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Jahangir Karami
Introduction
Iran and Russia have had good relations with each other during the past 20 years and political officials and analysts have refereed to the relationship between these two countries as “important cooperation” and “strategic one.” Nevertheless, relationship between Iran and Russia has been faced with serious problems since nearly one year ago. For instance, despite agreements signed between the two countries, Russia refused to deliver S-300 missile defense systems to Iran; Russians also put obstacles for Iran’s membership in Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the recent summit meeting of this organization in Tashkent.
We can talk of a “grand bargain” between Russia and the United States in which Iran has been sacrificed. According to this perception, Iran is considered as “bargaining chip” in Russia’s interactions with the West. Also, we can refer to the “termination of Iran’s role and function for Russians” as another important factor in this regard. At the same time, Russians are possibly worried of Iran’s threats against their interests. Russia feels that Iran is getting increasingly powerful. Russian officials are possibly worried of Iran’s nuclear programs and its probable influence among Muslims in southern Russia. Finally, we can refer to basic and fundamental problems in the relationship between Iran and Russia, as well as, their expectations from each other. At the same, both Russia and Iran do not understand each other very clearly. In other words, there have been issues in Iran’s “Look to the East” policy and its application towards Russia which have not been clarified. The current state of affairs is the result of such ambiguities. As a result, basic variables of the present research are pursued within concepts such as “Russia’s bargaining chip,” “a finished opportunity for Russia”, “a future threat for Russia”, and “unrealistic expectations from both sides.”
The author of the present article endeavors to make a review of Iran- relationship between the two countries within the past year. The present research evaluates the above-mentioned variables and puts the greatest emphasis on the last variable as one of the basic issues of this research. According to this perspective, Iran-Russia relations during the past 20 years will be evaluated based on Tehran’s ambiguous understanding of international issues. The author of the present article believes that both Iran and Russia, as two important partners, can adopt realistic and appropriate policies based on accurate understandings, and rational expectations, of each other’s potentials and capabilities during the new era.
Iran-Russia Cooperation during the Past 20 Years
Following the termination of Iraqi imposed war on Iran in 1988 and the departure of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in late 1980s, Tehran and Moscow experienced a new era of relationships. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the then - Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (the Majlis), paid a visit to Moscow in 1989 during which the two sides signed a 10-billion dollar agreement for economic and technical cooperation. Following the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1990, both Russia and Iran continued their collaborations with each other and gradually expanded these collaborations. High ranking officials of both Russia and Iran, such ministers of defense and foreign affairs and secretaries of national security council, paid visits to each other’s capitals. Geopolitical issues and Russia’s further distance from Iranian borders following the collapse of the former Soviet Union reduced Iran’s feeling of threat from its northern neighbor. At the same time, both Iran and Russia witnessed the emergence of a buffer zone between themselves that were prone to the influence of third partners.
As a result, Iranian and Russian officials were exposed to a situation in which their interests were seen as entangled with each other. Iranian and Russian leaders met each other in New York in 2001. Former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami paid a visit to Russia in 2001 and signed an agreement for basic cooperation between the two countries with former Russian President Vladimir Putin. These initiatives contributed to further enhancement of relations between Iran and Russia. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, too, has met his Russian counterpart. He has met with Russian president three times at the sideline of summits of Shanghai Cooperation Organization. At the same time, former Russian President Vladimir Putin paid a historical visit to Iran in October 2007. It was the first visit of a Russian leader to Iran during the past four decades and was interpreted as an important development in the relationship between the two countries. Russian officials, at the level of minister, had previously visited Iran; nevertheless, no Russian president or prime minister had visited Iran during the past four decades.
Political observers and analysts had repeatedly referred to the importance of Putin’s visit to Iran because many political circles believed that, due to the importance of Russia’s relationship with the United States, it was impossible that Putin made such a trip to Iran. Nevertheless, Vladimir Putin visited Iran in mid October to participate in the summit of the Caspian Sea littoral states. Former President Putin met Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during his trip to Tehran. (1)
Following the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Iran had no longer any common border with Russia. In fact, Iran and the former Soviet Union had nearly 2250 km of common borders until 1990. After the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, Russia’s threats against Iran were removed to a 400-km distance northward. It was a great development for the relationship between the two countries. However, there was a vacuum of power in the buffer zone that had been created in the geographical area between Iran and Russia after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. As a result, this geographical area witnessed the crisis which was the outcome of the presence of foreign powers there. Both Iran and Russia felt that the presence of foreign forces in this area is threatening their national interests. In fact, the collapse of the former Soviet Union had resulted in the establishment of a set of fragile, unsustainable, and subordinate systems in this region. During the early years after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the so-called “Atlantic-oriented” rulers of Russia prioritized their country’s integration with international and Western institutions over any other initiative.
As a result, the Islamic Republic of Iran had no appropriate status in Russian foreign policy. Russia even considered Iran as a threat against Moscow’s interests in Caucasus and central Asia. (2) During these years, the new Russian government was faced with numerous domestic problems. They were optimistic of Western contribution to their privatization program and economic revival initiatives. At the same time, Russians looked at political issues from a Western perspective. In other words, Russia had adopted an outlook towards Iran which was identical with that of the Western powers. In fact, Russians considered Iran as a threat against Moscow’s interests and, therefore, were less inclined towards cooperation and collaboration with the Islamic Republic of Iran. On the other hand, the bureaucratic system in Russia was concentrated on further expansion of Moscow’s relations with the West. However, the “Atlantic-oriented” outlook in Russia was gradually faced with great challenges and Russian elites adopted a doubtful perception towards such an outlook.
In order to convince the domestic public opinion and demonstrate their freedom of action in international relations, Russian officials decided to expand their relations with countries like Iran. The First Chechen Crisis (1994 – 1996) should be considered as the climax of tensions in the relations between the two countries. Later on, this crisis became an important factor for proximity between Iran and Russia. Since 1995, Russia has experienced an ever - increasing wave of nationalism and anti-American sentiments. As a result, Russian officials were obliged to adopt a more moderate and anti-Western foreign policy and communists and extremist nationalists allocated a large portion of votes in general elections of 1993 in Russia. (3) This shift in Russian policies along with anti-American sentiments and common interests in peripheral areas contributed to the expansion of relations between the two countries. At the same time, the two countries put great emphasis on expansion of economic, technical, and military cooperation. (4) Various factors have been effective in the expansion of Iran-Russia relations: geographical proximity, understanding their common interests in various regional fields, relative isolation of both countries and mutual understanding of the necessity of opposition towards the presence and influence of major foreign powers in their marginal environment.
Iranians considered their relationship with Russia as an instrument for further development of their international objectives. Iranian officials believed that expansion of relations with Russia could enhance their stance against Western and regional powers who were interested in constraining Iran’s role in the Middle East region. For Russian officials expansion of relations with Iran was important from another perspective: it is contributed to the expansion of Russia’s influence in regional and international affairs, especially the affairs of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region. Russian officials also could use their expansion of relations with Iran as an instrument to convince domestic public opinion of their own independence and freedom of action. Expansion of Russia’s relationship with Iran was quite effective in solving Moscow’s problems with the Caspian Sea littoral states and the issue of Muslims in Chechnya. Economic, technical and military cooperation between Iran and Russia expanded to an extent that the volume of exchanges between the two countries in 2007-2009 period surpassed more than 3.5 billion dollars. (5)
Nevertheless, Russia and Iran have experienced some problems and difficulties in their relations with each other during the past 20 years which have been ignored or marginalized by the officials of both countries. The Caspian Sea has always been one of the problems of Russia with the Islamic Republic of Iran during these years. In their covert or overt agreements with the Caspian Sea littoral states, Russians have paid little attention to Iran’s demands and concerns about this sea. Russia believes that Astara- Husseingholi is the separating line between Iran and neighboring Caspian Sea littoral states. This line has been drawn according to unilateral agreements among former Soviet republics before the collapse of the communist system in Moscow.
During the past 17 years, Russia acted supportively of such an approach. In fact, Russians have been disinclined towards making any agreement or issuing any statement in which further shares of the Caspian Sea have been allocated to Iran. Bilateral agreements between Russia and Kazakhstan and between Russia and Azerbaijan are considered as a blow to Iran’s stance regarding the legal regime of the Caspian Sea. Of course, the Islamic Republic of Iran has never accepted such an illusory dividing line which reduces Iran’s share of the Caspian Sea to less than 12 percent of this sea.
Iran and Russia are also at odds over energy routes that transfer oil and natural gas of the Caspian Sea region to global markets. Russia has adopted different strategies and approaches in order to convince Caspian Sea littoral states to select northern routes. It is quite natural that the Islamic Republic of Iran prefers southern routes as the shortest and the most economic routes for the transfer of energy resources of this region to global markets. Currently, most of the energy exports of the Caspian Sea region pass through northern routes and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Iran and Russia are also competing with each other in selling crude oil and natural gas to different countries of the world. When the Islamic Republic of Iran inaugurated the natural gas pipeline to Armenia with the annual capacity of 2 billion cubic meters, Russians purchased the whole share of the Armenian Natural Gas Company through their giant Gazprom. Afterwards, Russians were responsible for distributing the natural gas throughout Armenia. (6) It has been reported that the Russian Gazprom has endeavored to reduce the diameter of gas pipelines in northern Armenia from 1420 mm to 700 mm in order to stop the exportation of natural gas from Armenia to Georgia.
In addition, Russia practically expressed its concerns over Iran’s preparedness to export natural gas to Georgia during Moscow - Tbilisi crisis. As a major supplier of energy to Europe, Russia has always been concerned with Iran’s intentions to export its natural gas to European countries. When Russia’s export of natural gas to Ukraine and Europe was interrupted for a while in 2006 and 2007, Western states expressed their willingness to purchase part of their required natural gas from Iran. In his visit to Lisbon, Portugal, Iran’s Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, expressed Tehran’s preparedness to export its natural gas to Europe through Nabucco pipeline.
It was quite clear that Russians were dissatisfied with any natural gas agreement between Iran and Europe. (7) Russians are seriously opposed to the presence of their energy rivals in European markets; however, they have expressed their preparedness for making investments in projects that transfer Iranian natural gas to the “East.” For instance, Gazprom has proposed to make investments in the pipeline project that will transfer Iranian natural gas to Pakistan and India. Despite all these ups and downs in relations between Iran and Russia during the past 20 years, both countries have emphasized on mutual cooperation, especially at bilateral and regional levels.
Issues and Problems in Iran-Russia Relations since 2009
First signs of tension in Iran-Russia relations emerged in summer 2009. However, the two countries had previously experienced numerous ups and downs in their relations which were indicative of tremendous interruptions in Tehran-Moscow relations. A few days after presidential election of June 2009 in Iran, the Iranian state television broadcasted footages of president Ahmadinejad’s meeting with his Russian counterpart. According to Iranian state TV, President Medvedev congratulated Ahmadinejad over his reelection as Iranian president. This meeting was significantly important at that condition and it was generally assumed that the relationship between Iran and Russia was satisfactory. It was due to this fact that Mehdi Karrubi, the defeated candidate of Iranian presidential election, introduced Russia as the “exporter of the technology of suppression to Iran.” Iranian protesters expressed their dislike of Russian policies on various occasions through their slogan of “Death to Russia.” A few months later, the Russian government issued several statements in which Iran’s government had been invited to behave moderately towards street protesters. According to polls by Asr-e Iran website, 96 present of respondents were suspicious of Russia’s intentions.
More signs of tension between Iran and Russia emerged in the negotiations that were conducted over the establishment of an organization of natural gas exporting states. Russia expected Iran’s support of Moscow’s proposal for hosting the headquarters of such an organization. However, there was no agreement between the two countries over this issue and the negotiation process came to a standstill.
On January 19, 2009, Iranian officials did not allow a Russian cargo plane to pass through their country’s airspace en route to Bahrain. Nevertheless, Iran issued the necessary license for the transit of this Russian cargo plane through Iranian airspace. As a result of this delay, Russians were not able to send their sample SU27SKM fighter jet to the International Exhibition of Aerospace Industry in Bahrain. Iranian officials argued that they have received no on-time request from Russians demanding the passage of this cargo airplane through Iranian airspace. At the same time, Russia’s Ria Novosty News Agency described this behavior of Iranian officials as the latest sign of tension in Tehran-Moscow relations. This Russian news agency also enumerated several other cases of tension between Iran and Russia. Elsewhere, President Ahmadinejad urged major powers (including Russia) to make compensations for losses that they have imposed on Iran during World Was II. President Ahmadinejad’s remarks made in the inauguration ceremony of a cultural heritage exhibition were extensively reflected in Russia’s mass media. (8)
In another development, Iran rejected Russia’s proposal for the exchange of nuclear fuel and instead made an agreement with Turkey and Brazil for such a swap. Through expressing their confidence in Turkey, Iranians officials implicitly indicated that Russia is not a reliable partner. Afterwards, Russian officials adopted a harsher stand against Iran and, unlike previous years, expressed their concern about Iranian nuclear activities. They even advocated the necessity of adopting tougher actions against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Sergey Lavrov, Russian foreign minister, reiterated “We are sorry that Iran considers the suggested proposal for the swap of nuclear fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor as unacceptable.”
Russian foreign minister added “We believe that it is necessary to carry out greater efforts in this regard and also resume negotiations about different all aspects of Iranian nuclear program. Our objective is quite clear and transparent. We want Iran to remove all doubts and uncertainties about its nuclear program and assure the international community of the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. If there are no doubts and uncertainties about Iran’s nuclear activities, then nobody will reject Iran’s right to use peaceful nuclear technology. But it is not a simple situation. Considering the internal political situation in Iran, there is little hope about the state of affairs in the future. Nevertheless, all of us should act responsibly. The United Nations Security Council can assess other measures that can be adopted in this regard. However, it is expected all those who are involved in future decision-making procedures follow the nonproliferation regime and refrain from creating any ambiguity about the content of this regime. They are only required to put the nonproliferation regime and its content on the agenda.”
Russian top diplomat pointed out “Doubts and uncertainties about Iran’s nuclear activities emerged very soon and all the efforts of “three-plus-three” group were concentrated on removing these doubts and uncertainties. We wish to witness a constructive performance from Iran. It is generally believed that Iranian officials and the “three-plus-three” group have reached very useful agreements in Geneva talks. Nevertheless, these agreements have remained impractical. Once again, I should reiterate that the issue is quite complicated. We should act consciously and responsibly. All nuclear powers should concentrate on the implementation of nonproliferation regime. From this perspective, it is vitally important to have the International Atomic Energy Agency continue its inspections sustainably. We should not adopt steps which threaten future efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Iran. All our initiatives that are carried out within the context of “three-plus-three”, the United Nations Security Council, or any other organization should not contradict the International Atomic Energy Agency, because the Agency’s experts have more experience and information in this regard. The International Atomic Energy Agency, as a neutral international entity, is supposed to issue the final verdict on the scope of these threats through its inspectors and experts. However, it is vitally important to refrain from any violation of the nonproliferation regime.” (9)
Addressing a gathering of Russian diplomats, President Medvedev pointed out “I should refer to a very complicated issue, i.e. Iran’s nuclear program. We should refrain from simple mechanisms in this regard. It is quite clear that Iran is approaching the capability that can actually be used in the development of atomic weapons. It is obvious that Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has not banned the attainment of such a capability. Nevertheless, this issue has a systematic state of affair and is associated with defects that are apparent in contemporary international laws about the nonproliferation regime. I have repeatedly negotiated with our partners (including the United States and others) and emphasized that we cannot attain favorable results through mere imposing sanctions on Iran; nevertheless, these sanctions can be associated with specific meanings. Through adopting such measures, the international community sends a signal that the process of negotiation should be encouraged by all means. Currently, it is necessary to be patient and resume negotiations with Iran as soon as possible. We believe that the recent United Nations Security Council resolution against Iran is focused on attaining such an objective. Today, the failure of diplomacy is the failure of all of us. However, we should not forget that the behavior of the Iranian side has never been the best possible behavior. We have invited, and we will invite, Iran to expand its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency as much as possible and clarify all remaining issues about its nuclear program. Such an approach can guarantee the interests of the Iranian side. Those who are searching and endeavoring to find out an acceptable approach have a very heavy responsibility on their shoulders. All of them should actively cooperate with each other and refrain from unilateral actions.” (10)
Iran’s president’s response to these remarks of his Russian counterpart was a tough one. Addressing the Russian president, Ahmadinejad observed that President Medvedev “is ignorantly playing in an anti-Iranian drama written by Americans. He broadcasted the advertisement of an American propaganda film and even acted against his own country’s interests.” (11)
Russia’s Perspective towards Iran: Today’s Bargaining Chip or Futures Threat?
In the analysis of factors that have been effective in the deterioration of relations between Iran and Russia, one can argue that Russian officials have looked at Iran as a good partner for cooperation during the years after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. According to this argument, Iran has had numerous advantages for Russia and Russians have been dependent on their cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Advocates of such an argument believe that nowadays Russia is no longer dependent on Iran, and Tehran has no longer its previous advantages for Russians. During the years that Russia was faced with various threats in Central Asia and Caucasus and different countries were trying to expand their influence in the newly independent states of these regions, Iran was the only country that contributed to Russia to cope with regional crises in Central Asia and Caucasus and prevent the expansion of Western influence in these regions. Iran helped Russia to prevent the influence of Taliban in Central Asia. Of course, the Islamic Republic of Iran was furthering its national interests through such collaborations with Russia. Advocates of such a perspective argue that those bargaining chips are nowadays unavailable to Iran and Russia is more interested to expand its relations with the United States rather than the Islamic Republic of Iran.
However, many analysts, especially critics of Iran’s foreign policy, argue that Russia considers Iran as a bargaining chip in its “new grand bargain” with the United States. Based on this perspective, Russians are essentially utilitarian and traitors who look at all their partners and allies as an instrument for further development of their own objectives. Advocates of this outlook argue that Russians can be trusted because they leave their partners and allies whenever they wish. They refer to a long list of countries which were Russia’s allies but were left alone by Russians at the time of crisis. Serbia in 1999, Iraq in 1991 and 2003, and Libya in the 1990s are enumerated by advocates of such a perspective as some examples which prove Russia’s untrustworthiness. Russian and American proximity during the past two years has given momentum to such a perspective among political analysts and scholars of Iran-Russia relations.
During the past two years, Russia has gradually improved it relations with the United States and, at the same time, Iran has been one of the main issues that the two countries have made comprehensive agreements about it. (12) In his election campaigns, President Barrack Obama made numerous statements about the necessity of cooperation with Russia in order to stand against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Russian foreign minister and the US Secretary of State met each other in Geneva and emphasized on the necessity of further expansion of cooperation between the two countries. Later on, Obama and Medvedev met each other at the sideline of the G-20 summit in London in April 2009. The two leaders issued a joint communication which was mainly focused on cooperation for the development of international security and resumption of negotiations for the reduction of nuclear strategic weapons. (13) What is so much important is the fact that leaders of Russia and the United States have met seven times since Obama’s arrival to the White House in 2008. The two leaders have made important agreements with each other during these meetings.
Therefore, we can argue that Russia and the United States have resumed their relations in a new fashion during Obama and Medvedev administrations. Following Hillary Clinton’s visit to Russia, a working group, headed by Yevgeny Primakov, former Russian prime minister, and Henry Kissinger, former US secretary of states, was established which was commissioned to assess the relationship between the countries and present approaches which could further expand these relations. Barrack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev met each other in July 6, 2009, and emphasized on further expansion of bilateral ties. The two leaders made agreements over different issues, such as strategic weapons control, missile defense system in Eastern Europe, NATO’s eastward expansion, Afghanistan crisis, and Iranian nuclear issue. Obama and Medvedev also emphasized on cooperation for solving global problems and signed a document for joint collaboration between the two countries. At the same time, Russian and American military officials (General of the Army Nikolay Yegorovich Makarov and General Mike Mullen) signed an agreement about Afghanistan which specified the details of their mutual cooperation in this regard. Based on this agreement, the United States was allowed to transfer its military equipments to Afghanistan through Russian territory and airspace.
Describing Iran’s nuclear program as dangerous and referring to Iran and North Korea as threats of the 21st century, Barrack Obama once again related the establishment of the U.S. missile defense system in Europe to confront Iran’s nuclear program. In his speech in Russian School of Economy, the US president observed: “If Iran stops its military program, it will be meaningless to establish the US missile defense system in Europe.” (14) Elaborating on the issue of membership of Russian neighbors in NATO, Barrack Obama pointed out: “Each country’s membership in NATO is dependent on the consent of the majority of the people of that country. In addition, that country should carry out required domestic reforms in order to be eligible for membership in this organization and participate in the missions of allies. Let me speak clearly: NATO should cooperate with Russia and refrain from confrontation with this country.” (15)
In June 23, 2010, Russian and American leaders once again met each other in Washington and negotiated about nuclear arms control, Iran’s nuclear program and new procurement lines to Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan crisis, Middle East issues, European security and reduction of strategic trade. Expressing his support of Russia’s membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), Barrack Obama pointed out that Moscow and Washington are still at odds over issues such as Georgian crisis. Nevertheless, commercial and economic issues were main subjects of negotiations between Russian and American leaders. Russian and American presidents signed agreements over Russian membership in the World Trade Organization, purchase of 50 Boeing airplanes by Russians, and facilitation of the export of American poultry to Russia. Obama and Medvedev expressed their support of the interim government in Kyrgyzstan and its efforts for creating stability in this Central Asian state. The two leaders emphasized on the necessity of tougher sanctions on Iran and North Korea and decided to continue their strategic cooperation on Afghanistan.
However, Russia and the United States are still at odds over issues such as Georgian crisis, NATO’s eastward expansion, missile defense system in Europe, nuclear arms control treaty, and human rights record in Russia. Perhaps, we can argue that the establishment of a commission at presidential level for guaranteeing the continuation and expansion of relations between the two countries was the most tangible outcome of President Medvedev’s visit to Washington. President Medvedev also visited the Silicon Valley. The Russian president also welcomed the investment of American companies in the computer and information technology of his own country. The Silicon Valley is considered as the global center for high technology and plays a vitally important role in the development of information and telecommunication technology in the world. In his visit to the Silicon Valley, President Medvedev observed that he is inclined to take advantage of American experiences in establishing such a center in Russia, especially because many of famous experts and scientist in the Silicon Valley are Russians who have migrated to this region after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. (16)
Despite the fact that there are numerous problems in the relationship between Russia and the United States, the two countries have been focused on solving their differences over issues such missile defense system, Russian neighbors problems, contribution to Russian development, and strategic challenges during the past two years and have signed important agreements over these issues. Nevertheless, none of these issues have been completely solved yet. In fact, these issues are passing through a process which moves through the time. For instance, Russia and the United States have postponed their negotiations over the missile defense system until 2015. Meanwhile, Russians are less concerned with the substitute missile defense system that is currently being deployed by Americans. As another example, we can refer to the reduction of American interference in the affairs of Russian neighbors.
At the same time, it seems that the United States has removed some of its obstacles for providing developmental contributions to Russia. However, the strategic challenge can be considered as the most important and sensitive issue in Russian-American relations. Due to their nature, any agreement over one of these issues is dependent on agreements over other issues. Russia has also expanded its cooperation with NATO forces in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, it seems that Russia makes no effort to prevent tougher UN sanctions on Iran and North Korea. Russia’s refusal of preventing tougher UN sanctions against Iran is still affecting the Tehran-Moscow relations. Therefore, many observers and analysts consider these developments and interactions as a grand bargain which has been reflected in various agreements between Russia and the United States. They also argue that Russia has taken advantage of Iran as a bargaining chip for its own peculiar intentions.
Finally, we should focus on another variable, i.e. the issue of “threat.” Some analysts, especially Russian analysts, consider Iran as a threat for Russia. According to this perspective, a powerful Iran which has envisaged Central Asia, Caucasus, and the Caspian Sea region as its “critical peripheries”, can be a serious threat for Russian interests and influence in these regions. Russians refer to Central Asia, Caucasus, and the Caspian Sea regions as their own “near abroad” and consider them as the first priority of their foreign policy. Generally speaking, Russia is faced with NATO’s threat from its Western borders; China and its ever-increasing population threaten Russia from the east; and finally Muslims and the international terrorism threaten Russia from the south. Russian officials have been able to reduce their concerns from the West through negotiations with Western states. Therefore, Moscow is currently feeling no threat from its Western borders. (17)
The 30 million Muslim minorities in Aral and Northern Caucasus, the 60 million Muslims of Central Asia, the 350 million non-Arab Muslims (of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey), and Arab Muslims of the Middle East threaten Russia from the South. Russian statesmen believe that this threat will be exasperated with the access of Muslim nations to the atomic bombs. They are also concerned with the possible access of Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other Muslims states to nuclear weapons and their nuclearization according to Pakistan’s example. What is really important is the fact that some Russian analysts are tougher than the American ones. Speaking with reporters in Tehran, Sergey Karaganov reiterated upon Iran’s getting access to nuclear weapons, Russia will target its missiles towards Tehran. Russians are worried of a possible compliance of the United States with a nuclear Iran. In fact, some American analysts have argued that a nuclear armed Iran can act more responsibly and, as a result, it will be easier to come to agreement with Tehran. Russians are worried of such possible scenarios. In addition, some 30 million Muslims are living in southern parts of Russia and Iran’s access to nuclear bombs can threaten southern parts of Russia. (18)
Some political and security observers argue that Russia’s serious concerns of Iran’s nuclear program began with the exposure of Fordo nuclear installations near the holy city of Qom. The official website of Russia’s ministry of foreign affairs indicated that the exposure of Fordo nuclear facilities has undermined Russia’s confidence in Iran’s nuclear program. A Russian senior expert of Iranian affairs observes: “Making decisions about Iran’s nuclear program is one of the most difficult challenges for Russia. Russian officials are not interested in the emergence of nuclear powers around their borders.” This Russian senior expert adds: “Considering the critical situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, resorting to military force against Iran will be associated with more negative consequences. If Iran had not concealed its uranium enrichment facilities near the city of Qom, Russia would have been more confident in the nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Considering the relationship between Iran and Russia, and the development of nuclear energy, it can be argued that such concealment has affected Moscow’s relations with the international community.” (19)
Russians consider Iran as a country which attaches great importance to the West. Russian officials are worried of Iran’s possible re-alliance with the West and further isolation of their country by the Western world. On the other hand, Russians are not familiar with Iranian society and, therefore, they look at Iran as a threat; Polls and surveys indicate that Russian public opinion towards Iran has not been so much friendly and Western mass media have played a significant role in nurturing such a fear from Iranians among the Russian population. The problems that Russians have experienced with Muslims in Chechnya have been the main source of their dislike of all Muslims throughout the world. (20) According to some other polls and surveys, Russian people have no positive outlook towards Iran and they consider all Muslim nations, including Iran, the main threat against Russia after the United States and China.
In another survey which was carried out by “Russian Public Opinion Foundation” in April 22 and 23, 2006, some 37 percent of respondents described Iran as a friendly nation. Some 27 percent of respondents described Iran as a hostile nation and 36 percent of them had no idea in this regard. Some 38 percent of respondents in this survey agreed with Russia’s nuclear cooperation with Iran and the development of nuclear technology in the Islamic Republic, while 25 percent disagreed with such cooperation. Some 19 percent of respondents were indifferent towards this issue. Meanwhile, 18 percent of respondents were unaware of Iran-Russia nuclear cooperation. Some 37 percent of respondents considered Iran as a non-aggressive country, while 34 percent of them described Iran as an aggressive nation. Some 29 percent of them had no idea in this regard. (21)
Russian people have little knowledge about Iran and some Russian citizens can not differentiate this country from Iraq. In addition, Russian public opinion on various occasions receives their information about Iran from the Western media. This is rooted in the fact that Russians have a positive outlook towards Europe and consider themselves as a European nation. Iran’s stance towards Bosnian developments and its support of Bosnian Muslims had worried Russians. Of course, Russian communist, Slav, and Eurasian politicians, compared with their westernized colleagues, have a more positive outlook towards Iran. They look at Iran favorably due to Tehran’s stance towards Chechen developments. (22)
Iran’s Outlook towards Russia: Powerful Eastern Ally?
A set of developments during the past 50 years have turned the United States into an enemy of the Islamic Revolution. According to this perspective, contradiction and hostility between the Islamic Revolution and the United States are so deep-rooted that they cannot compromise with each other so easily. Therefore, Iran’s strategy is focused on finding out more international allies and taking further advantage of gaps between major powers. Iran has adopted the “Look to the East” foreign policy since the early years of the establishment of the Islamic Republic system and especially after the termination of the Iraqi imposed war in late1980s. However, Iran established closer relations with the nations of the East during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Advocates of the “Look to the East” foreign policy believe that Iran can protect its national interests through alliance with powerful Asian nations. According to this interpretation, Russia and China provided new examples of interaction with regional powers throughout the world. (23) As a matter of fact, the “Look to the East” foreign policy is a strategic idea and transcends far beyond the expansion of economic ties. This policy has mainly emphasized on political and diplomatic interactions in order to develop security and defense cooperation. Through adopting the “Look to the East” foreign policy, Iran has been able to enhance its global status and create a kind of balance in its relations with the West. (24) Iran is currently an observer member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and has demanded for official membership in this organization. This is an indication of Iran’s “Look to the East” foreign policy.
A conference about Shanghai Cooperation Organization was held in Iran in which many participants emphasized on the role of this organization as a global front against the Western threat. Participating in the meeting of prime ministers of Shanghai Cooperation Organization member states, First Vice President Rahimi observed: “Based on its geopolitical and geo-economic situation in the region, as well as, its economic, cultural, and political potentials, the Islamic Republic of Iran is quite ready to expand and deepen its relations with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and member states of this organization. Through permanent membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Iran can enhance its security status and strengthen its relations with other member states of this organization. Iran should take the utmost advantage of such an opportunity. It is quite obvious that China and Russia, as Iran’s foreign allies, can play pivotal roles in the acceptance of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” (25)
What is referred to as “Look to the East” foreign policy in Iran has many commonalities with the nationalist and anti-Atlantic policies in Russia. Nationalist politicians in Russia are also worried of the unipolar international system in the world which is based on the hegemonic power of the United States. Therefore, they welcome the anti-Western behavior of countries such as Iran. In other words, Russians prefer to solve their problems at global and international levels through presence in international communities and interaction with the United States, the European Union and other powers. At this level, Iran is tactically important for Russia and Moscow endeavors to take advantage of Iran’s stance towards the United States and global issues in order to develop its own objectives in those areas. Russia has no problem with the global system of liberal capitalism and is merely worried of being ignored in the international system. Russian officials are opposed to American unilateralism, but they have to observe some considerations in pursuing this objective.
Russia endeavors to constrain American unilateralism through expanding its cooperation with France, Germany and China. They do nothing special beyond diplomatic initiatives and interactions with major powers. In fact, Moscow has accepted the logic of contemporary international equations and endeavors to preserve them within the contexts and norms that have been emerged during the Cold War. Russia considers Eurasia as an important region for its political and national security interests. In other words, Russia can comply with Iran which only plays roles in secondary regions. However, the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a political and ideological system, is often faced with threats at global and international levels. It is at this juncture that we can discover a very important issue about Tehran-Moscow relations which generates fundamental misunderstandings among both Russian and Iranian analysts and politicians. (26)
Perhaps, Iranians have no proper understanding of Russia’s relationship with the West. Russia’s interactions with the United States and the European Union, as well as, their differences and competitions with each other have peculiar complexities. These complexities are rooted in Russia’s history. Therefore, we cannot understand the complexity of Russia’s relationship with the West through mere scrutiny of this country’s history of the past 20 or even the past 70 years. Even during Putin’s presidency, Russia was evaluated according to the Western criteria. Russian officials consider the West as the proper pattern for development and the source for meeting Russia’s technological needs. Russia’s international role is defined according to its relationship with the West. In other words, Russian intellectuals look at European norms as their final ideals and objectives.
At the same time, it seems that both Russian and Iranian officials are still in doubt towards each other. This is rooted in the fact that Iranian and Russian officials have no clear understanding of each other in their own foreign policy. Iran considers Russia as a powerful actor which intends to revenge on the United States and the West under the leadership of former KGB agents, military officers, and nationalists. Iranians believe that Russia will attain such an objective in the near future. Therefore, adoption of each anti-American movement or stance by Russians is deemed as a step towards the attainment of the above-mentioned objective. According to this perspective, Russia will finally stand against the United States. Advocates of this perspective argue that Russian officials consider the Islamic Republic of Iran as a powerful actor which is necessary for this alarming atmosphere. Therefore, Iran has a high priority in Russian foreign policy.
Nevertheless, it is a vitally important issue that Russia’s belief towards Iran is completely contradictory to the above-mentioned argument. Russians attach no great importance to Iran’s independence. They consider Iran as a third world country which is repeating the Russia’s revolutionary literature in the world. They believe that Iran’s importance lies in its capability in creating problems for the United States in international arena. However, Russia is not inclined to accept any disbursement in this regard, because Russian officials have more important priorities, such as Russia’s peripheral region (Commonwealth of Independent States), Europe, the United States, and East Asia. For Russians, Iran is included within their 5th regional priority, i.e. the Middle East. Therefore, Russian officials expect that Iran terminate its anti-systemic oppositions whenever Moscow demands. Through such an approach, Russia can refrain from being trapped in the problematic selection of the two partners. In other words, both Iran and Russia have unrealistic expectations from each other. Iran intends to use Russia for the development of its own grand strategies at an international level (for instance, standing against the United States); at the same time, Russia wants to take advantage of Iran in order to meet its own requirements at mutual and regional levels. (27)
Regardless of these issues, which are mainly rooted in outlooks, perceptions, images, and conceptions, there are also some problems in practical and objective areas. At the regional level, Iran and Russia’s cooperation has mainly been concentrated on the avoidance from creating any problem for each other. In other words, the two countries have rarely focused on dynamic, constructive, and future-oriented issues. Lack of an appropriate organization or mechanism for solving regional issues in the Caspian Sea, Central Asia, and Caucasus is a good example of such a state of affairs. Russia has been reluctant to the establishment of organizations and structures in which a country like Iran can play any role in them. Russians consider themselves as the monopoles of the Caspian Sea, Central Asia, and Caucasus and expect that the Islamic Republic of Iran respect such a monopoly. Nevertheless, Turkey, the United States, China, European countries, and Arab states are seriously active in these regions. (28)
Despite the fact that both Russia and Iran can be important partners for each other and in spite of the necessity of expansion of relations between Tehran and Moscow, their relationship with each other is faced with a fundamental issue, i.e. “difference of level.” In other words, Iran is mainly looking at Russia as a state which can be used for constraining the threats of the West against the Islamic Republic of Iran; on the contrary, Russia is mainly focused of the advantages of Iran in regional and mutual areas. According to a Russian scholar who has studied Iran's political affairs, “Russian officials believe that extensive cooperation [with Iran], which goes beyond the international red lines, is a threat for their country; they argue that disadvantages of coalition with Iran (as a state that is opposed to the developed countries of the world) are more than its advantages.” (29)However, one should not ignore the realities of Iran-Russia relations. The relationship between Iran and Russia during the past 15 years indicates that these two countries can have an important cooperation with each other based on their national interests. These relations should be based on existing realities in the international, global and regional relations, as well as, Russia’s potentials. As a matter of fact, Russia has no reason to oppose the global capitalist system, the Western international order, and the European Union. Russia is only concentrated on playing a role in these institutions and being accepted in them. Russian Officials are worried about possible threats that are raised by these Western institutions. Reacting to these threats, Russian officials are mainly focused on collaborating with more independent European states, as well as, cooperating with China.
However, it seems that Iran’s “Look to the East” policy is also faced with more fundamental problems. One of these problems is the relationship between national interests and friends/enemies. Generally speaking, a state provides a definition for its own national interests and then directs its foreign policy towards the materialization of those interests. In fact, different countries are categorized as enemies, friends, allies, rivals or a combination of them. However, due to American hostilities with the Islamic Republic of Iran and also Washington’s animosity with Tehran, Iranians have come to this conclusion that the shadow of an enemy has fallen on their national interests. These interests are defined as passively as possible due to American behavior. Therefore, in its pursuance of Iranian national interests, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is required to find out the American stance towards these interests. As a result, Iran and the United States are faced with contradictions in their foreign policy. Sometimes, Iran and the United States have unintentionally had common interest, but have been confused about the proper course that should have been adopted towards that common interest. This problem has imposed heavy costs on both countries.
The second problem is associated with the perception that “Russia is one and the same with the former Soviet Union.” Iranians have not realized that Russia is no longer a superpower as the former Soviet Union. Even if Russian officials want to depict their country as the heir to the former superpower, they cannot. At the same time, when Russian officials claim that they act as the inheritor of the former Soviet Union, it is nothing but a political gesture which has only domestic consumption. Russia is the 11th economy of the world. Russia requires at least 50 years in order to attain a status equal to that of the former Soviet Union. At the same time, Russia’s military budget is only five percent of NATO’s military budget.
Establishment of an international front is another issue which is at stake here. As a matter of fact, it is currently impossible to create such an international front against the United States. Countries like China, India, and Russia are reluctant to accept the costs of such a confrontation with the United States. Finally, there has been no clear understanding of Russia’s foreign policy in Iran. Priorities, objectives, and threats in Russia’s foreign policy have been defined in a way that we should nurture realistic expectations from such a policy. Despite the fact that the “Look to the East” policy and expansion of relations with the countries of the East seems to be an appropriate policy, we should realize that this policy cannot be always considered as a substitute for other policies.
Conclusion
Iran and Russia are apparently starting a new stage of their relationship which is totally different from those of the past years. During early years after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Russians were still at odds to concentrate on their joint regional interests with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In fact, they were reluctant to embark on regional cooperation with Iran and contribute to regional stability. However, Iran-Russia relations reached its climax during 2003-2008. During this period, Russia and the West experienced fundamental differences over various issues, such as American missile defense system in Europe, NATO’s eastward expansion, and the Western support of velvet revolutions in Russia’s so-called “Near Abroad.” Nevertheless, Russia has come to agreements with the West over some of these issues as a result of which Moscow-Tehran relations have been coupled with serious problems.
Analyzing the causes of such a state of affair, the present article emphasized on four factors. Through surveying those factors, it can be realized that Iran’s regional advantages for Russia have not been exhausted. In other words, the two countries can significantly contribute to regional stability. During all the years that Iran and Russia had collaborated in Central Asia, Caucasus, and Afghanistan, the two countries had common interests and provided mutual advantages for each other. Perhaps, the Islamic Republic of Iran could have refrained from cooperation with Russia; but due to Iran's foreign policy and its competitions with the West, Turkey, Israel, and regional Arab states, Tehran had no other choice but to collaborate with Moscow. At the same time, for Russia, which according to American officials and analysts, was exposed to the danger of disintegration, cooperation with Iran was an inevitable option. Kozirev and Yeltsin adopted such an approach from 1991 to 1993, but were obliged to make a shift in their policies.
This argument that Russia has used Iran as a bargaining chip in its interactions with the United States and the West is, to some extent, nothing but simplification of the issue. As a matter of fact, the relationship among Iran, Russia, and the United States is a trilateral interaction. The three countries have had good opportunities for expansion of their relations. Unlike Iran, Russia had not looked at relationship with the United States as a taboo. Nevertheless, many Russian statesmen, experts, analysts, and journalists are worried about possible Iran's threats in the future. Russians have the same outlook towards the West, Turkey, and China. What is so problematic in this regard is Russia’s expectation of Iran. Moscow expects Tehran to act according to Kremlin policies in international issues, such as the nuclear dossier. This is an issue that introduces the fourth factor for a more transparent analysis. This is an important factor that can provide a good opportunity for a translucent analysis of Iran-Russia relations.
Unrealistic expectations and perceptions that Iran and Russia have towards each other can be considered as asymmetric features of the relationship between the two countries. On the other hand, Iran looks at Russia within the context of “Look to the East” policy. From the very beginning, this policy put unbearable burdens on Tehran-Moscow relations. During its three decades of revolutionary life, Iran has always emphasized on its independent foreign policy. At the same time, Russians have repeatedly argued that they have no “strategic ally” in the modern world, because, as they argue, the age of alliances has come to an end. Mutual collaborations between Iran and Russia have always been important; nevertheless, these collaborations have usually been constrained by Iran’s independence in foreign policy and Russia’s desire to act out its role in international arena. As a result, issues of opportunity, threat, and bargaining chip are raised in a more simple analysis.
In fact, Russia’s ignorance of Iran’s independence and Iran’s unawareness of “the logic of acting at international levels”, as well as, Tehran’s incorrect perceptions, such as “the perception of Russian equality with the former Soviet Union” and “the idea of establishing an international eastern front,” have created a condition in which major powers embark on “bargains” which are common issues among them. Generally speaking, neither Iran is ready to pay the costs of alliance with Russia nor Russia is actually pursuing such an alliance. Nevertheless, it appears that both sides expect a kind of immaterialized alliance from each other.
However, we should not believe that there is no future for Iran-Russia relations. There are numerous problems between Russia and the West which will remain unsolved in predictable future. At the same time, relationship between Iran and Russia has been at an appropriate level even during the Cold War period, especially between 1970 and 1979. On the other hand, Russians see no constraints on for further expansion of their trade relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. It appears that the two countries can reorganize their relationship with each other within the new international situation, for both Iran and Russia can have great economic and technical advantages for each other; Mutual collaboration between Iran and Russia in areas of energy, technology, cultural and social communication, and regional issues is vitally important for both countries; Russian technology market is an extensive arena that is vied by countries such as China, Turkey, and India. At the same time, Iran has maintained its financial capabilities in the global economic crisis. There is specifically great tendency for cooperation in oil and gas technologies.
Jahangir Karami is an Associate Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran.
Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, Vol. 9, Nos. 3-4, Fall 2010-Winter 2011
Notes:
See “The Third Summit of Presidents of Caspian Littoral States in Tehran,” quoted in: http://www.irna.ir, October 17-18, 2007.
Elaheh Koulaei, Green Book of Russian Federation, Tehran: Publications of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 2009, p. 298.
Ibid., p. 279.
Ibid., p. 299.
See “The Commercial Relations between Iran and Russia,” quoted in: http://www.iranembassy.ru, August 13, 2010.
Abbas Maleki, “Iranian Challenges and Opportunities in Central Asia,” in: http://www.iras.ir, April 4, 2007.
See “Naboko and Iran,” quoted in: http://www.econews.ir/fa/NewsContent-id_131092.aspx
See “Sudden Postponement of Jalili’s Trip to Moscow,” quoted in: http://www.tabnak.ir/83345, January 27, 2009; http://www.rusiran.com/archives/002309.sctml, February 2, 2008;
See “Sergey Lavrov: Iran's Reactor Illegal and May Participate in the Crib,” quoted in: http://www.islammemo.cc/akhbar/Africa-we-Europe, 05/10/2009.
See “Iran is Quite Close to Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Potential,” quoted in: http://www.kremlin.ru, 05/10/2009.
See “The New Western Scenario by the Russian President,” http://www.asiran.ir, 05/10/2009.
Sergey Karaganov et al., “Russia and the U.S.: Reconfiguration, not Resetting,” Russia in Global Affairs, No. 3, July and September 2009.
Seyed Mohammad Kazem Sajjadpour, “Improve the Relations between Russia and America,” quoted in: http://www.irandiplomacy.ir/2010/appril/16.
See Sarmayeh Newspaper, July 7, 2010.
Ibid.
Paul J. Saunders, “Russian-American Obstacles Overshadow Obama-Medvedev Meeting,” U.S. News and World Report, quoted in: http://www.usnews.com, June 23, 2010.
T. Pakhalina, “Soft Culture between Russia and NATO,” quoted in: http://www.iraneurasia.ir/2010/july/13/10784, July 13, 2010.
Ibid., p. 1.
N. M. Mamedova, “Russia and Iran have Interests, not Love,”
The Daily Star, January 29, 2010, pp. 2-3.
Carol R. Saivetz, “Russia’s Iran dilemma,” Russian Analytical Digest, No. 6, September 19, 2006.
See "Russian polling Institute FOM," quoted in: http://www.bd.fom.ru.tb, April 22-23, 2006.
D. Shlapentokh, "Russian Elite Image of Iran: From the Late Soviet Era to the Present," quoted in: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil, September 2009.
D. Divsalar, “Look to the East" Approach in Iran's Foreign Policy,” Pegah Hozeh Weekly (in Persian), No. 237, 2008.
See Afsaneh Ahadi and Saghafi Ameri, Iran and the Look to the East Policy, Tehran: Center for Strategic Research, 2008.
See “Russia an Uncertain Partner for Iran,” quoted in: http://www.strategicreview, August 2, 2010.
26. Mark N. Katz, “Russian-Iranian Relations in the Ahmadinejad Era,” quoted in: http://www.wilsoncenter.org, February 29, 2008.
See Jahangir Karami, Iran and Russia Relations; New Age of Cooperation, Tehran: Publications of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009; See "Russian Foreign Policy Concept," quoted in: http://www.kremlin.ru, 2008.
Lena Jonson, Vladimir Putin and Central Asia, The Shaping of Russian Foreign Policy, London: I. B. Tauris, 2004, pp. 116-118.
Mamedova, op. cit., p. 2.
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