Ashraf Ashrafpour

The geopolitics of the contemporary Persian Gulf was dominated by a triangular conflict between the three most powerful states of the region: Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In the Cold War era, Persian Gulf region was one of the most important centres of two superpowers’ rivalry. Some analysts in the late 1970s believed that Persian Gulf region was the only vital region of the U.S. and Soviet Union strife struggling to obtain higher position through increasing their influence on regional states.

The U.S. by reason of its dominance over Iran and the Persian Gulf’s south shore states took strongest and higher position in comparison with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, formation of regional balance of power was the main and basic part of the U.S. and the Soviet Union foreign policy in the region.

The end of the Cold War presented the United States with an opportunity to pursue a fundamentally different type of strategy in that region; a policy of friendly but more detached and contingent relations with the regional states, in distinction to the existing U.S. policy of close and enduring political, military, and personal ties with friendly regimes.

The Clinton administration identified both Iraq and Iran as significant threats to America’s interests in the region. It developed a policy, known as ‘dual containment’, to deal with those threats by isolating both countries regionally, cutting them off from the world economic and trading system, and encouraging a regime change in Iraq.

In the 1990s, Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries started to strengthen their military power and armament. It seems there were two reasons to do so. First, they had no other choice to protect and defend themselves against any possible threats. Second, to satisfy the United States. As they requested the U.S. to establish security in the region, they wanted to accomplish their own share.

While political and security elites in Persian Gulf countries are trying to perfect an international power balance in the region, the entire Middle East is undergoing a socio-political transformation that is largely bypassing traditional forms of “Realpolitik”. Amid the hyperbole regarding Iran’s nuclear program and Iraq’s continuing chaos, a much larger and potentially more explosive phenomenon has been steadily developing from Northern Africa to the Persian Gulf. The transition from authoritarian controlled states to more open societies, alongside a population boom that could lead to high rates of unemployment and economic stagnation throughout the region over the next several years.

Yet the 2003 Iraq War has created an entirely new situation since the indefinite U.S. presence has virtually transformed the triangle into a square. Yet in reality this impression is misleading because Iraq's role has actually been usurped by the United States. This has resulted in a new, artificial triangle comprised of the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia.

Strangely enough, within this new triangle, external, or at least non-Arab powers, i.e., the U.S. and Iran, are the most powerful actors, even hinting at the emergence of a bilateral system. Nevertheless, history, tradition, and geography would suppose a renaissance of the traditional triangle. Washington would probably not object to an Iraq acting as its strategic partner in the region as imperial Iran did in the 1970s.

After the 2003 Iraq War, the order of Persian Gulf has changed and new conditions dominate the region. Strategic equilibrium order and balance of power have entirely indisposed and regional states’ place in power equations has totally changed. The states which were powerfully ordaining the Persian Gulf’s affairs, are now under internal and external pressures and instead of them, small states that could not play any important role in regional order, have been U.S.’s political and martial bases such as Bahrain.

Iran’s influence in Iraq and the possibility of any collaboration between the U.S. and Iran to obtain mutual benefits have worried the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. They assume that kind of cooperation will not be whole some for their security, especially with considering progressive process of the Shiite geopolitics in the region.

It seems that the greatest danger in the Persian Gulf is not a nuclear Iran or a traditional threat of conventional invasion, but rather internal socio-economic and political changes that might be increasingly hard for leaders to direct or control. Regionally, the greatest threat is not strategic Weapons of Mass Destruction attacks, but the fragmentation and weakening of the central Saudi state, Iraqi civil war and dissolution and growing radicalism via violent forms of politicized Islam in the Arab states of the Persian Gulf including increased levels of trans-national violence and terrorism.

A stable regional order in the Persian Gulf is a critical necessity for stability in the Middle East. Such an order would be an outcome of the policies of Iran, the United States and the other states of the Persian Gulf. Today, the security preference of most regional governments is to re-establish the kind of balance of power in the Persian Gulf they once felt comfortable under, a balance maintained by friendly relations with a major regional power and backed up by a more distant US presence.

At last, the Arab Spring has transformed the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East at large, ushering in a new era of uncertainty for the entire region and has forced a reassessment of the national security priorities of countries across the region.

The Arab regimes of the region are now scrambling to buy off popular discontent with salary increases, new state subsidy packages and fake promises of political reform. Simultaneously, new recognition has been given to democratic movements and the aspirations of millions of Arab and Muslims who seek political freedom, social justice and dignity.  The result of these movements is forming a new political order that is emerging on the horizon, where the theme of change and democracy is now at the centre of the politics of the region which will ultimately shape the new regional order.

Under the current situation, if nothing serious happens, such as the regime change in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait or the other states of the Persian Gulf region, one should perceive that to reinstall regional security, the best path to establish regional order in the Persian Gulf region is to restore a sort of balance of power which would be consisted of Iran, Saudi Arabia and United States as an extra-regional power.

Amongst regional states, Iran, due to its political and military power, and Saudi Arabia, due to its economic power, are the two countries which able to play the mentioned role. And the United States due to its influence on regional politics and the power to deter any aggressive state which may have tendency to violate the region such as Iraq under Saddam did so, still is the best choice to be the third leg of this triangle. But a very important precondition must be made.

America should accept the significant role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the region’s security and change its foreign policy regarding Iran. President Obama seemed to be determined to do so, but has been unsuccessful so far. May it will happen in the next America’s administration if Ron Paul, one of the candidates of U.S. 2012 Presidential election, wins the vote of Americans. He encourages friendly engagement with Iran and has stated that friendship is the best way to deal with Iran.

Ashraf Ashrafpour is a Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies (IMESS)