Mahdi Ahouie

Abstract

Is it possible to recognize any subjective “common grounds” from which all Iranian elites with different political orientations would have approached the question of Palestine- Israel?  So  far  most  studies  have  been  focused  on  differences among various approaches of Iranian intellectuals towards the establishment of Israel in the territory of Palestine and very few researches have been concentrated on the developments of the Iranian political discourses on Israel. Despite all differences, it seems that all Iranian elites as members of a same society have more or less experienced a common historical knowledge toward Israel and a similar outlook towards the nature and function of Israel in the Middle East, which has inevitably resulted in total rejection of the State of Israel during the period following the Islamic Revolution. The present article is focused on reviewing the discourse of Iranian political elites towards Israel and analyzing this  process.  This  research  concludes  that  the  outlook  of  all Iranian elites towards the following three concerns plays an important role in defining their outlooks towards Israel: Iranian relations with the West; Iranian status in the region and establishment of justice in regional and global relations.

Introduction

This article investingates whether there is any connectivity and similarity among different outlooks of Iranian political elites on Israel. Most researchers have merely paid attention over the past decades to the obvious major differences among Iranian outlooks towards Israel. However,  through  a  careful  study  of  total  discourses  of  Iranian political elites towards the question of Palestine during the past six decades, one may be surprised to find out that all Iranian discourses on Israel, despite being rooted in different schools of thought, have somehow followed a similar basis. The three pillars of this rationale, which can be defined as the framework of Iranian outlooks towards Israel, are summarized into three categories: Looking at Israel as the creature and representative of the Western world in the Middle East region; Looking at Israel in order to attain regional hegemony; and Looking  at  the  issue  of  Palestine-Israel  from  the  perspective  of Justice. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that Iranian elites, based on their political school of thought, have adopted different, and sometimes contradictory interpretations of these three fundamental pillars under different circumstances. Therefore, their outlook, discourse, and behavior towards Israel are different from one another. Despite the fact that different schools of thought have adopted different understandings and perceptions towards these concepts, the abovementioned three principles, at least in their abstract meanings have been scrutinized by all elites. These understandings and perceptions  have  formed  the  basis  of  Iranian  political  discourse towards Israel during the past six decades.

An assessment of general features of Iranian foreign policy discourse is far beyond the scope of the present article. However, we can identify three general features for Iranian political discourse towards the outside world: Feeling of historical humiliation by major powers (especially Western powers); Feeling of historical superiority over the regional surroundings; and a common concern for attaining justice (as equilibrium) in international environment.(1) The present article is focused on making a review of the discourse of Iranian political elites from various groups and schools of thought. This research is endeavoring to create a logical relationship between these features  and  the  kind  of  approaches  that  have  been  adopted  by Iranians towards Israel in order to present a pattern for explaining the framework of Iranian outlooks towards the Jewish state during past decades. For this purpose, Iranian elites will be studied within the context of three groups of secular nationalists, nativist socialists, and religious forces.  Through this  categorization, we  can  define differences and similarities as well as the strategic logic of each group as precisely as possible. The importance of this research for policy making is to show that the current Iranian objection against Israel is not  a  merely  ideological  stance,  limited  to  a  certain  type  of government  in  Iran  rather,  the  Iranian  political  elites,  whether religious  or  secular,  inevitably  look  at  Israel  from  the  above- mentioned perspectives and  therefore, challenges between the  two sides  can  continue  as  long  as  Israel  is  representing  the  West, attempting to maintain regional hegemony in the Middle East by using aggressive and expansionist policies.

1. Outlook towards Israel in the Secular Nationalist Discourse

1-1. Israel; Representative of the West

Political leaders in the Pahlavi regime, and most importantly the Shah himself, welcomed the establishment of Israel in the Middle East as a developed state based on Western standards. These elites considered Israel as a state which, compared with its immediate environment, especially Arab states, was a progressive state. The existence of such a pattern of the Western civilization in the heart of the Middle East region was considered as the cause of further humiliation of Arabs and enabled the Shah to further westernize the Iranian society. Assadollah Alam, the shah’s close friend and advisor, made a secret visit to Israel in early 1960s. After returning from Israel, Alam gave a detailed report about symbols of Western civilization in Israel.(2)    Industrial,  agricultural,  technological  and  military cooperation between Iran and Israel reached its climax during 1960s and 1970s. The Pahlavi regime handed over extensive farmlands near Qazvin to Israeli experts and specialists to carry out their agricultural experiments and activities. During the Pahlavi regime, Iran purchased a large portion of its military equipments from Israel. Many members of the royal family used to go to Israel for medical treatments. Generally speaking, officials of the Pahlavi regime considered Israel as a “little America” in the heart of the Middle East which could meet various  Iranian  scientific  and  technological  requirements  through better understanding of regional circumstances.(3)

In addition, the Pahlavi regime took advantage of its friendship with Israel as an instrument for further proximity with the United States and giving more assurances to the White House officials. The Shah believed that Jews had extensive power and influence in American legislative organizations and mass media.(4)  As a result, he pursued a fixed policy of friendship with Israel in order to receive the support of the Zionist lobby in the United States from mid-1950s until the end of his rule in late 1970s.(5)  Since late 1960s and the arrival of President Richard Nixon to the White House, the Shah was almost assured of the United States’ support of his regime. The Shah ouse, koiirealized that the United States is greatly dependent on Iran for maintaining the stability and security which was desired by the West, because Americans were engaged in the Vietnam War, British forces were withdrawn from the Persian Gulf, and the price of the crude oil had suddenly increased in global markets. The Shah was aware that Americans are dependent on Iran for preserving peace and stability in the Persian Gulf region; therefore, he felt that there is no need for Israel to act as a mediator between Iran and the United States.(6)

It seems that since early 1970s there has been a shift in the Shah’s outlook towards Israel as an instrument for expanding his relations with the West. It was due to this reason that the Shah and his government officials, such as Ardeshir Zahedi, made harsh criticisms against Israel’s policies.(7) Most of the time, these criticisms were disappointing for Israeli officials.(8)  Nevertheless, Iran and Israel had close relations with each other until late 1970s and the overthrow of the Pahlavi regime. Israelis used their influence in Washington in order to convince the United States to continue the sale of American military equipments to  Iran.(9)   Some  analysts who  were  close  to  the  Shah believe that his policy of criticism of Israel during 1970s disappointed the Zionist lobby in the United States and, as a result, the White House was unable to calm down internal turmoil in Iran.(10)  This analysis is highly exaggerative. In addition, we should realize that the very fact that some of the Shah’s close friends and advisors believed in such an analysis is indicator of the depth of the belief of these individuals in Israel’s role in relations between Iran and the West.

1-2. Israel; an Instrument for Attaining Regional Hegemony

Many analysts believe that the pattern of relationship between Iran and Israel during the Pahlavi era was based on Ben Gurion’s “Doctrine of Periphery.” (Ben Gurion was Israel’s founder and its first prime minister). According to this doctrine, Israel endeavored to form a coalition with non - Arab states of the Middle East, as well as, the states of North Africa against threats posed by Arab states. Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia were main axes of this regional coalition. These three states were close allies of the Western block. Through expanding its relations with these states, Israel was able to get out of isolation. Through creating a network of friendly states outside the Arab nations of the Middle East region, Israelis could enhance their legitimacy and international accreditation. On the other hand, those states which had tensions in their relations with Arab states attained more strength against their common enemies through alliance with Israel. At the same time, such an alliance could act as an effective obstacle against the influence of the Soviet Union and communism.(11)  However, Iran had a specifically important status among countries which were considered as axes of Ben Gurion’s “Doctrine of Periphery.” Several reasons can be enumerated for the importance of Iran in this doctrine:

● Due to its vast energy resources, Iran could guarantee Israel’s energy security at critical conditions. At the same time, Iranian government  had  access  to  various  indicators  of  power  (such  as military prowess, territorial extensiveness, population, strategic situation, etc.). Therefore, establishment of  close relationship with Iran could enhance Israel’s position in an environment full of different hostile forces.

● Due to historical and cultural reasons, Iranians had no interest in establishing close relations with Arabs. At the same time, Arabs have always considered Iran as a threat against themselves. On the contrary, Iranians have had friendly relations with Jews since ancient times. Jews have always considered Iranians as their supporters and saviors.(12)

The Shah was worried of Arab radicalism and, at the same time, was concerned with the influence of communism in the region. Therefore, he considered Ben Gurion’s “Doctrine of Periphery” as an attractive approach in this regard. It was according to such an analysis that the Shah expanded his relations with Israel in various fields. Following various developments in the region, the Shah’s interest in Israel’s  “Doctrine  of  Periphery”  increased  significantly.  The overthrow of Iraq’s conservative monarchic regime and the emergence of the left-leaning government of Abd al-Karim Qasim in this country was a worrying issue for the Shah. He was also worried of the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt during 1950s. Therefore, the Shah decided to get closer to Israel and welcomed Tel Aviv’s “Doctrine of Periphery.”  He  realized  that  establishing  close  relationships  with Israel was the only way for an effective confrontation against the Soviet Union’s influence in the region and ever-increasing power of leftists, anti-Iranian Arab states.(13)  Mohammad Reza Shah believed that friendly relation with the Israel under those circumstances was an obstacle against the collapse of Iranian regional authority. He even considered such an approach as a guarantee for further strengthening Iranian long-term hegemony in the Middle East region. At the same time,  the  historical  memory  of  friendly  relations  between  ancient Persia and Jews was a further incentive for the Shah, who considered himself the heir of Cyrus the Great, to put greater emphasis on expanding Iran’s relations with Israel. This sympathetic approach towards Israel was further enhanced due to Shah’s pessimism and uncertainty towards Arabs. He believed that Iran can create a firm obstacle against its Arab enemies through coalition with Israelis. The Shah argued that the adoption of such an approach could guarantee Iran’s influence in the Middle East region.

As it was pointed out earlier, after the downfall of Gamal Abdel Nasser in late 1960s, the Shah gradually realized that Israel is getting abnormally powerful. Considering the gradual decline of the threat of Arab radicalism, the Shah realized that political equilibrium in the region  was  changing  to  the  disadvantage  of  conservative  Arab regimes. The Shah, who had established close ties with Israel in order to thwart the threat of Arab radicalism and further strengthen Iranian hegemony and influence, became worried of an ever-strengthened Israel which could act as a new rival for Iranian hegemony and supremacy in the region.(14)   Meanwhile, conservative Arab leaders, such as Anwar Sadat of Egypt and King Hussein of Jordan, were focused on reducing tensions with Israel. Based on the previously- mentioned analysis about reducing Iran’s dependence on Israel for expanding Tehran-Washington relations, the Shah adopted a policy of criticism against Tel Aviv’s militarism in the region and encouraged Israeli officials to shift their policies vis-à-vis the Arabs and sign peace agreements with them.(15)  In fact, the Shah was trying to show an independent and justifiable picture of his policies to the regional people and depict himself as the spiritual leader of the Middle East. Therefore, he repeatedly invited conservative Arab leaders and Israeli officials to Tehran and encouraged them to move towards peace and friendship with each other.(16) Since late 1960s and following the reduction of the threat of Arab radicalism in the region, the Shah was always concentrated on defining a status for Iran which was superior to the Arab - Israeli disputes. He was trying to depict Iran as an actor which creates balance in the region and acts a regional arbitrator.

1-3. Looking at Israel from the Perspective of Justice

The nationalist secular discourse adopted an ambiguous outlook towards the occupation of Palestine since the establishment of Israel.

This discourse recognized the right of Jews for establishing a Jewish state. According to this discourse, Jews have been victims of Christian anti-Semitism in Europe for many years; they were depicted as oppressed people who were seeking for a land of their own. At the same time, the nationalist secular discourse advocated the cause of Palestine and Arabs on various occasions. This kind of discourse criticized Israel’s violent behavior in occupying the Arab territories. It was perhaps for this reason that the Iranian government supported the idea of establishing a confederation comprised of Arabs and Israelis just a year before the establishment of the state of Israel.(17)  Dr. Mossadiq’s  outlook  towards  Israel  can  be  surveyed  based  on  the above-mentioned analysis. Dr. Mossadiq recognized the right of Jews for establishing an independent state and territory in the Middle East; nevertheless, he rejected the racist and violent aspects of Zionism in displacing Palestinians from Arab territories.(18) It was quite clear that Dr. Mossadiq’s opposition to this aspect of Zionism in Palestine had no religious foundation; rather, it was solely rooted in his liberal and anti-despotic spirit.(19)

Also, the Shah and his close associates believed that the establishment of a Jewish state was the “right” of Jews who were spread  throughout  the   world   and   suppressed   by   others.  They considered  the  kindly  behavior  of  Cyrus  the  Great  towards  Jews during ancient times as a sacred myth. Their propaganda about this phenomenon  was  so  extensive  as  if  they  considered  themselves obliged to repeat the history and revive justice towards the Jews at the contemporary time.(20)   Most  secular nationalists in Iran considered Jews  as  a  displaced,  suppressed,  and  afflicted  people(21)  whom should be sympathized with and supported in attaining their final objective, i.e. establishment of a Jewish state in a territory which belongs to others.(22) For instance, Daryoush Homayoun, one of the most famous pro-Shah journalists and politicians, was enthusiastically advocating the epic return of the Jewish people to their “promised land” after more than two thousand years of suffering and displacement. He availed himself of this opportunity to express his interest in the idea of founders of Israel. Daryoush Homayoun considered Israel’s founders as individuals who were advocates of the rights of Jewish people and protected them against hostile Arab states.(23)

Other Iranian statesmen of the Pahlavi era, such as Assadollah Alam, shared such a respectful feeling towards the Jewish state. They were also pessimistic towards the Arab states. Some of these feelings have been referred to in Assadollah Alam’s memoirs.(24)     More importantly, the Shah himself was always emphasizing on historical and friendly relations between Iranians and Jews. He insisted that Iran recognizes Israel’s right of existence. However, both the Shah and his associates, on various occasions such as the Six-Day War of 1967 and the  Ramadan War  (Yam Kippur  War)  of  1973,  criticized Israel’s resort to violence against the Arabs. On various occasions, the Shah described Israel’s policies as “short-sighted” initiatives and denounced Tel Aviv’s invasion of Arab territories.(25)   Of course, this kind of policy was based on the previously mentioned logic, rather than the promotion of the right of the oppressed Palestinian people. For instance, Daryoush Homayoun’s claim and analysis can be scrutinized from this perspective. Less than one month after the Six-Day War, Daryoush Homayoun described the stance of Iranian government as identical with that of the Arab states. He argued that Iranian government wants Israel to end the invasion of its neighbors and emphasized that Iran, as a country that has been a victim of such invasions for one and a half century, should do its best to prevent such incidents in its peripheral geographical region.(26)

Therefore, we can witness that adoption of a balanced stance towards  Arabs  and Israelis was  one of  the salient features of  the Shah’s Middle East policy. It was due to this policy that Iranian government criticized or supported either the Arabs or the Israelis on different occasions. This policy has often been described as a tactic adopted by the Shah to maintain relations both with Israel and the Arab states. Such a policy was rooted in the Shah’s unconscious inclination towards creating a kind of equilibrium in the issue of Palestine. The Shah was interested in an equilibrium in which neither the Arabs nor the Israelis were victorious over the other side. He intended  to  take  advantage  of  such  an  opportunity  for  further expanding his power as the regional ultimate power. Inclination towards such an approach is quite clear in the Shah’s statements and in the writings of Daryoush Homayoun and Assadollah Alam.(27)  This approach is to some extent similar to the current stance of West towards the issue of Palestine and the so-called Middle East Peace Process.

2. Outlook towards Israel in the Indigenous Socialist Discourse

2-1. Israel; Representative of the West

Iranian nativist socialists were a group of former members of the Tudeh Party. In the mid-1940s, this group separated from the Tudeh Party, because they believed this political party had completely succumbed to policies and approaches of the Soviet Union. These individuals formed a group of their own which was named “The Third force.” Their leader was Khalil Maleki, one of the Iranian leftist intellectuals. Khalil Maleki along with his brother, Hussein Malek, laid the foundation of a new socialist movement in Iran which introduced a nativist interpretation of Marxism and socialism.(28) They were leftists who had cut their relations with the school of Marxism- Leninism and  were  searching for  the  real  essence of  Marxism in places other than the Soviet Union. In such a situation, they welcomed the establishment of Israel as a happy event, because Israelis had introduced a pattern of modern socialist approach within the context of creating common farmlands (Kibbutz). Therefore, Israel could be considered as an ideal substitute for these Iranian socialists who had been divorced from the Soviet Union.(29)  Nevertheless, traditional advocates of the Soviet Union in the Tudeh Party, following the Kremlin officials, welcomed the establishment of the state of Israel too and described it as a step towards the materialization of lost rights of working classes.(30)  After mid-1950s, the Soviet Union reduced its relations with Israel and subsequently, the Tudeh Party stopped its support  of  this  regime.(31)    But  Iranian  socialists  continued  their support  of  the  newly  established  state  of  Israel,  because  they considered it as an appropriate substitute for the Soviet pattern.

These leftist Iranian intellectuals maintained such an outlook towards Israel until the Six-Day War between Israel and the Arabs in June 1967. During this period, Khalil Maleki made a visit to Israel and praised the Jewish state in his statements. Some of these intellectuals even compared founders of Israel with prophets and religious saints. They described the state of Israel as the “savior” of the identity of the people of the East, from Tokyo to Tel Aviv, against the Western and Eastern imperialism.(32)  Khalil Maleki described Israel as a miracle that presents the best and the most liberal pattern of socialism in the contemporary world.(33)  However, after the Six-Day War and the occupation of extensive areas of Muslim states by Israel, some Iranian socialists, including Jalal Ale Ahmad, turned around from Israel and recognized the real essence of this regime as the puppet representation of the West in the Middle East region. During the years after the Six- Day War, Jalal Al-e Ahmad became the most important critic of Israel among the Third Force socialists. There were other authors and intellectuals, such as Ali Asghar Haj Seyed Javadi, Reza Baraheni and Manouchehr Hezarkhani, who criticized Israel through their numerous compilations and translations. They propagated their ideas throughout the  society  and  provoked  many  Iranian  people  and  intellectuals against Israel. On the contrary, Khalil Maleki and several younger socialists of the Third Force, including Daryoush Ashouri, still supported Israel after June 1967. They believed that Israel’s socialism is much better than the Soviet Union’s communism. They also considered Israel as a more progressive state than the Arab states. They were so entangled by false beliefs and so fascinated with Israel that could not accept this reality that what they considered as the best and the most progressive pattern of socialism was, in fact, nothing but an entity created by the West in the Middle East.

2-2. Israel; an Instrument for Attaining Regional Hegemony

As it was pointed out earlier, Iranian nativist socialists were advocates of the state of Israel since the establishment of this state until the Six-Day War (in June 1967). It is quite interesting that these leftist intellectuals, despite their fierce criticism of the Pahlavi regime and its foreign policy, had unique commonalities with the Shah over Israel. Like the Shah, these leftist intellectuals propagated for the righteousness of Israel against regressive Arab states.(34) Maleki and Ashouri, two of these leftist intellectuals who had visited Israel in the

1960s, clearly praised Israel against what they described as “underdeveloped and regressive Arab states.” According to these intellectuals, all Arab states were Iranian enemies whom should never be trusted.(35) On the contrary, they defined Israeli Jews as representatives of a progressive nation who had created a socialist system and should be trusted by Iranians. Therefore, we can argue that Iranian socialists considered friendship with Israel as an instrument for thwarting the Arab threats against Iran. They believed that friendship and coalition with Israel can contribute to further strengthening of Iranian regional hegemony and authority.(36)

After 1967, a group of Iranian socialists still believed that friendship with Israel was preferable over proximity with the Arabs. Nevertheless, another group of them, headed by Jalal Al-e Ahmad, reversed their path and stood against friendship with Israel. This group of Iranian socialists argued that Iran, as a member of the third world community, could not and should not ignore the Arab nations, especially the oppressed people of Palestine.(37) In the post-1967 period, Al-e Ahmad and his friends argued that continuation of Iran’s support for Israel would have no outcome but isolation from the Islamic world and the third world nations. They believed that Iran should refrain from proximity with Israel in order to maintain its status and authority among Islamic and third world states. These leftist Iranian intellectuals emphasized on the necessity of supporting the Arab states in their resistance against Israel’s invasion and violence. In fact, these intellectuals depicted animosity with Israel as an instrument for attaining regional power and legitimacy for Iran.

2-3. Looking at Israel from the Perspective of Justice

Iranian  socialists,  headed  by  Khalil  Maleki,  interpreted  the establishment of the state of Israel in Palestinian territories as the practice of justice towards the Jews. They considered the Jews as a landless and oppressed nation. They also considered Palestine as a territory devoid of people. Therefore, they argued that it is the optimal condition to accommodate the oppressed and landless Jews in the empty-territory of Palestine. That argument suffered from serious factual mistakes in both of its segments: Neither Jews were a people without land, nor Palestine was a land without people. Nevertheless, its advocates propagated it regardless of such contradictions with reality. In addition, they considered migrant Jews as resolute and determinant people who were reviving Palestine’s deserts through modern socialist methods, i.e. establishment of Kibbutz.(38)  This analysis was not justifying the occupation of Palestine, nor was it compatible with tangible realities on the ground. Aggressive and offensive tone of this group of Iranians towards the Arabs is clearly reflected in statements and speeches by Khalil Maleki and Daryoush Ashouri. According to them, establishment of the Jewish state in Palestine as a progressive state and as a symbol of non-Stalinist socialism was the “right” of the oppressed but genius and determinant Jews.(39)

As it was pointed out, Jalal Al-e Ahmad was the first Iranian socialist who, very soon, reversed from such a selfish attitude towards Israel. After the Six-Day War (in June 1967) and the extensive occupation of Arab territories and displacement of hundreds of thousands of Arab people by Israeli forces, Jalal Al-e Ahmad began his  criticisms  against  the  Jewish  State  as  clearly  as  possible  by rejecting all his previous supports and praises of Israel. Of course, he was severely criticized by his friends and fellow-socialists, especially Khalil Malkei. However, Al-e Ahmad did not accept their criticism and could not close his eyes on clear oppression and injustice of Israelis. At the same time, we should remember that the group of Iranian intellectuals who criticized Israel’s oppression, due to their socialist attitudes, always adopted also an economic outlook towards the concept of justice in their analyses of Israeli behavior. At first, this group of intellectuals praised Israel as a “progressive” socialist state and considered the Arabs as “regressive and underdeveloped” people. In the post-1967 period, however, they described the existence of Israel as a clear discrimination against the oppressed Arab nations of the Middle East. Israel was a developed state which was dependent on massive supports of the West and shared a large portion of economic interests of the region. These socialist intellectuals described Israel’s behavior  as  the  main  cause  of  Arab  nations’  negative  reactions towards the Jewish State.(40)

Briefly speaking, we can argue that nativist socialists had a special attitude towards the concept of “justice” and this attitude has played a vitally important role in the formulation of their discourse towards Israel. They had such an attitude when they considered the establishment of the state of Israel as a “right” of the Jews. They still maintained their attitude when revolted against clear oppression of Israel against Palestinians and other Arab nations. They, in fact, criticized Israel’s behavior as an example of the western colonial and hegemonic oppression against subjugated nations.

3.  Outlook  towards  Israel  in  the  Discourse  of  the  Islamic Revolution

3-1. Israel; Representative of the West

The religious/revolutionary discourse in Iran from the early days of the establishment of Israel has looked at the Jewish state as a creature of the West and the representative of the Western colonialism in the Islamic world. Ayatollah Abol Qasem Kashani and Mojtaba Navab  Safavi  should  actually  be  considered  as  the  pioneers  of religious opponents of Israel in Iran. Ayatollah Kashani and Navab Safavi started their opposition to Israel since the early days of the establishment of this regime in the Palestinian territory. They considered Israel as the representative of Western colonialism and the symbol of suppression of Muslims. Ayatollah Kashani and Navab Safavi organized numerous public demonstrations and made frequent speeches against Israel.(41)  Undoubtedly, the path that was introduced by Ayatollah Kashani and Navab Safavi in campaign against Israel was in conflict with some hard-line religious trends that considered the     Pa lestinian-Israeli     conflict     as     a     “war     between disbelievers” (because those trends argued that Sunni Palestinians should not be supported).(42)  Through serious efforts, Ayatollah Kashani and Navab Safavi were able to attract the attention of public opinion of Iranian Muslims and provoke them against Israel. After the martyrdom of Navab Safavi and isolation of Ayatollah Kashani following the 1953 coup d'etat in Iran, Gholam Reza Saeedi published numerous essays and articles in religious-oriented newspapers and continued the anti-Israeli discourse in Iran.(43)

The Islamic movement of Imam Khomeini (RA) once again revived  the  anti-Israeli  discourse  and  saved  it  from  being marginalized. This ideal was theorized by intellectuals such as Ayatollah Seyed Mahmoud Taleghani and Ayatollah Morteza Motahari,  who  were  influenced  by  Imam  Khomeini  (RA)’s worldview. The above-mentioned ideal was practically pursued by individuals such as Dr. Mostafa Chamran. Therefore, we can describe hostility towards Israel as one of the basic features of the identity of the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In his speeches against the Shah’s regime in early 1960s, Imam Khomeini (RA) repeatedly condemned and criticized Israel and Zionism. Some Western  analysts  have  endeavored  to  associate  Imam  Khomeini (RA)’s anti-Israeli stance with anti-Semitism. Nevertheless, many observers, including David Menashri, the Jewish scholar of Iranian culture and civilization, argued that Imam Khomeini (RA), as a great theologian, acknowledged the rights of religious minorities. He pointed out that Imam Khomeini (RA)  treated non-Muslims, including the Jews, with respect during his leadership of the Islamic movement.(44)

Therefore, we can argue that Imam Khomeini (RA)’s hostility with Israel was not rooted in his opposition towards the Jews. Rather, Imam Khomeini (RA) considered Israel as the main cause of the expansion of neocolonialism and Western hegemony in the Islamic world, the Middle East, and Iran. Therefore, Imam Khomeini (RA) made  no  distinction between hostility towards  Israel  and  hostility towards the Shah or the United States. Imam Khomeini (RA) referred to  Israel  as  a  “cancerous tumor” and  this  is  an  indication of  his outlook towards the Jewish state. In fact, Imam Khomeini (RA) considered Israel as an essentially aggressive entity in the Islamic world which is the result of the Western hegemonic initiatives.(45) The Islamic Revolution in Iran, as a revolution against Western hegemony over Iran and the region, inevitably had an anti-Israeli nature. At the same time, Israel has never denied its Western nature and even has boasted of such a characteristic. Israelis have usually depicted their Western nature as the cause of their superiority over other Middle Eastern   nations.   Therefore,   it   was   quite   natural   that   Islamic Revolution of the Iranian nation concentrated its attacks on American and Western, as well as Israeli policies. During the past three decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran has taken advantage of its animosity with Israel  as  an  instrument to  exert  pressure  on  Western powers  and thwart their threats.(46)  Such a stance towards Israel is based on principles such as “resistance against oppressor,” “supporting the oppressed,” and “protecting Islam and Muslims.”

3-2. Israel; an Instrument for Attaining Regional Hegemony

The religious discourse of the Islamic Revolution in Iran is concentrated on animosity with Israel as a precondition for Iran’s proximity and alliance with the Islamic world and regional nations. Through joining to the anti-Israeli alliance in the region and taking advantage of its geopolitical status and its extensive resources, the Islamic Republic of Iran changed the balance of power in the Middle East against Israel. Before the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Iran was a close ally of Israel and the Pahlavi regime played a vitally important role in Ben Gurion’s Peripheral Doctrine and Israel’s security. The pre-revolutionary Iran was an ally of Israel and through this alliance weakened the Arab fronts. Nevertheless, Iran’s separation from Israel and its alliance with anti-Zionist forces was a vitally important  advantage  for   the   Islamic  world.   Saddam  Hussein’s invasion of Iran in 1980 and almost unanimous support of all Arab leaders,  especially  Yaser  Arafat,  of  former  Iraqi  dictator overshadowed positive consequences of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s anti-Israeli stance. However, the Islamic Iran persisted on its anti- Israeli approaches. Subsequently, the discourse of the Islamic Revolution in Iran turned towards making direct contacts with the Arab nations regardless of their rulers’ attitudes. This kind of policy opened a new political approach towards resistance against Israel. Emergence  of  revolutionary  and  popular  movements  against aggressive Israeli policies, such as the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, as well as the initiation of Intifada in the Occupied Territories were all consequences of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and Imam Khomeini (RA)’s leadership. Unlike the weak and conservative  Arab   leaders  and  the   officials  of   the   Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) who were engaged in political conspiracies and financial corruption, these revolutionary and popular movements were quite ready to make sacrifices for freedom and resistance against occupation. Undoubtedly, these movements created strategic and unpredictable challenges for Israel and Western powers.

Generally speaking, Imam Khomeini (RA)’s leadership transformed popular Arab forces into a significant obstacle against Israeli expansionist policies. As a result, such an anti-Israeli approach became a vitally important principle in the strategic policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This policy has been continued even after the demise  of  Imam  Khomeini  (RA).  The  anti-Israeli  policies  of  the Islamic Republic of Iran have actually enhanced Iran’s spiritual influence, authority, and legitimacy among Arab and Muslim peoples during the past three decades. Iran’s success in containing Israeli aggressive policies through taking advantage of popular Arab forces, especially the Lebanese Hezbollah, has been introduced as a triumphant pattern for enhancing the prestige of the Islamic world in the era following the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. At the same time, these popular and resistant forces have increased Iran’s defense and deterrent capabilities. For instance, when there were serious rumors regarding the possible Israeli or American military attack against Iran’s  nuclear facilities, the world witnessed Israel’s failure in its 33-day war against the Lebanese Hezbollah in the summer of 2006. Israel’s failure in this war disappointed all Iranian enemies and forced them to review their anti-Iranian war plans. The 33-Day War between the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Israeli army is undoubtedly considered as a turning point in the history of developments in the Middle East region, because Israelis experienced a failure for the first time. It is quite interesting that all Arab armies were unable to stand against the Israeli army for more than six days during the climax of Arab nationalism in the late 1960s. Nevertheless, a small combatant force, such as the Lebanese Hezbollah, stood against Israel’s powerful army for more than thirty days and imposed a humiliating defeat on it. The Lebanese Hezbollah stood against the Israeli army based on a model inspired by the Islamic Revolution. Hezbollah’s victory against the Israeli army enhanced the strategic status of the Islamic world and increased its strategic influence in international equations.

3-3. Looking at Israel from the Perspective of Justice

The aggressive nature of Israel is one of the most important factors for the hostility of Iran’s religious and revolutionary forces towards the Jewish state. Israel has a violent record of occupying the territory  of  Palestine  and  Qods  (the  heart  of  the  Islamic  world). Israelis displaced more than one million Muslim inhabitants of Palestine.  As   a   result,   the   Iranian   revolutionary  forces   found themselves as obliged to support the cause of Palestine as the basis of their revolutionary identity. Ayatollah Kashani, the forerunner of anti- Israeli forces, had repeatedly referred to Israeli crimes and the oppression of Palestinian people from early days of the establishment of the State of Israel.(47)  Nevertheless, during later years, all Iranians were concerned with the sufferings of the Palestinian people more deeply and tangibly. During their revolutionary resistance against the Shah’s regime, the Iranian people felt a kind of commonality with Palestinians, because both were suffering from suppressive regimes which were supported by the United States. At the same time, Israel and  the  Shahof  Iran  had  close  relations,  especially  in  military, security, and intelligence fields. During this period, most of the revolutionary forces in  Iran,  including religious and  leftist  forces, were supporting the cause of the Palestinian people. They were, in fact, propagating for anti-Israeli forces which consequently enhanced revolutionary  feelings  against  the  Shah’s  regime.  As  a  result, resistance against Israel had been considered as an uncompromising symbol and ideal for Iranian revolutionary forces since many years before the victory of the Islamic Revolution.(48)

In fact, the challenge between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the West over the Middle East Peace Process is rooted in fundamental differences between approaches adopted by both sides regarding the idea of justice in the question of Palestine. According to the Western approach, the existence of Israel is an undeniable and irrefutable phenomenon. Based on this approach, the acceptance or non- acceptance of this phenomenon by regional nations is not the question. Westerners argue that there is only one solution for the Arab-Israeli crisis: establishment of an independent Palestinian state along with the state  of   Israel.  Such   an   independent  Palestinian  state  can  be established in the West bank and the Gaza Strip. However, until very recently, the Gaza Strip was occupied by Israelis. In addition, Israelis are still occupying the West Bank.

In general, the West believes that the two-state solution is the only practical and acceptable approach to the question of Palestine. The fundamental stance of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the issue of Palestine has been clearly explained by Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution.(49) Surprisingly, Iran’s current position towards Israel is not different from its first stances in this regard back in 1947. Iran has proposed the establishment of a single Palestinian state which would include Muslim, Jewish, and Christian citizens equally. In order to achieve such an objective, it is necessary to hold a referendum in which all indigenous Palestinians can freely participate. The Islamic Republic of Iran considers this solution  as  a  fully  democratic  and  fair  solution  for  the  issue  of Palestine. The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that whatever system of governance that is selected by original and non-immigrated inhabitants of Palestine (including Muslims, Christians, and Jews) through such an approach should be respected by all other states.

Generally speaking, the Islamic Republic of Iran has always paid   specific   attention  to   “justice”   in   the   issue   of   Palestine. Mohammad Khatami, former Iranian President, clearly pointed out that the main reason for Iran’s opposition to the Middle East Peace Process is the injustice that is hidden in this process.(50)  President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s proposal to transfer Israel to North America or Europe should be interpreted according to the justice-oriented discourse of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Western mass media, which are often influenced by Zionists, endeavor to propagate against the Islamic Republic of  Iran.  They  try  to  raise  global public opinion against Iran. They accuse the Islamic Republic of Iran of trying to obtain nuclear weapons in order to make a destructive attack against Israel and create another Holocaust. Nevertheless, President Ahmadinejad has raised a logical question which has created a new discourse about justice in the Palestinian question. He asks if the West considers itself as the main culprit for the Holocaust, why the Palestinians and Muslim nations should be penalized. Such an argument has encouraged many Western intellectuals and even ordinary people in Western countries to reassess the nature and the cause of the establishment of the State of Israel and, at the same time, wonder about the tyranny and injustice towards the Palestinian people.

Conclusion

An assessment of the discourse of Iranian political elites towards Israel indicates that all of them have considered the Jewish state as the real and direct representative of the West in the Middle East. The concept of the “West” in this article refers to both the Western civilization  (as  a  cultural,  social,  and  economic  system)  and  the Western powers (as objective examples of this system). In fact, Iranian elites consider Israel as a symbol of the Western culture and civilization and an offspring of major Western powers, especially the United States and the United Kingdom, in the Middle East region. According to this analysis, we can argue that the outlook adopted towards Israel by each Iranian political school of thought is homogenous and, at the same time, directly  related   to   its   outlook  towards   the   West.   Secular   and Westernized nationalist forces considered Israel as a “little Middle Eastern America.” They believed that it is necessary to establish close relationship with Israel. Nevertheless, religious, anti-Western forces considered resistance against Israel as an inseparable principle in the process of combating Western dominance.

Attainment of regional hegemony has always played a very significant role in the formulation of the foreign policy discourse of Iranian political elites. Different political schools in Iran have paid special attention to  Iran’s  hegemony in  its  peripheral environment. Even socialist forces, despite their emphasis on a kind of trans- boundary and transnational alliance for the confrontation against arrogant and imperialist powers, attached great importance to Iran’s role as the nucleus of this movement and the country that is essentially capable and authorized to guide other oppressed nations in their resistance against hegemonic powers. Unlike nationalists, these socialist forces made no repetitive references to Iran’s grandiose and ancient civilization. Rather, they adopted other methods for emphasizing on Iran’s highly status in global and regional arenas. Iranian political elites have proportionately paid attention to Israel’s role in enhancing Iran’s regional strength and influence. For some times, secular nationalist forces and some socialists considered friendship with Israel as an effective factor for further development of Iranian hegemony. At the same time, religious forces believed that opposition and hostility towards Israel is a prerequisite for Iran’s dignity and credit in the Middle East region. Sometimes, even some secular nationalist forces argued that modification of relations with Israel is necessary for the constancy of Iranian regional hegemony and influence.

In addition, many Iranian elites have used the concept of justice as a criterion for supporting their arguments about Israel. This is perhaps rooted in the fact that Iranian anti-oppression spirit cannot be convinced to support political worldviews that are indifferent towards the issue of justice. At the same time, all these elites, who are members of the Iranian society, have always been concerned with the concept of justice. Therefore, we can argue that justice as an abstract notion has always been a central concern in the Iranian discourse on the Palestinian crisis. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that each political school of thought has adopted its own peculiar perceptions towards the concept of justice which is rooted in its worldview. For instance, secular nationalists had borrowed the concept of justice from ancient Iranian mythology. They practically advocated a kind of equation between the hostile sides. However, socialists considered principles of Marxism as the basis of their worldview about justice. Therefore, they referred to economic discrimination as the main cause of violent skirmishes in the Middle East region. On the contrary, religious forces have defined their outlook towards the concept of justice according to Islamic tenets and Shi’ite religious principles. They resorted to this famous recommendation of the Holy Prophet of Islam that it is not acceptable to remain indifferent upon hearing the weeping of a fellow Muslim.

Therefore, it is quite natural that political groups or elites in Iran have different perceptions towards the idea of justice in the issue of Palestine. It is due to this fact that each of them has adopted its own peculiar conclusions which are sometimes contradictory with those of others. As a result, we can interpret Iranian outlook towards Israel based on the three notions of “the West”, “regional hegemony”, and “justice” since Iranian political elites have referred to these three elements in their discourse. In other words, Iran’s outlook towards Israel is dependent on its outlook towards the West (in both its theoretical and practical forms), its outlook towards Arabs, its outlook towards regional status of Iran, and its outlook towards the concept of justice and its application in the question of  Palestine. It is quite natural that such outlooks are actually dependent on ideologies and worldviews of each of political schools of thought and, therefore, they might be interpreted very differently.

Mahdi Ahouie is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran.

Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, Vol. 9, Nos. 3-4, Fall 2010-Winter 2011

Notes:

1. In order to get access to more precise analyses about historical and social roots of Iranian outlooks towards themselves and the external world, see Graham Fuller, The Center of Universe: Geopolitics of Iran, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991; Nikki R. Keddie and Yann Richard, Roots of Revolution, An Interpretative History of Modern Iran, New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, 1981.

2. Maeer Ozra, Memorial, Trans. Abraham Khakhami, Bozorg Omid (editor), Jerusalem: No Publisher, 2000, p. 25.

3. Ali Akbar Velayati, Iran and Palestinian Developments, First Edition, Tehran: Office of Islamic Culture Publications, 1997, pp. 193-194.

4. Ozra, op. cit., p. 213.

5. Sohrab Sobhani, The Pragmatic Entente, Israeli-Iranian Relations 1948-1988, New York and London: Praeger: 1989, p. 6.

6. Ibid., p. 71.

7. For instance, the Shah described Isareli policies as “foolish” and “illogical” (See Amir Assadollah Alam, Alam’s Memoirs, Alikhani (ed.) Tehran: Ketabsara Publications,  Vol.  5,  1998,  p.  191).  Elsewhere,  the  Shah  condemned  Israeli aggressive policies and pointed out that Israel should realize that it no longer can play the role of a regional police (See Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, A Collection of Speeches, Statements, Interviews, and Remarks of His Majesty Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Vol. 7, Tehran: Ministry of Imperial Court, 1968-1978, p. 6969). In addition, Ardeshir Zahedi pointed out that Israel should refrain from its arrogance in dealing with regional nations and withdraw its forces from Arab territories.

8. Samuel Segev, The Iranian Triangle: the Untold Story of Israel’s Role in the Iran- Contra Affair, Translated from Hebrew by Haim Watzman, New York: The Free Press.

9. Velayati, op. cit., pp. 195-197.

10. Nahavani, The Last Shah of Iran, Fatal Countdown of a Great Patriot Betrayed by the Free World and a Country Whose Fault Was Success, Translated to English by Steeve Reed, Berkshire: Aquilion Ltd, 2005, pp. 224-226, p. 240 and p. 345.

11. For further information on the details of Israeli foreign policy towards Iran see Trita Parsi, “Israel and the Origins of Iran’s Arab Option, Dissection of a Strategy Misunderstood,” Presented at the 2005 Middle East and Central Asia Politics, Economics, and Society Conference, Salt Lake City, 2005.

12. Mohammad Reza Agharebparast, “Priorities of Israeli Foreign Policy towards

Iran,” Rahavard Siasi (in Persian), No. 18, 2007, pp. 5-6.

13. Sobhani, op. cit., p. 19.

14. Parsi, op. cit., p. 6.

15. Ibid., pp. 4-7.

16. In order to get more information about the Shah’s meetings with Israeli officials see Segev, op. cit.

17. Due to the indifference of major global powers and Western states to this proposal, Iran never made any reference to this proposal again and since 1950 recognized the Israeli government.

18. This argument is based on Mr. Hussein Shahusseini’s deductions from outlooks of Dr. Mossadiq towards Israel. Mr. Hussein Shahusseini was a member of the second national front and expressed his ideas in an exclusive interview with the present author in August 21, 2005 in Tehran.

19. Eshagh Emran Shaoul, Cultural Values and Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Iran: The Case of Iran’s Recognition of Israel (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation), Washington DC: George Washington University, 1971, p. 246.

20. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Mission for my Country, New York and London: McGraw-Hill Company, Inc, 1961, p. 30.

21. Shaoul, op. cit., p. 120.

22. Such an idea about the establishment of the Jewish state in the Middle East had been expressed by Enayatollah Sami’ei, Reza Shah’ foreign minister in late 1930s (Velayati, op. cit., p. 158). Following the establishment of the state of Israel and during Mohammad Reza Shah’s reign, this ides was one of the effective factors that made Iranian foreign policy officials interested in proximity with Israel (Sobhani, op. cit., p. 8).

23. Daryoush Homayoun, “Under the Light of New developments,” Bamshad, 25

July - 1 August, 1967, pp. 16-17.

24. Alam, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 79 and Vol. 1, p. 354.

25. Pahlavi, Collection of Speeches, Statements, Interviews, and Remarks of His

Majesty Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, op. cit., Vol. 5, pp. 4407-4408.

26. Daryoush Homayoun, “The Collapse of the Policy of Revenge,” Bamshad, 11

July - 18 July, 1967, p. 15.

27. For instance, the Shah in an interview in 1969 pointed out that Iran is completely sympathizing with Arabs. He also emphasized that Israel should withdraw its forces from territories which had been occupied in June 1967. At the same time, the Shah believed that Israel’s right of existence and the security of Israeli borders should be respected (See Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Iranian Foreign Relations in

1969, Tehran: Office of Journals and Publications, 1970, p. 252.

28. For more information in this regard see the introduction written by Homayoun

Katouzian to political memoirs of Khalil Maleki (Khalil Maleki, “The Issue of Arabs and Israelis,” Nabard-e Zendegi Journal (in Persian), January 1981, pp. 35-80.

29. Both Khalil Maleki and Hussein Malek published numerous articles about Kibbutz and praised what they called the Israeli socialism. Khalil Maleki’s articles were published in two journals of Elm va Zendegi and Nabarde Zendegi during

1950s and attracted the attention of many individuals (for instance, see the monthly of Elm va Zendegi, April and May 1953 and the monthly of Nabarde Zendegi, January 1958 and March 1961). Jalal Al-e Ahmad, too, has referred to Kibbutz and modern common systems in Israel as major factors that attracted his attention and the attention of his fellow socialists to Israel (Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Journey to the Land of Ezraeil, Tehran: Ravagh Publications, First Edition, 1984, p. 59.

30. Shaoul, op. cit., p. 161.

31. For further studies about the policy of the Soviet Union towards Israel since the establishment of the state of Israel until the mid-1950s, see Uri Bialer, Between East and West: Israel’s Foreign Policy Orientation 1948–1956, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

32. Al-e Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 47-50.

33. Maleki, op. cit., p. 18.

34. It is quite interesting that Assadollah Alam, Minister of Court and a close advisor  of  the  Shah,  had  told  him  that  Israel  is,  in  fact,  the  symbol  of  “real socialism”  and  a  country  that  can  be considered  by  Iran  as  a  reliable  regional partner. This was an idea which was shared by indigenous - oriented socialists. Anyhow, Alam’s emphasis that Israel should be considered as the symbol of “real socialism” is a vitally important issue (Alam, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 354).

35. Maleki, op. cit, p. 18.

36. Ale Ahmad, op. cit., pp. 61-62.

37. Ibid.

38. Maleki, op. cit., p. 18.

39. Ibid., pp. 32-33.

40. Ali Asghar Haj Seyed Javadi, “The Reality of a Confrontation,” Negin Journal

(in Persian), September 1975, p. 40.

41. In order to get more acquainted with anti-Israeli activities and speeches of Ayatollah Kashani, see Seyed Jalaloddin Madani, Islamic Iran against the Zionism, Tehran: Soroush Publications, 1984.

42. This kind of attitude persisted so many years after the establishment of the state of Israel and the start of the Islamic movement of Imam Khomeini (RA). During his years of exile in Najaf, Imam Khomeini (RA) was concentrated on improving this kind   of   attitude   towards   the   issue   of   Palestine   (See   Seyed   Ali   Akbar

Mohtashamipour, Memories of Seyed Ali Akbar Mohtashamipour, Tehran: Office of the Literature of the Islamic Revolution, 1997, pp. 356 and 500.

43.  Gholam  Reza  Saeedi  was  a  religious  scholar  and  author.  He  published numerous articles in A’ein Eslam and Nedaye Haq newspapers during 1950s in which he criticized Israel and the performance of Jews in Iran. A collection of his articles was published in 1956 (See Gholam Reza Saeedi, Danger of Jews for the Islamic World and Iran, Vol. 2, Tehran: Me’raj Publications, 1972.

44. Sander L. Gilman and Steven T. Katz (eds.), Anti-Semitism on Times of Crisis, New York and London: New York University Press, 1991, p. 367.

45. Imam Rouhollah Khomeini (RA), Palestine in Imam Khomeini’s Outlook, Tehran: Institute of Publication and Compilation of Imam Khomeini (RA)’s Works,

1999, pp. 7-12.

46.   Amir   Mohammad   Haji   Yousefi,   Iran   and   the   Zionist   Regime,   from

Collaboration  to  Confrontation,  Tehran:  Imam  Sadeiq  University  Publications,

2003, pp. 190-191.

47. Madani, op. cit., pp. 125-126.

48. Haji Yousefi, op. cit., p. 179.

49. Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, The Issue of Palestine and Zionism: Remarks of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Tehran: Organization of Islamic Propaganda, 2000, pp. 121-123.

50. Interview with CNN, January 7, 1998.