview, Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani has noted that his policy after the Operation Kheibar was never officially substantiated by Imam, but was not rejected too. He says, “Firstly, it was based on conquering valuable regions inside Iraqi territory to be used as leverage during subsequent negotiations. Secondly, we could claim our rights until a court convened to pinpoint the war damages. However, some revolutionary guards opposed me and told me that Imam says ‘war, war, until victory’ while you say ‘war, war, until a victory’”.
A: No. What Mr. Rafsanjani says is the same political strategy which was pursued after the liberation of Khorramshahr. In reality, what was not heeded was proposed the strategy of the war commanders which was offered to authorities following the Operation Ramadan.
Q: Did Imam agree to an expeditionary operation outside Iran to achieve political goals?
A: He wanted to know why we planned to cross the international borders. After listening to my arguments, he said “I would think for a week before answering you.” Then the late Ahmad Khomeini contacted me and announced Imam’s agreement. Operation Ramadan followed which aimed to take Iranian forces as far as Arvand River and conquer part of Iraqi soil. Therefore, everybody agreed to a political strategy after the liberation of Khorramshahr and a military strategy was out of the question. Operation Ramadan was a single operation, but a military strategy plans a group of operations. However, in a political strategy, the goal is not to carry out a series of operations, but to fulfill a single operation in order to secure political goals. Before the liberation of Khorramshahr we pursued a military strategy to liberate all the occupied regions of Iran. Therefore, we designed 14 operations in the summer 1981 which were carried out one after the other until the liberation of Khorramshahr. However, our strategy changed afterwards and a political strategy superseded a military one. The political strategy which started with the Operation Ramadan and continued until the Operation Kheibar, did not succeed.
Q: Why the political strategy failed?
A: That failure could be assessed from two angles: First, Saddam and his forces did not surrender to our political strategy and their plans could not be foiled through that strategy. Second, we had problems for conducting military operations. We did our best to change political strategy, but we were rejected by political officials and they said that they are short of wherewithal for a military strategy. Hence, the military strategy which sought to topple Saddam and do away with sedition in the whole world, did not go beyond words. At the same time, it was the desired strategy of Imam and combatants, therefore, no basic changes occurred at the war fronts. Afterwards, the war commanders gave up any hope about the approval of a military strategy and our efforts were focused on the success of a political, though faulty, strategy. Therefore, we went on with the political strategy, but the revolutionary guards said “now that you don’t let us implement a military strategy, at least, let us act independent of the Army.” This change in management of war fronts led to victories as a result of the Fao battle and the Karbala 5 operations in Shalamcheh and Halabjah regions and those triumphs led to the approval of the 598 UN resolution.
Q: So, you claim that despite outward slogans about the overthrow of Saddam, a different strategy was practically pursued?
A: Yes. We formulated a military strategy, but it did not go beyond lip service. According to the political strategy, Mr. Hashemi told us “if you conquer Shalamcheh and get close to Basra, we will finish the war.” That is to say that we always planned to end the war and during the concluding five years, war had become a repeated affair because military operations meant to serve politics. The only year when the revolutionary guards were asked to plan a military strategy was the last year of war when Iraqi troops had launched some offensives and the revolutionary guards noted that to change the political strategy to a military one, needed wherewithal should be provided to capture Baghdad and finish the war. Then we wrote a letter to Hashemi Rafsanjani about this and he took the letter to Imam. At the same time, economic ministers noted that they cannot supply what we asked and in fact they transferred a problem which should have been solved by the government to the late Imam which resulted in the acceptance of the 598 UN resolution.
Q: People have every right to know why military operations continued after the retake of Khorramshahr. You say the political strategy sought to use military assault to end the war. Didn’t any of those operations reach their ends in order to end the war according to political strategy? In other words, why the political part of that strategy was never implemented to put an end to the war?
A: Two factors were crucial in this regard. Firstly, Iraq, the United States and other Western countries knew what Iran was going to do. Therefore, when our politicians told them that we will continue war until sedition is wiped off the face of the Earth, they knew that what Imam and our combatants said in this respect was only lip service. They were aware that we sought war until a victory.
Q: So, the enemy knew that we are not going to continue the war until the final victory, but until a victory?
A: Yes. The world knew the way our politicians thought. It is true that politicians repeated Imam’s motto, but the world does not care for mottos. They reckon on what goes on behind the scenes as well as the behavior of politicians. Another point was that Iran should have appeared much stronger in diplomatic terms. On the other hand, we did not have serious political allies in the world to count on their votes at the United Nations Security Council.
Q: Was accepting the resolution due to the impossibility of more operations or the result of a change in strategy?
A: Before the 598 resolution, the only proposal they made to Iran was ceasefire and ceasefire means unfinished war.
Q: Did they mean that the both sides should have stopped where they were and start to talk?
A: Yes. Negotiations could have continued for 30 or even 40 years during which the both countries should have been prepared for restarting war. This was an option. Another option was for Iran to adopt a political strategy; that is to achieve peace following an operation. The third option was to continue military strategy until the downfall of Saddam and achieving a great victory. In fact, Iran was offered with this option after the liberation of Khorramshahr. We chose for the second option; that is, conducting a military operation to obtain political ends. Those operations helped Iran force the world to approve the 598 UN resolution. The resolution 598 had offered Iran with peace and a number of concessions for the first time. Those concessions included going back to the international borders, determining and paying war compensation, and setting up a committee to decide the aggressor. These were the salient features of 598 resolution.
Q: However, it (the resolution) fell short of Iran’s political and military objectives.
A: Yes. It was far from what Imam and combatants sought. But it was a victory of sorts for a Third World country. Of course, accepting the resolution 598 was postponed for several months due to ambiguities surrounding some of its terms.
Q: Mr. Hashemi has attributed the acceptance of the resolution to several reasons including exhaustion of Iranian forces, the letter wrote by economic ministers and the governor of the Central Bank to the effect that they could not afford the war requirements and your letter as the then commander of afford the revolutionary guards that it would have taken three years to rebuild troops. Mr. Hashemi has said that people were ready to accept austere conditions if Imam asked them to do so, but Mr. Rezaei’s letter finalized the acceptance of the resolution. However, you have attributed the letter to changing strategies and not the acceptance of the 598 UN resolution.
A: I don’t know what Mr. Hashemi’s attitude has been, but there was a disagreement between commanders and Mr. Hashemi, especially after the Operation Kheibar. Military commanders argued that political strategy will not be fruitful and asked for an opportunity to draw up a military strategy. However, their request was never granted by Mr. Hashemi and other political officials. He once told us that we cannot even supply bootlaces for Basijis and soldiers. Therefore, military strategy proposed by commanders was never heeded because domestic economy could not supply war needs. They only allowed this by the end of war, when political strategy proved a failure. Resolution 598 was, indeed, an outcome of the Faw and Karbala 5 operations. Even the said resolution was not observed. At that time, they asked us what we needed to terminate the war. Revolutionary guards wrote the letter to Mr. Hashemi (not Imam) revealing their requirements. Hashemi took the letter to Imam along with other letters from Mr. Khatami, the then minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, Mir-Hossein Mousavi; the then prime minister, as well as Army commanders telling him about what military commanders had requested while economic and political officials said they had no money. It was at the time that Imam accepted the UN resolution. Those developments were very vital and perhaps they were the most crucial juncture of the Islamic revolution that should be understood. Imam was opposed to war from the outset and was honest to people and combatants during the war. (Baztab Website; September 29, 2003)
Q: Can we compare the Iran-Iraq war with the US war against Iraq?
A: Iraq-Iran war can be compared to Iraq’s war with the United States from various viewpoints including similarities and differences. Both were unequal wars; that is, Iraq was superior to Iran in terms of the organized forces and advanced equipment while Iran lacked them. The second war was also unequal because the number of Iraqi soldiers was two times that of US troops, but Iraq was not comparable to the United States from in trems of air power. When Iraq attacked us, we were unequal from all viewpoints. Iraq was superior to us in terms of infantry as well as tanks and artillery. As air power, we were roughly on equal standing, but Iraq grew in air power later. So, how Iran could resist Iraqi forces for up to eight years and liberate all its occupied cities, but Iraq could not withstand the American onslaught for more than three weeks? We must note that both Iran and Iraq were the weaker sides of those wars. Iran was not prepared for battle just in the same way that Iraqis were not prepared to fight with the United States. At least, they did not take the possibility of war very seriously until a month before it started. We were also faced with a surprise war, but why we resisted and liberated our cities while Iraqis failed? I do not believe that Mr. Saddam Hussein had reached a compromise with the Americans. Perhaps some elements inside the Iraqi army were compromising and this happens in all wars when a powerful country attacks a weaker state. The main reason was that Iraqis did not see themselves on the same side as their government. It is true that they did not help the Americans, but they did not resist them too. This was not the case with the Iraq-Iran war when all our people from the nomads inhabiting border areas to those living in cities resisted Iraqis and offered martyrs. Therefore, the first reason was that Iranian people in contrast to Iraqi people were not indifferent to the war. The second reason was the existence of the revolutionary forces that were motivated and innovative. This was lacking in the Iraqi army where you could not find the likes of Jahanara. You could not find a single person like him who could resist the Americans with 50 soldiers, kill them and take them into captivity. We had many revolutionary youth younger than 30 years who were university graduates too. They organized people and fought in various cities. Most of our commanders such as Hemmat and Bakeri were not military men by nature, but were revolutionary elements who took up arms when the war began. The third reason was the existence of faithful, loyal forces in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Army. It is true that the Iranian army was trained by the American advisors under the former Shah, but it contained the revolutionary forces which did their best during the way though they were sometimes hampered by Mr. Bani Sadr. The Iraqi army lacked such loyal and revolutionary forces. Last but not least, there were defensive creativities, both at Iranian fronts and in the structure of Iranian corps including type of tactics, military arrangements, choosing operation strategy and style and so on. Iraqis were surprised by our initiatives. This did not happen during the Iraq war with the United States. All combat strategies used by Iraqis were known to the Americans and, therefore, the Iraqi forces were rapidly controlled by the American troops. However, people who are not familiar with military affairs may claim that Iraq’s rapid collapse was a result of a clandestine compromise. This is a political analysis of war.(Kayhan newspaper; May 24, 2003)
Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati
Q: One of the main ambiguities about the Iran-Iraq war which has drawn much attention from the media is its continuation after the retake of Khorramshahr. Several conflicting views have been expressed. Some domestic elements belonging to the Freedom Movement of Iran claim that after the recapture of Khorramshahr Iran was offered good proposals to end the war from Arab countries and not accepting them was a strategic mistake which prolonged the war for six more years. Some reformist political figures assert that Imam agreed to ceasefire after the liberation of Khorramshahr, but political and military authorities were against it and Imam finally surrendered to their viewpoint. On the other hand, Mr. Rafsanjani who was one of the most influential officials of that time took part in an interview last year saying that he was not willing to prolong the war, but it was some military commanders who were inspired by ideological goals of the Revolution and insisted on the continuation of war. On the contrary, Mohsen Rezaei, the then commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) has also noted that it was not the revolutionary zeal of military commanders but dawdling of political authorities which prolonged the war. You played a crucial role as the official in charge of the country’s diplomatic apparatus at that time. If Iran was to be proposed with ceasefire, that proposal should have come through the Foreign Ministry. Therefore, your analysis of what happened after the liberation of Khorramshahr can dispel many doubts.
A: To give a realistic and honest answer to this question, I must say that conditions at the war fronts were very suitable in the first half of 1361 (1982-83) because victories of the Iranian military which started by breaking the siege of Abadan in October of the preceding year had reached their acme after the liberation of Khorramshahr on May 24, 1982 and Iran had also retaken some of areas previously occupied by Iraq. Of course, there were still many places that remained occupied along the 1,200-km common border with Iraq and they continued to be occupied even after the end of war and the establishment of a ceasefire. The idea brought up at the Supreme Defense Council was that if we occupied some areas inside Iraqi territory we could use them as a good leverage to force Iraq withdraw its troops from Iran and pay Compensation. At the same time, it could have prompted international organizations to do something to put an end to the war. Those efforts which were spearheaded by the Organization of Islamic Conference, Non-Aligned Movement, and the United Nations as well as some Arab countries were intensified after the liberation of Khorramshahr. The United Nations sent Olaf Palme, the former Swedish prime minister as well as that country’s deputy foreign minister, Jan Eliason; while the Organization of Islamic Conference appointed a committee comprising the former Pakistani president, Zia-ul-Haq, former Bangladeshi president, Zia ur-Rahman, former Guinean president, Ahmed Sekou Toure, former Gambian president, Dawda Jawara, the former Turkish prime minister, Bulent Ulusu and head of Palestine Liberation Organization, Yasser Arafat. The Non-Aligned Movement had appointed some foreign ministers for consultations including the foreign ministers of Cuba, Zambian; former Indian foreign minister, Narasimha Rao; and former Palestinian foreign minister, Faruq Qaddumi. They visited Tehran but without any accurate proposal to meet our demands for going back to international borders and war the compensation.
After the liberation of Khorramshahr, some countries came up with certain innovations for ending the war and their proposals included our demands such as compensation for the first time. Withdrawal of Iraqi troops was the first priority for us because even after the liberation of Khorramshahr up to the acceptance of the 598 UN resolution, about 20,000 sq. km. of our soil was still occupied by Iraqi forces and if we had accepted ceasefire soon after the liberation of Khorramshahr, there were no guarantees that we could have regained our territories. This was very important as most our soldiers were not professional and included Basij forces who were sure to leave the war fronts after truce. However, Iraqi forces who were professional soldiers would have retained their positions. If we had accepted peace at that time, a catastrophe like what happened after the second Iran-Russian war would have happened. During those wars, Abbas Mirza attacked Russian troops by relying on the lay people who had come to the war fronts after ulema issued fatwas and forced Papkovic, the famous Russian commander, to withdraw up to Tbilisi. However, volunteer Iranian forces returned to their homes in the fall and Papkovic grasped that opportunity to attack Iran again when he advanced as far as Zanjan and Qazvin. If we had accepted truce after the liberation of Khorramshahr, since the UN resolution had only mentioned ceasefire and not the withdrawal of forces, there was no guarantee-even outward-that Iraqi troops would have withdrawn from Iran’s occupied regions while volunteer forces would have left the war fronts. On the other hand, our professional soldiers were not as numerous as their Iraqi counterparts who had increased by threefold and there was a risk that Iraq might have kept the occupied Iranian territories and even launched repeated assaults on Iran. Therefore, withdrawal of forces and war compensation were our top demands for accepting ceasefire. The first clear proposal for ceasefire and compensation was presented to us by the then secretary general of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Habib Shatti.
Shatti came to Tehran to tell us that he can talk the wealthy Arab countries to pay the war compensation. His proposed figure was 10 billion dollars, but we said the figure fell short of our expectations. During the same time, Mr. Bandar, the then Indian deputy foreign minister conducted similar negotiations as intermediary to determine the war compensation and he was talking about 30-50 billion dollars. However, neither Mr. Shatti, nor Mr. Bandar gave a clear answer to us. Mr. Shatti was not in a position to provide us with a final commitment. Though he was secretary general of Organization of the Islamic Conference, he was neither a foreign minister, nor a deputy foreign minister and he could not propose assurances about 10 billion dollars which was one-tenth of the appraisal of Mr. Abu Faraj, a Somalian expert of the United Nations. He had approximated Iran’s war compensation to stand at some 100 billion dollars, though we still believe that the actual figure is much higher and near 1,000 billion dollars. In fact, no official from Saudi Arabia or other Arab countries that were supposed to pay us compensation, engaged in committed, serious negotiations with us. We took lessons from the the Middle East experiences and the previous wars between Arab countries and Israel. Israel never withdrew from the occupied territories and when the initial fervor of Arab countries ebbed, it easily owned their lands. Those conditions were more acute in our war with Iraq because the whole world was practically behind the aggressor and it was possible for Iraq to use an alternative war and ceasefire to occupy the whole Iran. Therefore, before the approval of the first resolution that met our priorities; that is, the withdrawal of Iraqi troops and the announcement of aggressor by the 598 UN resolution in 1987, we were offered no appropriate ground for ending the war and accepting peace.
Q: What was the position of our officials about accepting peace?
A: Some political officials were disappointed with war and were willing to accept ceasefire. Their willingness was increased due to the widespread media propaganda. Western countries kept claiming that Iraq was to blame for starting war with Iran while Iran was to blame for continuing the war and passing over peace proposals. In reality, however, we were offered no honorable solution up to the end of the war before the approval of the 598 UN resolution. Of course, that resolution was the fruit of a heroic six-year resistance at the war fronts and persistence in political negotiations which made that resolution include all our main demands for announcing aggressor and the withdrawal of Iraqi forces to the international borders.
Q: Another ambiguity about Iran’s positions during the war is a time interval of more than one year between the approval of the 598 UN resolution by the Security Council and the acceptance of ceasefire by Iran. Diplomatic critics of the Islamic Republic of Iran who are mainly Western-minded and liberal, incriminate you with abstinence and acting on ideological grounds at that juncture and claim that when you should have shown more resilience and put a rapid end to the war, you resisted more than a year before accepting the resolution and this incurred heavy losses on our country.
A: Those remarks, like other claims, are more due to the lack of information about Iran’s political position.
In reality, when resolution 598 was approved in 1987, it needed an executive bylaw which was presented by the then UN secretary general after a short while. We believed that both the resolution and its executive bylaw should be accepted simultaneously. Iraq, however, did not accept the executive bylaw which was the gist of the resolution, and his continued for a whole year. Iran maintained that accepting the resolution without its executive bylaw would be meaningless and futile. The first paragraph of the resolution was about the withdrawal of both sides to behind the international borders. If a timetable was not set, the Iraqis would have stayed on our soil and kept occupied territories until the international atmosphere changed. Therefore, Iraqis opposed the executive bylaw which was proposed by Javier Perez de Cuellar, the then UN secretary general, and this was in fact opposing the resolution. A sign of opposition was that after the unilateral acceptance of the resolution and its executive bylaw by Iran, Iraq did not accept it and attacked us again, dispatching MKO (Mujahideen Khalq) forces to our country and taking many Iranian soldiers into captivity to use them as bargaining chips for swapping the prisoners of war. Therefore, up to the time that we accepted the resolution 598 in the summer of 1988 without Iraq accepting its executive bylaw, Western countries frequently emphasized that Iraq has accepted the resolution while Iran has refused to do so. At that time, they were taken by surprise because we had accepted ceasefire, but Iraq attacked us. It was at that time that I went to New York for peace talks and I saw that my Iraqi counterpart, Tariq Aziz, was not ready to accept ceasefire and only emphasized on rapid initiation of bilateral negotiations. Tehran was pressing me to announce ceasefire as soon as possible, but Iraqis did not accept it. Therefore, I announced that as long as Iraq has not accepted ceasefire, there was no point in negotiating with its foreign minister. In fact, we made initiation of negotiations conditional on the acceptance of ceasefire by Iraq.
Under those circumstances, the whole world was pressing Iraq to accept ceasefire. Bandar bin Sultan, Saudi ambassador in Washington, went to Iraq and all Western countries were urging Iraq to accede to ceasefire. Finally, after several days of my arrival in New York on the invitation of the UN secretary general and pressed by the whole world, Tariq Aziz, went to New York, but still asserted that he was under no orders to accept ceasefire. However, under the tremendous international pressure, Iraq finally accepted ceasefire on August 20, 1988. According to the executive bylaw of the resolution, UN peacekeepers were to be deployed along the Iran-Iraq borders after the acceptance of ceasefire by both countries to supervise truce and the both sides were called on to go back behind the international borders after a set period of time. After another interval, the prisoners of war were to be swapped followed by announcement of the aggressor. Iraqis were not willing to accept ceasefire because they wanted to use it as a bargaining chip; that is to use its leverage for abrogating the Algeria 1975 Treaty; a goal they failed to achieve through war. For this reason, when I started negotiations with Tariq Aziz, the Iraqis insisted that negotiations about ceasefire and dredging Arvand River should be carried out simultaneously. We told them that dredging should be done according to the Algeria 1975 Treaty, but Tariq Aziz mentioned they were not agreed to dredging according to the said treaty. He proposed that we must first dredge the river before negotiating about the 1975 Treaty. This was a stratagem used by Iraqis because if you could make a single article of a contract null and void, all other article would share that destiny and become nonnegotiable. For this reason, Iraqis wanted to make the whole Algeria 1975 contract null and void by bypassing the article on dredging Shat-al-Arab. This caused problems during negotiations which were suspended for some two years after accepting ceasefire. Of course, during that time UN peacekeepers were deployed between our forces and Iraqi forces. In fact, ceasefire was in place without any real peace. The important point about the positions taken by Iraq and Tariq Aziz was that they tried to weaken United Nations’ role or totally do away with it; so as to conduct negotiations without the supervision of the United Nations. We, on the other hand, insisted that the United Nations should oversee talks because we were not in the same conditions militarily as we were before 1987 and we wanted to use the UN leverage to press Iraqis. Anytime those negotiations reached an impasse, we use that leverage to press Iraqis. We even had long debates about the arrangement of the negotiating table in Geneva because it had a special meaning. Our position was that the table should be arranged as a triangle; one side us, one side Iraqis and one side for the UN and this was the final configuration of the table. Another discrepancy was about the venue of negotiations. We insisted that the talks should be held in New York, but they insisted on Geneva. In New York we had a stronger political lobby due to the presence of prominent ambassadors from all countries and we could use that lobby to press Iraq into accepting peace. This was not the case in Geneva. Anyway, negotiations on the basis of 598 UN resolution were carried out over two years and in many bouts. On the whole, 598 UN resolution was not pleasant to us and the late Imam likened it to drinking a ‘chalice of poison’ and explained the reasons for accepting the resolution in a secret letter to legislative authorities.
Q: Were you under any pressure from political authorities or Iran during the acceptance of the resolution and the subsequent talks, to withdraw in the face of Iraqi counterpart?
A: Diplomatic apparatus was under many pressures at that juncture, especially after accepting ceasefire, because prolonged negotiations were conducted on dredging Arvand River and, in fact, the credit of the Algeria 1975 Treaty. Some political officials also pressured us to withdraw on dredging Arvand River which would have made the whole 1975 Treaty null and void. However, my personal belief and experience was that if we withdrew on Iran’s territorial integrity, we would not only have been taken responsible before history; but the whole system of the Islamic Republic of Iran would also have been incriminated with sacrificing national interests as well as Iran’s territory the 1975 Algeria Treaty. Therefore, I vehemently resisted all pressures and orders that called on us to withdraw during the negotiations. They said, “There is no point in your resistance because peace is more important than dredging Shat- al-Arab and if this goes on, Iraq may attack us again.” They even talked with Imam about this and Imam had told them that Velayati is right and sent a message to me telling me to be steadfast. At the same time, Iraqis were cunningly using diplomatic maneuvering to take Shat al-Arab away from us. Even Tariq Aziz said to me imploringly that “you have a long coastal line in your country, but our only access to high waters is through Khour Abdollah and Basra.” In fact, this issue; that is access to high seas and control of Bubiyan Island was the main motive for Iraq to storm Kuwait. It was for that reason that Saddam reached a compromise with us and withdrew from Iran. (Baztab Website; April 1, 2005)
General Alaei
Q: How do you compare the Sacred Defense, especially the liberation of Khorramshahr to other wars in the history of our country?
A: During the past centuries, Iran has always lost part of its territory during wars or has given in to contracts that have ultimately leds to loss of land such as the derogatory Turkmenchai Treaty. Even during the former Shah’s regime, when Iran had full backing of the United States and enjoyed the most powerful army in the region, Iran lost one of its great islands. I quite remember that when we studied at school, our geography book mentioned one of the current island states of the Persian Gulf as Iran’s 14th province. However, that island and even part of western mountainous areas of Iran were lost under the former Shah. Therefore, every war in which Iran has been engaged over the past centuries has led to loss of our territory. It is a fact that Iraq’s war against Iran was not simply a regional war waged by one of our neighbors and many analysts have admitted that we have been facing forces missioned by world powers to topple our government. The Iraqi army did not talk about border targets or territorial disputes, but they clearly mentioned overthrow of the Islamic government as their ultimate goal. What they said had been dictated to them by the world hegemonic powers and they enjoyed modern equipments to do so. On the opposite, we had practically nothing. But the major thing that happened was people’s resistance against occupying forces which started from the beginning of the enemy’s onslaught. When that resistance was tied to classic forces, it led to generation of a major power which made our defensive forces prevail over Iraqis and, as a result, Iraqi forces changed their position from an offensive one to a defensive stance after only six months of war. After two more years, we started to force Iraqis back into their own territory and everybody knows that during the eight-year war not even one millimeter of our soil was occupied by Iraqi troops. I think the 34-day resistance of the people of Khorramshahr was the gist of war and a manifestation of all subsequent resistance during the war.
Q: As the then commander of Karbala Headquarters what do you think was the role of that headquarters during the liberation of Khorramshahr?
A: Karbala Headquarters was in charge of designing and controlling operations. It played a major role before operations which was designing a plan to take occupied lands back from the enemy by putting into force a chain of operations and when they were carried out it was proved that the early idea behind them has been correct. Those operations were code-named Karbala 1 through Karbala 12 which led to withdrawal of the occupying forces from our land. Another important role played by the Headquarters was the large-scale design of the operations and using suitable tactics for every operation. For example, one of the main reasons behind the victory of Operation Beit-ul-Moqaddas was the tactic chosen. At that time, there were two schools of thought. The first one was a purely classical military thought which was planned and executed according to classical military concepts. They said you should depend on logistical routes to operate and choose a route through which you would be able to go ahead after passing through the enemy’s frontline. This is true but when conditions are prepared. It pertains to two armies which are on equal standing. But our problem was that we faced Iraqi army by relying on personal capabilities, not modern equipment. During Operation Beit-ul-Moqaddas Iraq also brought in its armored forces while deploying a huge number of its infantry troops; so that, it was very difficult to pass through the enemy’s frontlines. Under those conditions, we should have designed a maneuver which would have both been executable and successful. Therefore, the Karbala Headquarters, especially its command believed in finding the best way to victory taking into account enemy’s fortifications and abilities. They highly valued initiatives. They maintained that if we could find vulnerable points of the enemy, we could use our forces at those points to the best effect. Karbala Headquarters found the best maneuver for the Operation Beit-ul-Moqaddas by taking advantage of fearless intelligence forces who risked their lives by penetrating deep inside the enemy’s fortifications and identifying their weak points. The maneuver was designed on the basis of that information and operation was carried out 14 km deep inside enemy forces by our infantry. This maneuver was in contrast to classic warfare and proved quite successful. During the first night our forces gained control of the Ahvaz – Khorramshahr road and this role was played by the Karbala Headquarters. The next role of the headquarters was the management of operations and maneuvers proportionate to the situation of war. Though the main goal of the Karbala Headquarters was reaching Khorramshahr, the maneuver used in that operation was designed to get our forces to the back of enemy troops stationed in Khorramshahr. For this reason, when our forces crossed the Ahvaz – Khorramshahr road during the further stages of that operation and reached the stronghold of Saddam’s forces, the 5th and 6th mechanized divisions of the Iraqi Army fled from the region.(Iran newspaper; May 24, 2003)